Opinion
NUMBER 13-17-00643-CV
04-26-2018
RANDALL STONE, Appellant, v. COMMERCE & INDUSTRY INSURANCE, Appellee.
On appeal from the 24th District Court of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
In appellate cause number 13-17-00643-CV, appellant Randall Stone attempts to appeal from the trial court's order granting appellee Commerce & Industry Insurance's plea to the jurisdiction. Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, claiming that the trial court's order granting its plea to the jurisdiction is not a final, appealable order. We will grant appellee's motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant sustained an on-the-job injury resulting from a motor vehicle accident. Appellee was the worker's compensation carrier for appellant's employer. Appellant submitted a claim for worker's compensation. Thereafter, a hearing officer for the Texas Department of Insurance—Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) held a contested hearing to decide the disputed issues related to appellant's compensable injury. The hearing officer decided: (1) the date on which appellant reached maximum medical improvement; (2) appellant's impairment rating; (3) applicable dates relating to appellant's disability; and (4) an average weekly wage. An appeals panel for the Division affirmed the hearing officer's decision and order. Thereafter, appellant timely filed suit against appellee seeking judicial review of the appeal panel's determination. Appellee answered the lawsuit and simultaneously presented a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider any issue other than whether appellant had reached maximum medical improvement. The trial court accepted appellee's position and granted the plea.
In its order granting the plea, the trial court specifically stated that "this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider any of [appellant's] claims, or any issues, except whether [appellant] has reached maximum medical improvement." The order concluded by stating that "[a]ll relief not specifically granted herein is denied"—a statement commonly referred to as a Mother Hubbard clause. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's order, in response to which appellee files a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
II. JURISDICTION
Generally, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order that is not considered "final." See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record. See id. Whether an order is final must be determined from its language and the record in the case. See id. There must be a clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.
There are a few statutory exceptions to the general rule that a judgment must dispose of all parties and claims to be final and appealable. One exception exists when an order grants or denies a government's plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). In that situation, the order is appealable even though other parties or claims may still be pending in the trial court. See id. Appellee is a private insurance carrier—not a governmental unit—so this exception does not apply here.
See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. 2001) (holding that order that did not indicate that it was a final judgment and did not dispose of all pending claims and parties was not a final, appealable judgment); see also id. (holding that order stating that plaintiffs took nothing as to "one of the defendants" was not a final, appealable judgment because the defendant named in order was not the only defendant remaining in the case).
Here, the trial court granted appellee's plea to the jurisdiction as to all of appellant's claims, "except whether [appellant] has reached maximum medical improvement." Therefore, by its express language, the order is not final until the issue of whether appellant reached maximum medical improvement is resolved by the trial court. See id. at 200 (observing that "[i]f a court has dismissed all of the claims in a case but one, an order determining the last claim is final"). Appellant may choose to appeal the trial court's order granting the plea to the jurisdiction once the issue of medical improvement has been finally resolved by the trial court.
Appellant argues that the language "all relief not specifically granted herein is denied" indicates that the order is final, regardless of whatever else the order says. However, the Texas Supreme Court rejected appellant's argument in Lehmann when it held that "inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause—by which we mean the statement, "all relief not granted is denied", or essentially those words—does not indicate that a judgment rendered . . . is final for purposes of appeal." Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d 191, 203-04 (Tex. 2001).
III. CONCLUSION
We grant appellee's motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal in cause number 13-17-00643-CV for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
As per our order issued simultaneously herewith, appellant will not bear any cost associated with this appeal because he is indigent.
/s/ Rogelio Valdez
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice Delivered and filed the 26th day of April, 2018.