Opinion
No. 48A04-1101-DR-51
09-15-2011
MICHAEL J. STOHLER, Appellant-Respondent, v. MARY ANNE STOHLER, Appellee-Petitioner.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : DAVID W. STONE IV Stone Law Office & Legal Research Anderson, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : JASON A. CHILDERS ANGELA WARNER SIMS Hulse Lacey Hardacre, Austin, Sims & Childers, P.C. Anderson, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
DAVID W. STONE IV
Stone Law Office & Legal Research
Anderson, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JASON A. CHILDERS
ANGELA WARNER SIMS
Hulse Lacey Hardacre, Austin,
Sims & Childers, P.C.
Anderson, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable G. George Pancol, Judge
The Honorable Jack L. Brinkman, Master Commissioner
Cause No. 48D02-0211-DR-940
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD , Judge
Appellant-Respondent Michael Stohler ("Husband") appeals from the trial court's order following the dissolution of his marriage to Appellee-Petitioner Mary Anne Stohler ("Wife"). Husband contends that the trial court erred in determining his income, apportioning educational expenses for the couple's daughter, imposing liability for a portion of one of the couple's son's college expenses, and apportioning educational tax credits. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Husband and Wife's divorce became final on July 13, 2005, pursuant to a final settlement agreement ("the Agreement") entered into by both parties. Husband and Wife had three children during the course of their marriage: James, born February 1, 1986, Maria, born June 4, 1987, and Benjamin, born January 9, 1991. At the time of the divorce, James was attending Purdue University and Maria was expected to begin college in August of 2005. The parties agreed that James and Maria would be responsible for twenty percent of their college expenses with Husband responsible for eighty percent of the balance and Wife twenty percent. The Agreement provided that "the limitation for the parents shall be a State supported public school" and that "[b]oth James and Maria shall apply for all financial aid, grants and scholarships that are available." Appellant's App. p. 19.
James graduated from Purdue in 2009, having taken nine semesters to complete his degree and having had taken flight lessons, which were not required and for which he received no academic credit. The total cost of James's education was $68,597.95, and he received $24,581.00 in grants and scholarships. Maria matriculated at Notre Dame University, graduating in May of 2009. As part of Maria's studies, she traveled to Egypt in the summer of 2008, a trip during which she earned academic credit. The cost of Maria's undergraduate education was in excess of $166,000.00. In addition to scholarships and grants, Maria had received $36,613.00 from her godfather for her education.
On October 21, 2009, Wife filed a petition to modify decree of dissolution and an affidavit for contempt citation, in which she alleged that Husband had failed to make property settlement payments, contribute to James's and Maria's education, and timely and consistently pay child support. On October 13, 2010, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued its findings and recommendations.
The trial court concluded, inter alia, that the cost of James's ninth semester should be included in the education costs for which Husband and Wife would be partially liable but that Husband and Wife would not be liable for any of the costs of James's flight lessons or Maria's trip to Egypt. The trial court noted that the parties agreed that the approximate cost of Maria's education had she attended Purdue should be used to fix their liability for those costs and found that approximate cost to be $63,557.20. The trial court found that Maria would have received scholarships and grants in amounts comparable to those received by James and so reduced the estimated cost by $24,581.00, leaving a balance of $38,976.20.
The trial court found, after crediting Husband for previous payments and concluding that he was liable for eighty percent of the costs of James's education and Maria's adjusted costs, that Husband's total liability for education costs was $51,860.20. The trial court also ordered that Benjamin, who is a special needs student and was to matriculate at Ball State University in the autumn of 2010, would be responsible for twenty percent of his education costs with Husband responsible for seventy percent of the balance and Wife thirty percent. The trial court also found that Husband's weekly gross income was $1371.00 and that Wife's was $715.00.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
When, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply the following two-tiered standard of review: we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and the findings support the judgment. Clark v. Crowe, 778 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions thereon will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous, that is, if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. Id. at 839-40. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. at 840. This court neither reweighs the evidence nor assesses the credibility of witnesses, but considers only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Id.
I. Whether the Trial Court Erred in
Determining Husband's Weekly Income
"When we review the calculation of a parent's income, we will not reverse the trial court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous." Eppler v. Eppler, 837 N.E.2d 167, 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Naggatz v. Beckwith, 809 N.E.2d 899, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans denied. "If the trial court's income figure includes the income required by our Child Support Guidelines and 'falls within the scope of the evidence presented at the hearing,' the trial court's determination is not clearly erroneous." Id. at 173 (citing Naggatz, 809 N.E.2d at 903).
Husband contends that the trial court's finding that his weekly gross income was $1371.00 was clearly erroneous. Husband himself, however, tendered to the trial court a child support obligation worksheet dated March 20, 2010, in which his weekly gross income was listed at $1371.52. It seems that the trial court did nothing more than adopt Husband's own estimate of his weekly income. The trial court's finding regarding Husband's weekly income is not clearly erroneous.
II. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Determining the Amount
Husband Must Reimburse Wife for Maria's Educational Expenses
Husband contends that the trial court erred in failing to take into account the approximately $36,000 Maria received from her godfather for educational expenses and the alleged fact that she qualified for a full scholarship to attend Indiana University. "[W]hen the apportionment of college expenses is at issue, the clearly erroneous standard articulated in [In Matter of Paternity of Humphrey, 583 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 1991)] governs appellate review." Carr v. Carr, 600 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ind. 1992). "[W]e will affirm the trial court unless the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances which were before it." Id. (citing Humphrey, 583 N.E.2d at 134). "Although a parent is under absolutely no legal duty to provide a college education for his children, a court may nevertheless order a parent to pay part or all of such costs when appropriate." Gilbert v. Gilbert, 777 N.E.2d 785, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Indiana Code Section 31-16-6-2(a) provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he child support order or an educational support order may also include, where appropriate[,] amounts for the child's education in elementary and secondary schools and at institutions of higher learning, taking into account[] the child's aptitude and ability[.]"
A. Godfather's Contribution
As previously mentioned, Maria's godfather contributed approximately $36,000 to Maria's education. Husband contends that the trial court should have used this contribution to offset the parents' liability for Maria's education instead of Maria's. Indiana Child Support Guideline 8(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The authority of the court to award post-secondary educational expenses is derived from IC 31-16-6-2. It is discretionary with the court to award post-secondary educational expenses and in what amount. In making such a decision, the court should consider post-secondary education to be a group effort, and weigh the ability of each parent to contribute to payment of the expense, as well as the ability of the student to pay a portion of the expense.
If the court determines that an award of post-secondary educational expenses is appropriate, it should apportion the expenses between the parents and the child, taking into consideration the incomes and overall financial condition of the parents and the child, education gifts, education trust funds, and any other education savings program. The court should also take into consideration scholarships, grants, student loans, summer and school year employment and other cost-reducing programs available to the student. These latter sources of assistance should be credited to the child's share of the educational expense unless the court determines that it should credit a portion of any scholarships, grants and loans to either or both parents' share(s) of the education expense.
Husband's argument is essentially that, because the Child Support Guidelines favor that "scholarships, grants, student loans, summer and school year employment and other cost-reducing programs available to the student" be credited to the student's share of expenses, there is a presumption that any other outside funding should be credited to the parents' share. Child Supp. G. 8(b). The Guideline language simply does not support this conclusion, favoring apportionment of funds such as gifts to neither the parents nor the child. The Guidelines require only that the trial court "tak[e] into consideration the incomes and overall financial condition of the parents and the child, education gifts, education trust funds, and any other education savings program." Child Supp. G. 8(b). Husband neither establishes that the trial court failed to take the gift into consideration nor offers any reason why the credit for the gift should not have been credited against Maria's share of her educational costs.
Indeed, the record clearly indicates that Maria's godfather intended the money to defray her costs, not her parents'. Maria's godfather wrote Husband a letter that contained an accounting of "monies to re-imburse [sic] Maria for expenses incurred at Univ. ND during the years of 2005, 2006, 2007." Appellee's App. p. 19. Additionally, Maria testified that she understood that the money was her benefit, not her parents'. Husband has failed to establish that the trial court erred in this regard.
B. Scholarship
Husband testified at the hearing that Maria had qualified for a full academic scholarship to Indiana University, an opportunity that he argues should relieve him of all responsibility for her educational costs. We note that Husband produced no documentary evidence of this, Maria was not asked about this alleged scholarship when she was on the stand, the trial court did not find that Maria had been awarded a scholarship to Indiana, and Wife does not concede that such a scholarship was offered to Maria. The trial court was under no obligation to credit Husband's testimony in this regard, and apparently did not. Husband's argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, one that we decline.
III. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in its
Allocation of Benjamin's Educational Expenses
Husband argues that he has been ordered to pay an inappropriately large share of Benjamin's educational expenses and that the trial court erred in failing to condition Husband's liability on Benjamin maintaining a minimum GPA and completing his postgraduate studies in eight semesters.
