Opinion
No. 00 Civ. 8560 (SAS)
August 16, 2002
Stephen C. Jackson, Esq., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Danielle A. Gentin, Wendy H. Schwartz, Assistant United States Attorneys, New York, NY, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
At the conclusion of the trial in the above captioned case, the jury reached a verdict in defendant's favor. A judgment was then entered dismissing the Complaint. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff moved for a new trial under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60(b). Defendant opposes this request, claiming that plaintiff's assertions in support thereof are devoid of merit. For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion is denied.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Standard Under Rule 59(a)
Rule 59(a) provides that "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). When considering a Rule 59 (a) motion, "[t]he district court ordinarily should not grant a new trial unless it is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1988). According to the Second Circuit, "[t]he judge's duty is essentially to see that there is no miscarriage of justice. If convinced that there has been then it is [her] duty to set the verdict aside; otherwise not." Bevevino v. Saydjari, 574 F.2d 676, 684 (2d Cir. 1978)
B. Standard Under Rule 60(b)
Rule 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged . . .; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). A court may not "lightly invoke the `extraordinary judicial relief' of annulling a final judgment." Batac Dev. Corp. v. BR Consultants, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 721, 2000 WL 307400, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2000) (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). Such relief should only be granted in "exceptional circumstances." Batac, 2000 WL 307400, at *3 See also Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Key Pharm., 75 F.3d 815, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1996) ("A movant under Rule 60(b) must demonstrate `exceptional circumstances' justifying the extraordinary relief requested."); Dellefave v. Access Temporaries, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6098, 2001 WL 286771, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001) ("Rule 60(b) is `extraordinary judicial relief' and can be granted `only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.'") (quoting Nemaizer, 793 F.2d at 61). The decision whether to grant a Rule 60(b) motion lies in the discretion of the district court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Jones v. Trump, 971 F. Supp. 783, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, No. 97-9017, 1998 WL 1967891 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 1998).
A Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for appeal. See Competex, S.A. v. Labow, 783 F.2d 333, 335 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, Rule 60(b) motions that simply attempt to relitigate issues and thereby circumvent the appellate process are routinely dismissed. See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, No. 99 Civ. 4303, 2000 WL 744148, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000) (denying Rule 60(b) motion where "[t]he vast bulk of [movant's] argument constitutes nothing more than a futile effort to have this Court revisit its Opinion"); Batac, 2000 WL 307400, at *3 (holding that a party "may not . . . use Rule 60(b) as a substitute for appeal or to relitigate matters already resolved by the court adversely to that party")
Although plaintiff does not specify which subsection of Rule 60(b) she is invoking, she does allege that the Government "fraudulently and/or inadvertently proffered a Stipulation of Settlement regarding the 1995 case that was not so ordered by the court. Said stipulation was illegible and did not contained [sic] the court's endorsement." See Affirmation of Stephen C. Jackson ("Jackson Aff.") at ¶ 5. In light of these allegations, the Court will construe plaintiff's motion as if brought under Rule 60(b)(3).
1. Standard for Rule 60(b)(3)
It is well established that "a Rule 60(b)(3) motion cannot be granted absent clear and convincing evidence of material misrepresentations and cannot serve as an attempt to relitigate the merits." Fleming v. New York Univ., 865 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1989). See also King v. First Am. Investigations, Inc., 287 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Fraud upon the court must be established by clear and convincing evidence.").
According to the Second Circuit, fraud upon the court "is limited to fraud which seriously affects the integrity of the normal process of adjudication" and embraces "`only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases.'" Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1325 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Kupferman v. Consolidated Research and Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Examples of conduct that meet the definition of fraud upon the court include bribery of a judge, jury tampering, or hiring an attorney for the sole purpose of improperly influencing the judge. See United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that fraud upon the court includes bribing a judge, tampering with a jury, or fraud by an officer of the court); In re Genesys Data Techs., Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 2000) (same).
C. Plaintiff's Attempt to Relitigate Her Case Must Fail
The crux of plaintiff's motion concerns evidence of a previous sexual harassment suit brought by plaintiff against another employer in 1995. Admission of this evidence, albeit damaging to plaintiff's case, does not merit a new trial. See Gonzalez v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 329, 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (precluding plaintiff from using a motion for relief from judgment to relitigate the merits of her claims of discrimination), aff'd, 101 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1996) Moreover, her allegation of fraudulent action by the Government, a serious accusation, is unsubstantiated.
Specifically, plaintiff notes that the Stipulation of Settlement in her 1995 case (Government Exhibit DG) was not so ordered by the court, in that action. See Jackson Aff. at ¶ 5. However, plaintiff and her attorney both signed the document and do not dispute that the case was settled for the amount stated at trial. See Trial Transcript ("Tr.") 281-82. The absence of the court's signature on the settlement document, an objection not raised by plaintiff at trial, is therefore irrelevant. Moreover, the Government did nothing wrong in proffering this Stipulation and certainly did not make any material misrepresentation to the Court. The jury's consideration of this evidence did not cause it to reach an erroneous result or otherwise cause a miscarriage of justice. If anything, it was plaintiff's failure to proffer credible evidence that resulted in the jury's verdict, not any fraud perpetrated by the Government. In short, the admission of a document revealing the settlement of plaintiff's prior lawsuit justifies neither a new trial under Rule 59 nor relief from judgment under Rule 60.
Plaintiff then makes several arguments that are in fact appellate issues but which I will nonetheless briefly address. First, plaintiff argues that the copy of the settlement agreement provided by the Government at trial was illegible. This claim can be summarily dismissed as the copy provided at trial was in fact legible. Moreover, plaintiff and her counsel undoubtedly possess better copies of the document which they failed to provide at any point during the trial. Indeed, it was plaintiff's failure to disclose her prior lawsuit that caused the Government to use a faxed copy of the document obtained from the State Attorney General's Office.
Plaintiff then argues that she should have been permitted to argue in summation the reasons why her 1995 lawsuit was dismissed, prior to being settled, on procedural grounds. See Jackson Aff. at ¶ 6. This claim can also be summarily dismissed. It is a fundamental principle of law that facts not in evidence cannot be argued in closing. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5172 (3d ed. 1998). Because plaintiff did not present any evidence at trial concerning the dismissal of her previous lawsuit, the Government's objection to plaintiff's attempt to introduce reasons for the dismissal at closing was properly sustained.
Finally, plaintiff claims that "[t]he evidence adduced at trial clearly established that plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action after plaintiff filed her harassment complaint." Jackson Aff. at ¶ 7. This represents nothing more than plaintiff's disagreement with the jury's decision on this claim. As plaintiff does not even attempt to assert a factual basis for reconsideration on this point, her conclusory argument must fail.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's motion is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion and this case.
SO ORDERED: