Opinion
No. C 02-2414 MEJ
November 7, 2002
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are: 1) Defendant SIACI's ("SIACI") Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue, filed on August 21, 2002; 2) Defendant La Chambre Syndicale Du Demenagement's ("La Chambre") Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue, filed on October 2, 2002; and 3) Defendant TISON, S.A., UTS-TISON, S.A and TISON SARL's ("TISON") Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue, filed on October 2, 2002. Having considered the parties' submissions, oral arguments at the November 7, 2002 hearing, relevant case law and statutory authority, and Good Cause appearing, the Court DISMISSED Plaintiffs' complaint at the November 7, 2002 hearing for the reasons set forth more fully below.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiffs Ian Stock, Man-Helene Stock, Nicholas Stock, Daphne Brun, Alban Brun, Thomas Stock, Charles Stock and Alexander Stock ("Plaintiffs") currently reside at 1981 Branciforte Dr., Santa Cruz, California. Each of the Plaintiffs except Alexander Stock, who was born in Santa Cruz on January 22, 1998, resided until June 21, 1997 at La Ballanderie in Saint Hilarion, France.
TISON, S.A. is the incorporation name of UTS-TISON and TISON SARL. TISON, S.A., LTTS-TISON and TISON SARL are one entity; they do not have separate corporate identities. TISON is a moving company and a French corporation with its principal place of business in Maurepas, France. TISON is not registered to do business in California, does not hold licenses in California, does not own or rent property in California, has not appointed an agent for service of process in California, does not have corporate officers or employees domiciled in California, does not conduct director or shareholder meetings in California, does not own, operate or charter any vessels which are registered in or call at ports in California, does not have bank accounts or telephone numbers in California and does not advertise or solicit business in California. Plaintiffs allege that TISON estimated the cost and Marie-Helene Stock accepted TISON's estimate of the cost of the family's planned move from their home in France to California. The parties entered into a contract for FF 48,316 ($8,278.82).
Defendant SIACI is an insurance broker and a French corporation with its principal place of business in Paris, France. SIACI is not registered to do business in California, does not hold licenses in California, does not own or rent property in California, has not appointed an agent for service of process in California, does not have corporate officers or employees domiciled in California, does not conduct director or shareholder meetings in California, does not own, operate or charter any vessels which are registered in or call at ports in California, does not have bank accounts or telephone numbers in California and does not advertise or solicit business in California.
SIACI was the insurance broker of record for AGS Holdings, a French policy holder. SIACI obtained insurance from various French insurers for AGS Holdings' account. SIACI's relationship with the TISON entities arose in France by virtue of its relationship as the broker for AGS Holdings, their parent company. The TISON entities were insureds under AGS Holdings' policy. Plaintiffs allege that, of the FF 48, 316 contract price, FF 9,000 ($1,542.13) was paid for FF 600,000 ($102,808.38) of insurance coverage.
Defendant La Chambre Syndicale is a French trade union with French moving companies as its members. La Chambre's principal place of business is in Paris, France. It has no employees or offices in California, maintains no financial accounts, telephone or mailing addresses in California, and has never been authorized to conduct business in California. Also, none of the officers, directors or employees of La Chambre reside within California. Plaintiffs allege that La Chambre presented itself in France as offering reassurances to families if they used La Chambre member companies to move their furniture, in particular offering to indemnify and make whole any of its member companies' customers' losses attributable to the financial failings of any one of its moving company members.
According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs engaged TISON to move their furniture and affairs from their home near Paris to the Port of Oakland in June of 1997. The contract with TISON provided for moving the furniture, including insurance coverage, at a cost of FF 48,316 ($8,278.82). Plaintiffs allege that they arranged for substantial insurance coverage through TISON and that SIACI furnished the insurance. Plaintiffs withheld FF 5,000 ($856.74) of the contract price, alleging that the furniture did not fit into the container on the day of departure and because the inventory was incorrect.
Plaintiffs arrived in Santa Cruz on June 28, 1997 and allege that TISON did not ship the furniture to them until October 2000. Plaintiffs further allege that the furniture and affairs arrived in complete disarray and with significant damage. Plaintiffs state that the furniture arrived in Oakland, California in a sealed container and was immediately hauled to Santa Cruz and unloaded. Plaintiffs allege that, during the three-plus year period between engaging TISON and the actual delivery of the furniture, TISON threatened Plaintiffs with the judicial sale of their furniture in France if they did not pay increasingly extortionate bills, attempted to denounce Plaintiffs to the French tax authorities and delayed in bad faith Plaintiffs suit to compel delivery. Plaintiffs further alleged that La Chambre reneged on its promises to intervene to settle Plaintiffs' dispute with TISON and refused to compensate Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also allege that adjusters appointed by SIACI examined the damage suffered during the move and refused to pay for the damage suffered to their furniture and affairs during the move.
B. Procedural Background
On March 28, 2002, Plaintiffs commenced this action in the Superior Court for the State of California in and for the County of Alameda, alleging breach of contract, negligence, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On May 17, 2002, SIACI removed the case to this Court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b), stating that the Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) and 1337(a), since this dispute involves the international shipment of cargo by sea and a policy of marine (cargo) insurance, complete diversity of citizenship exists according to Plaintiffs' Complaint, and therefore this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), since the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
On May 22, 2002, SIACI filed an answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. La Chambre filed its answer on June 28, 2002 and the TISON Defendants' filed an answer on August 15, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, SIACI filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue as well as a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Declarations of Forrest Booth and Jean-Yves Roy in support thereof.
On October 2, 2002, La Chambre filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue as well as a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Declaration of Ann-Michele G. Higgins in support thereof
Also on October 2, 2002, the TISON Defendants filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue, and for Summary Judgment, as well as a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Declaration of Forest Booth in support thereof.
On October 17, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Three Motions to Quash and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue, as well as the Declarations of Ian Stock and Marie-Helene Stock in Support Thereof. Also on October 17, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Lengthen Time Before Hearing the TISON Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Application for Filing Papers in opposition to said motion.
On October 22, 2002, SIACI and the TISON Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motions to Quash Service and to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue.
On October 23, 2002, the Court granted Plaintiffs'motion to lengthen the time before hearing the TISON Defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted Plaintiffs' application for deferral of deadline for filing papers in opposition to said summary judgment motion. The Court set a hearing date for January 9, 2003.
On November 7, 2002, the Court held a hearing on the matter.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
California's long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See Cal.Civ. Code 410.10. Thus, this Court need only analyze whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with constitutional constraints. Defendants must have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). A defendant's activities involving the forum state should be such that the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). If the defendant's activities in the forum state are `substantial', or `continuous and systematic', a federal court can exercise general jurisdiction over it as to any cause of action, even if it arises out of an activity unrelated to the defendant's contact with the state. Bancroft Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the defendant's activities are not sufficient for general jurisdiction, it may still be subject to specific jurisdiction. Id. A court may exercise specific jurisdiction if the foreign party purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, the cause of action arises out of the forum-related activity, and the forum's exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985).
"The party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists." Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). "When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff is `obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction.'" Id. (citation omitted).
1. General Jurisdiction
"A defendant whose contacts with a state are "substantial' or "continuous and systematic' can be haled into court in that state in any action, even if the action is unrelated to those contacts." Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984)). However, Courts "regularly have declined to find general jurisdiction even where the contacts were quite extensive." Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1993).
"The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is `fairly high' . . . and requires that the defendant's contacts be of the sort that approximates physical presence." Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1086 (citations omitted). In evaluating physical presence, the Court considers several factors, including whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the state's markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated there. Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986).
2. Specific Jurisdiction
The existence of specific jurisdiction is determined by the application of a three-part test:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.Panavision Int'l. L.P. 141 F.3d at 1320.
B. This Court's Jurisdiction Over TISON
In its motion, TISON argues that the Court lacks both general and specific jurisdiction over it.
1. General Jurisdiction
First, TISON argues that it has not had continuous or systematic contact with California warranting the exercise of general jurisdiction. TISON states that it is not and has not been registered to do business in California, does not hold licenses in California, does not own or rent property in California, has not appointed an agent for service of process in California, does not have corporate officers domiciled in California, does not conduct director or sharehold meetings in California, does not own, operate or charter any vessels which call at ports in California, does not have bank accounts in California, does not advertise or solicit business, and does not have employees in Calfornia.
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction over Defendant exists. Scott, 792 F.2d at 927. Here, Plaintiff makes no argument in support of general jurisdiction over TISON. Nor does the Court find any indication that TISON's contacts with California are substantial or continuous and systematic. Accordingly, general jurisdiction over TISON does not exist and the Court shall next look to specific jurisdiction.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Second, TISON argues that the Court also lacks specific jurisdiction over it. The Court shall apply the three-part test used by the Ninth Circuit as stated above in making its determination.
a. Purposeful availment
"The purposeful availment requirement ensures that a nonresident defendant will not be haled into court based upon `random, fortuitous or attenuated' contacts with the forum state." Panavision Int'l, L.P., 141 F.3d at 1320 (citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475). A foreign act
that is aimed at, and has effect in, the forum state satisfies the purposeful availment requirement. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984). This "effects test" is satisfied when a defendant has: "(1) committed an intentional act, which was (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state." Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087 (citing Panavision Int'l, L.P., 141 F.3d at 1321). A foreign act is expressly aimed at the forum state "when the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state." Id.
TISON argues that it did nothing to avail itself of the protections of California' laws or the jurisdiction of the California courts and that Plaintiffs' claims, which arose at sea or during cargo loading in France, have nothing to do with any activities in this forum. TISON further argues that nothing it did in packing and arranging for the ocean transportation of Plaintiffs' household goods in France would cause TISON to anticipate being haled into court in California.
Plaintiffs argue that TISON contracted to deliver their furniture and affairs to California and that its charter documents authorize it to do business in all countries of the world. Upon review of the parties' arguments, the Court finds that TISON's contacts with California do not satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. Marie-Helene Stock entered into the contract to arrange for the move of the family's household goods in France. At the time, Ms. Stock resided in France and the TISON entities were engaged in business in France. In addition, while TISON packed Plaintiffs' furniture for shipping, it did not perform the move of Plaintiffs' goods from France to California; rather, Plaintiffs' goods were transported by an ocean carrier aboard the vessel "NYK Kay," which is neither owned, operated nor chartered by TISON. Plaintiffs seek to impose personal jurisdiction over TISON based on the fact that TISON knew of Plaintiffs' relocation destination. However, the Court finds that TISON's act of entering into a contract with Ms. Stock was not an act expressly aimed at the state of California. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. TISON entered into a contract with a resident of France. Thus, the Court finds that the purposeful availment prong is not satisfied and it does not have specific jurisdiction over TISON. Id. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the action against TISON.
C. This Court's Jurisdiction Over SIACI
In its motion, SIACI argues that the Court lacks both general and specific jurisdiction over it.
1. General Jurisdiction
First, SIACI argues that it has not had continuous or systematic contact with California warranting the exercise of general jurisdiction. SIACI states that it is not and has not been registered to do business in California, does not hold licenses in California, does not own or rent property in California, has not appointed an agent for service of process in California, does not have corporate officers domiciled in California, does not conduct director or shareholder meetings in California, does not own, operate or charter any vessels which call at ports in California, does not have bank accounts in California, does not advertise or solicit business, and does not have employees in California.
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that jurisdiction over Defendant exists. Scott, 792 F.2d at 927. Here, Plaintiffs make no argument in support of general jurisdiction over SIACI. Nor does the Court find any indication that SIACI's contacts with California are substantial or continuous and systematic. Accordingly, general jurisdiction over SIACI does not exist and the Court shall next look to specific jurisdiction.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Second, SIACI argues that the Court also lacks specific jurisdiction over it. Again, the Court shall apply the three-part test used by the Ninth Circuit as stated above in making its determination
a. Purposeful availment
SIACI argues that it did nothing to avail itself of the protections of California's laws or the jurisdiction of the California courts and that nothing it did in arranging insurance for the AGS Holdings group of companies would cause SIACI to anticipate being haled into court in California. SIACI further argues that Plaintiffs' claims arose at sea or during cargo loading in France and have nothing to do with activities in this forum.
Plaintiffs argue that they paid SIACI over $1500 to insure Plaintiffs' move to California and that the destination of the move was not pure chance. Plaintiffs further argue that SIACI has a broad-based international network active in all five continents, and in particular in California. Upon review of the parties' arguments, the Court finds that SIACI's contacts with California do not satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. SIACI's contact with Plaintiffs arose in France by virtue of Plaintiffs arranging for the transport of their possessions with the TISON entities. Further, it is not clear that SIACI did in fact insure Plaintiffs. Rather, SIACI is engaged in business as an insurance broker and was the broker of record for AGS Holdings. AGS Holdings is the parent company of TISON. SIACI's role as broker for AGS Holdings was to procure transportation insurance coverage for AGS Holdings in its transportation operations. Plaintiffs offer no evidence to rebut SIACI's claims that it is an insurance broker, not an underwriter. Even assuming that Plaintiffs paid SIACI any type of premium for cargo insurance, payment would have taken place in France, where Plaintiffs made arrangements for transportation of their goods. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that SIACI's act of procuring transportation insurance coverage for AGS Holdings was not an act expressly aimed at the state of California. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. Thus, the Court finds that the purposeful availment prong is not satisfied and it does not have specific jurisdiction over SIACI. Id. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the action against SIACI.
D. This Court's Jurisdiction over La Chambre
In its motion, La Chambre argues that the Court lacks both general and specific jurisdiction over it.
1. General Jurisdiction
First, La Chambre argues that it has not had continuous or systematic contact with California warranting the exercise of general jurisdiction. La Chambre states that it is a French corporation with a principal place of business in Paris, France, that it serves as a trade union whose members are French moving companies, it has no employees or offices in the State of California, was not formed under the laws of California, has not consented to this Court's jurisdiction, is not a resident of California and has never been authorized to conduct business in California, maintains no financial accounts, offices, telephone or mailing addresses in California, and none of its officers, directors or employees reside within California.
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction over Defendant exists. Scott, 792 F.2d at 927. Here, Plaintiff makes no argument in support of general jurisdiction over La Chambre. Nor does the Court find any indication that La Chambre's contacts with California are substantial or continuous and systematic. Accordingly, general jurisdiction over La Chambre does not exist and the Court shall next look to specific jurisdiction.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Second, La Chambre argues that the Court also lacks specific jurisdiction over it. The Court shall apply the three-part test used by the Ninth Circuit as stated above in making its determination.
a. Purposeful availment
La Chambre argues that it has undertaken no intentional act that was expressly aimed at California and that the scope of its activities is only in France. La Chambre further argues that its website is maintained exclusively in French. La Chambre also states that it is not a moving company and only acts as a trade union for its members to represent the profession in France.
Plaintiffs argue that La Chambre's 800 members compromise two thirds of all French moving companies, all of whom make their living out of domestic and international furniture moves, and that its traditional mission of informing, promoting and defending the moving company profession will have lead to the promotion and marketing internationally of its moving company members' services. Plaintiffs further argue that if each La Chambre member makes only an average of one move a year to or from the U.S., its members make 800 moves a year involving the U.S. Plaintiffs also contend that La Chambre profits from its referrals to California moving companies because when a French moving company arranges to move furniture to California, it will in the normal course locate and give business to a California moving company, who will then do the same when moving furniture from California to France.
Upon review of the parties' arguments, the Court finds that La Chambre's contacts with California do not satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. La Chambre is not a moving company itself, but only acts as a trade union for its members in France. Plaintiffs' complaint centers on a contract entered into between Marie-Helene Stock, a resident of France at the time she entered into the contract, and TISON, one of La Chambre's members. Plaintiffs seek to impose personal jurisdiction over La Chambre based on the fact that moving companies are international and, therefore, La Chambre should know that the companies it represents do business in and the effects of which are felt in California. However, the Court finds that La Chambre's act of acting as a trade union representative of TISON in France is not an act expressly aimed at the state of California. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. Thus, the Court finds that the purposeful availment prong is not satisfied and it does not have specific jurisdiction over La Chambre. Id. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the action against La Chambre.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over all named Defendants. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendants' contacts with California are of the sort that approximate physical presence to confer general jurisdiction. In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prove that Defendants purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum to confer specific jurisdiction. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' three motions and dismisses Plaintiffs' complaint. Accordingly, the Court also DENIES the TISON Defendants' motion for summary judgment as moot and VACATES the January 9, 2003 hearing.
The Clerk of Court shall close the file in this matter.