A. Disproportionate Share
As previously mentioned, the trial court ordered Husband to pay seventy percent of the parental share of Benjamin's educational expenses and Wife thirty percent. As previously mentioned, the trial court found that Husband's weekly gross income was $1371.00 and that Wife's was $715.00, which translates to Husband earning sixty-six percent of the parents' total weekly income and Wife thirty-four percent. The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that "[w]hile the statutes and our guidelines do not require apportionment [of educational expenses] based on precise parity, they do require rough proportionality." Carr, 600 N.E.2d at 946. Even so, we are not prepared to say that a four-percent disparity is close enough under the circumstances of this case. Assuming that Benjamin's education at Ball State ends up costing approximately $60,000 and based on the latest income figures, Husband would end up spending $2400 more than his proportionate share and Wife $2400 less than hers. We cannot say that a swing of $4800 is trivial, and so remand for revision of the trial court's order such that Husband is responsible for sixty-six percent of Benjamin's education costs and Wife thirty-four percent.
Ball State University's website estimated total costs for instate students for 2010-11 to be $15,748. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY, http://cms.bsu.edu/AdmissionsLanding/TuitionandFees.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
B. Minimum GPA and Eight-Semester Requirements
Husband also contends that his liability for Benjamin's education should be conditioned upon Benjamin maintaining a minimum GPA and completing his undergraduate studies in four years. "The court should require that a student maintain a certain minimum level of academic performance to remain eligible for parental assistance and should include such a provision in its order." Child Sup. G. 8(b). Husband argues that Guideline 8 essentially requires the trial court to establish a minimum GPA. However, this court, in Deckard v. Deckard, 841 N.E.2d 194, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), rejected this very argument, and we see no reason to depart from our prior holding. In Deckard, while we encouraged trial courts to set minimum academic standards, we concluded that "whether a minimum grade point average is appropriate and, if so, the precise level of that grade point average, should be determined on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 202 n.6.
Husband also argues that the trial court's failure to establish minimum GPA requirements and limit his liability for Benjamin's education to eight semesters was erroneous in light of Benjamin's status as a special needs student. Husband argues that it is by no means clear that Benjamin has the ability to complete an undergraduate program at all, much less in eight semesters. While this may be true, we cannot say that the trial court erred in this regard.
Minimum GPA requirements seem fairly obviously intended to encourage a child to take responsibility for his or her education and put forth a good-faith effort if the parents are to be compelled to pay for it. Such requirements seem to assume that if the child has failed to achieve minimum academic standards, it was most likely due to a lack of effort. That assumption does not apply with equal force in this case. Put another way, it is entirely possible that Benjamin could put Herculean effort into his studies and still not excel, through no fault of his own. By the same token, if Benjamin requires nine or ten semesters to graduate, again through no fault his own and after putting forth good effort, Husband does not explain why it would be fair for only Benjamin and/or Wife to be responsible for the additional semesters. The trial court did not err in refusing to impose a minimum GPA on Benjamin or limiting Husband's liability for his education to eight semesters.
IV. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Failing to Award
Husband a Setoff for Tax Credits Received by Wife
Husband contends that the trial court improperly denied him the benefit of education tax credits received by Wife in 2008 and 2009 related to James's and Maria's education expenses in the total amount of $2181.00. Eighty percent of the credits would come to $1744.80. Again, we are not prepared to say that this is a trivial amount of money. The trial court determined that Husband's liability for education costs related to James and Maria was $51,860.20. Wife's share, or twenty percent of the total parental liability, would then be $12,965.05. Allocating the 2008 and 2009 education tax credits entirely to Wife reduces her net liability to $10,784.05, effectively reducing her percentage liability to seventeen percent of total parental liability while increasing Husband's to eighty-three percent. The parties, however, agreed that Husband would pay eighty percent and Wife twenty percent. We remand with instructions to reduce Husband's liability for John's and Maria's education costs by an amount equal to eighty percent of the 2008 and 2009 education tax credits, or $1744.80.
Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court did not err in determining Husband's income or apportioning Maria's educational expenses. The trial court did err, however, in apportioning liability for Benjamin's college expenses and apportioning educational tax credits received by Wife. We remand with instructions to order that Husband pay sixty-six percent of the parental share of Benjamin's educational expenses and that Husband's liability for James's and Maria's educational expenses be offset by $1744.80.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. ROBB, C.J., and BARNES, J., concur.