Opinion
No. 1-667 / 00-2022.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lyon County, ROBERT C. CLEM, Judge.
The defendants appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment. REVERSED.
G. Daniel Gildemeister and Edward J. Keane of Gildemeister Keane, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellants.
John S. Moeller of O'Brien Galvin Moeller, Sioux City, and Richard H. Moeller of Berenstein, Moore, Berenstein, Heffernan Moeller, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellees.
Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
The defendants appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment. They contend they are entitled to immunity, as a matter of law, under Iowa Code section 670.4(10) (1999). We reverse.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . Jennifer Stettnichs was raped shortly after a prisoner escaped from the Lyon County jail and forced his way into her home. Prior to being apprehended, the prisoner also kidnapped Jennifer and two of her children. Jennifer and her family filed suit against the county, the sheriff, and a deputy sheriff.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming they were immune from liability under Iowa Code section 670.4(10). The district court found there was a factual issue as to whether the prisoner was under the supervision or control of the county at the time the crimes were committed, and it denied the motion for summary judgment. The defendants' application for interlocutory appeal was granted.
II. Scope of Review . Interpretation of a statue is a legal question that is properly resolved by summary judgment. Jarnagin v. Fisher Controls Intern., Inc., 573 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Iowa 1997). We review the district court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment for errors at law. Id. We look to whether the district court correctly applied the law to the facts. First State Bank v. Clark, 635 N.W.2d 29, 30 (Iowa 2001).
III. Immunity . Iowa Code section 670.4 sets forth the circumstances in which a municipality is immune from tort actions. Section 670.4(10) provides municipalities immunity from:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an officer or employee of the municipality, . . . if the damage was caused by a third party, event, or property not under the supervision or control of the municipality. . . .
The defendants contend they are entitled to immunity, as a matter of law, under section 670.4(10). They argue this case is controlled by the supreme court's opinion in Hameed v. Brown, 530 N.W.2d 703 (Iowa 1995) because the prisoner was not under their supervision or control after he had escaped and, therefore, they are immune from liability for the crimes he committed against the Stettnichs family.
In Hameed, the plaintiff had obtained a no contact order against her former boyfriend. Hameed, 530 N.W.2d at 705. After the boyfriend violated the order, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Id. The police attempted to execute the warrant at a personal residence, but an officer allowed the boyfriend to go upstairs to retrieve something and he fled though a second-story window. Id. at 705-06. Several hours later, the boyfriend stabbed the plaintiff. Id. at 706. In determining whether the boyfriend was under the supervision or control of the city at the time of the stabbing, the supreme court examined the common meanings of the words "supervise" and "control." Id. at 707. Applying these definitions to the statute, the court stated:
[W]e think liability can attach to the municipality only if the third party caused damage (1) while the municipality was overseeing the third party's conduct with the power to direct and decide the implementation of the third party's intentions, or (2) while the municipality was exercising restraining influence over the third party.Id. The court then held the city was immune from liability because the boyfriend had not been under the supervision or control of the city at the time he stabbed the plaintiff. Id.
The district court distinguished Hameed from the Stettnichs' case in its ruling that denied the defendants summary judgment. It noted that in Hameed the boyfriend had been served with a bench warrant, but had not been arrested. He was permitted to go to another place unattended. Additionally, the assault took place twelve hours after his escape. Conversely, the court found the defendants in the case at bar had taken charge and custody of the prisoner and he was under their supervision and control at the time of his escape. It further noted the sexual assault and kidnapping were not remote in time or place from his escape. The court then concluded there is a factual issue as to whether the prisoner was under the supervision of defendants at the time the crimes were committed.
We first note the issue of whether a person is under the supervision or control of a municipality is a legal question for the court, not a factual one. See id. (citing Williams v. Bayers, 452 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990)). We further find the distinctions urged by plaintiffs are not persuasive. The prisoner was not under the supervision of defendants at the time the crimes were committed. While there is no question he was under the defendants' supervision and control prior to his escape, the escape took him outside their supervision and control. There is also no doubt the negligence of the defendants in supervising the prisoner allowed him to escape. However, they are immune from liability for such negligence under section 670.4(10).
REVERSED.