Opinion
21-35726
11-10-2022
WILLIAM G.H. STEPHENS V, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D.B. ROBERTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted October 18, 2022 Portland, Oregon
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00673-BR
Before: PAEZ and BADE, Circuit Judges, and R. COLLINS, District Judge.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
MEMORANDUM
William Stephens appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of D.B. Roberts, Inc. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court's decision on cross-motions for summary judgment de novo. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Or. Dep't of Revenue, 965 F.3d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). We affirm.
1. The district court reasonably concluded that D.B. Roberts established it would suffer undue hardship if it granted Stephens' request for an additional period of leave. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[A]n extension of an existing leave period[] may be a reasonable accommodation if it does not pose an undue hardship on the employer."). No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Indeed, at the time it denied the request, Stephens' leave had already resulted in lost business opportunities, negatively impacted Stephens' coworkers, and aggravated Stephens' manager's health problems.
The district court's citation to the "de minimis" standard for determining undue hardship, rather than the "significant difficulty or expense" standard, was erroneous but harmless because the district court considered the appropriate statutory factors in its determination. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.121(2).
2. Moreover, D.B. Roberts did not fail to engage in the interactive process because the record does not show that an alternative accommodation was possible. Snapp v. United Trans. Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[T]here exists no stand-alone claim for failing to engage in the interactive process. Rather, discrimination results from denying an available and reasonable accommodation.").
3. Furthermore, D.B. Roberts participated in the interactive process in good faith by discussing Stephens' leave request with his wife, who was acting as his agent. See Eads v. Borman, 277 P.3d 503, 508 (Or. 2012) (stating that authority exists when an agent's actions encompass "what the agent is actually or apparently authorized to do"). Stephens admitted he gave his wife authority to act on his behalf and requested all employment communication go through his wife's email.
AFFIRMED.
The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.