Opinion
3-12-0668
06-10-2013
AARON STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARCUS HARDY, Warden, Stateville Correctional Center, Defendant-Appellee.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
Will County, Illinois,
Appeal No. 3-12-0668
Circuit No. 11-MR-1053
Honorable
Marzell L. Richardson, Jr.,
Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lytton and O'Brien concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court properly denied Stewart's habeas corpus petition. ¶ 2 The plaintiff, Aaron Stewart, appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition. On appeal, Stewart argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition because: (1) the court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over his criminal case; (2) a default judgment should have been entered against the defendant, Marcus Hardy; and (3) the court failed to set forth findings of facts and conclusions of law to support the dismissal. We affirm.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 After a bench trial, Stewart was convicted of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1 (West 2002)) and was sentenced to 55 years' imprisonment. On October 27, 2011, Stewart filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Stewart argued that he was unlawfully confined because the initial bond court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction after 48 hours, the victim never signed the complaint, and the court lost personal jurisdiction when the original indictment was dismissed and he was convicted without the filing of a second indictment. ¶ 5 The trial court issued summons on January 3, 2012. The summons directed the defendant to file an appearance within "30 days after service." The defendant was personally served on January 18, 2012. On February 9, 2012, the defendant filed a motion, under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code), to dismiss Stewart's petition. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010). ¶ 6 On February 13, 2012, Stewart filed a motion for the entry of a default judgment. Stewart argued that the defendant had 30 days "from the date of the issuance of the summons to answer" and the time to answer had expired. On March 2, 2012, Stewart filed a traverse to strike the defendant's motion to dismiss. Stewart argued that the defendant's motion was filed after the deadline for filing a response to his habeas petition. ¶ 7 On May 11, 2012, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss Stewart's habeas petition. The court found that Stewart's petition failed to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. ¶ 8 On June 11, 2012, Stewart filed a motion to vacate the order denying his petition. The trial court denied the motion. Stewart appeals.
¶ 9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, Stewart contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for habeas corpus relief, making three arguments in support of his claim. First, Stewart argues that the court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal case as: (a) the felony complaint was not signed by the victim; (b) Stewart did not appear before the court within 48 hours of being taken into custody; and (c) there was nothing to be adjudicated. Second, Stewart argues that a default judgment should have been entered against the defendant. Third, Stewart contends that the court failed to set forth findings of facts and conclusions of law in support of the dismissal. ¶ 11 We review an order denying a petition for habeas corpus de novo. Ely v. Sheahan, 361 Ill. App. 3d 605 (2005). A writ of habeas corpus is "available only to obtain the release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the person of the petitioner, or where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner's conviction that entitles him to release." Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 58 (2008). Applying these standards, we hold that Stewart's petition did not allege a habeas corpus claim.
¶ 12 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 13 The trial court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal case. A trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is derived from the state constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9; People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817. A trial court has the power to determine all "justiciable matters" which includes "a controversy appropriate for review by the court" that is "definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot." Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335 (2002). Here, Stewart had been charged under the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2002)) with attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4, 9-1 (West 2002)), a controversy appropriate for review by the trial court. Thus, the court had subject matter jurisdiction. Further, the trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over Stewart when he personally appeared before the court. People v. Speed, 318 Ill. App. 3d 910 (2001). Finally, Stewart's claim that the criminal complaint was not signed by the victim did not divest the court of jurisdiction. See Watkins v. Page, 322 Ill. App. 3d 360 (2001) (a defective indictment does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction and entitle the plaintiff to habeas relief). In any event, the criminal complaint was supplanted by an indictment charging attempted first degree murder. See 725 ILCS 5/111-2(a) (West 2000).
¶ 14 B. Occurrence Subsequent to Conviction
¶ 15 Secondly, the record does not support a finding that an occurrence, subsequent to Stewart's conviction, entitled him to release. Although Stewart argued that the defendant did not file a timely response, we find that this claim is not supported by the record and would not entitle Stewart to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Raimondo v. Pavkovic, 107 Ill. App. 3d 226 (1982) (the general rule that a default judgment is not encouraged, but is employed only as a last resort, is especially applicable to the quasi-criminal proceedings of a habeas corpus case). On the face of the summons, Stewart had 30 days to respond to the defendant's habeas corpus complaint. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 181 (eff. Jan. 4, 2013). The record reveals that the defendant received service on January 18, 2012 and filed a motion to dismiss the petition on February 9, 2012, well within the 30-day period.
¶ 16 C. Findings of Fact
¶ 17 Finally, the trial court was not required to make findings of fact when it granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. See Tilschner v. Spangler, 409 Ill. App. 3d 988 (2011) (dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code does not require the trial court to weigh findings of fact). However, the trial court drew the legal conclusion that Stewart's petition had not stated a claim that warranted habeas corpus relief. As previously discussed, we agree with this finding. Therefore, Stewart did not establish a viable habeas corpus claim, and the trial court did not err when it granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.
¶ 18 CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. ¶ 20 Affirmed.