Opinion
Civ. File No. 03-5528 (PAM/AJB).
September 7, 2004
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation ("RR") of United States Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan dated July 22, 2004.
The Court must conduct a de novo review of any portion of the Magistrate Judge's opinion to which specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.1(c)(2). Based on that review of the record and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's RR.
The RR recommended denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusions, arguing that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly rejected the statements of Plaintiff's treating physicians and erroneously concluded that Plaintiff's testimony was not fully credible.
Plaintiff was treated at Ramsey Medical Center on June 4, 1997, following an automobile accident. Since January 1998, Plaintiff has received treatment from various physicians and has participated in months of physical therapy. Plaintiff has suffered from neck, shoulder, back and hip pain, as well as depression and anxiety. (Tr. at 123.) Plaintiff has also been diagnosed with diabetes.
In November 2001, Dr. John Cooper, a psychologist at Plaintiff's regular clinic, examined Plaintiff and determined that "[he] appears capable of entry-level work for brief periods and brief superficial contact with coworkers in a structured setting but is clearly having trouble sustaining this for more than short periods." (Id. at 416.) Dr. Cooper gave Plaintiff a global assessment of functioning ("GAF") of 35, which "indicates major impairment in the ability to make social and occupational adjustments." (Id. at 18-19.) According to Plaintiff, Dr. Cooper's reports implied that Plaintiff was not capable of working. The ALJ discounted this opinion, because it was not supported by objective evidence in the record. As the Magistrate Judge noted, the ALJ relied on the opinions of over half a dozen treating physicians in making this determination. (RR at 23.)
The opinions provided by Plaintiff's multiple treating physicians constitute substantial evidence to allow the ALJ to disregard Dr. Cooper's opinion. For example, Dr. Wille, who saw Plaintiff in January, March, and May 1998, found that Plaintiff's shoulder condition, as well as his range of motion, continued to improve. (Id. at 308, 310.) Dr. Wille also indicated that Plaintiff could still work with restrictions. (Id. at 309.) Additionally, Dr. Lutz treated Plaintiff on numerous occasions between February and August 1998, and agreed with Dr. Wille's diagnosis. (Id. at 321, 324.) Furthermore, Dr. Mark E. Friedland examined Plaintiff in December 1999, and concluded that Plaintiff's "subjective complaints with respect to his right and left shoulders, neck, mid and low back are all far and in excess of any objective findings." (Id. at 94.) Other treating physicians also offered similar opinions that contradicted Dr. Cooper's assessment.
Judicial review of the decision denying benefits is limited to a determination of whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Morse v. Shalala, 32 F.3d 1228, 1229 (8th Cir. 1994). "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the [denial of benefits]." Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 2001). The Court must evaluate both evidence that supports and detracts from the decision to deny benefits. Id.
When evaluating the evidence, the ALJ should give more weight to the opinion of doctors who have treated the claimant regularly over a period of months or years because they have a "longitudinal picture of [the] impairment." Shontos v. Barnhart, 328 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i)). On the other hand, an ALJ may not accord a treating physician's opinion controlling weight based solely on the physician's status as the treating physician. Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 2000). An ALJ may give less weight to a treating physician's opinion when that opinion conflicts with other substantial medical evidence contained within the record. Id. at 1013.
Plaintiff argues that the Social Security Administration's utilization of medical experts who "routinely see the Claimant only once" is analogous to Dr. Cooper's opinion, and thus the ALJ and Magistrate Judge erred in discounting Dr. Cooper's opinion. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge neglected to consider Dr. Cooper's opinion that Plaintiff "is clearly having trouble sustaining this for more than short periods." (See Tr. at 416.) The Court disagrees.
The fact that Dr. Cooper only evaluated Plaintiff on one occasion was not the decisive element in the ALJ's decision to discount his opinion. Rather, it was merely one of many elements of that decision. In addition to reviewing Dr. Cooper's assessment, the ALJ also considered the numerous opinions of respected physicians who treated Plaintiff on multiple occasions. These numerous opinions contradict Dr. Cooper's assessment. Thus, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ's decision was based on the review of the evidence as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Morse, 32 F.3d at 1229. The record reflects that the ALJ correctly balanced Dr. Cooper's opinion with the other substantial medical evidence in the record.
The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain were not fully credible. The ALJ must consider various factors when deciding to discount a disability claimant's subjective complaints. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984). The Magistrate Judge held that the ALJ satisfied thePolaski standard and accordingly discredited Plaintiff's testimony of disabling pain. See Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004). As the Magistrate pointed out, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's complaint was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence in the record and that Plaintiff's allegations "have not required hospitalization, surgical intervention or other aggressive treatment." (Tr. at 21; see RR at 24.) Furthermore, Plaintiff "has maintained an active lifestyle and severe symptoms have not been documented when [Plaintiff] has taken his medications as prescribed." (RR at 25; see Tr. at 21.) The ALJ sufficiently acknowledged and considered the Polaski factors before discounting Plaintiff's subjective complaints. Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1072; (see Tr. at 21-24.)
CONCLUSION
As the statute requires, the Court has reviewed the record regarding Magistrate Judge Boylan's RR. Based on that review and all the submissions of the parties, the Court ADOPTS the RR.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 11) is DENIED; and
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.