Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-000599-MR NO. 2014-CA-000971-MR
06-05-2015
THOMAS JOHN STEPHENS APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE AND JENNY KELLER APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT Thomas John Stephens: Benjamin Brock Taylor Louisville, Kentucky BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT Jenny Keller: Erin Hoffman Yang Assistant Public Advocate Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Thomas A. Van De Rostyne Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 13-CR-00656-002
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 13-CR-00656-001
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: DIXON, JONES, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES. DIXON, JUDGE: Thomas John Stephens and Jenny Keller appeal from the orders of the Fayette Circuit Court that denied their individual motions to suppress evidence. Although Stephens and Keller filed separate appeals, this Court will hear their appeals together, as they arise from the same criminal case.
Stephens was paroled in March 2012, after serving five years of a twenty-five year sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine in Fayette County. According to Stephens's conditions of parole, his area of supervision was Scott County, and he was not allowed to leave the county without permission from his parole officer. In early April 2013, Kentucky State Police Trooper Jeremy Devasher, who was familiar with Stephens's history of manufacturing methamphetamine, learned from a fellow trooper that Stephens had been stopped recently for a traffic violation while driving a green Mercury Cougar. Devasher noted that the stop had uncovered a large quantity of matchbooks without strike plates, an ingredient in an uncommon form of methamphetamine known as "Red P." Thereafter, Devasher learned that officers in Lexington had been investigating a residence on Ward Drive where trash pulls revealed other ingredients for "Red P." On April 29, 2013, Devasher spotted the green Mercury parked outside Room 315 at the Knights Inn in Lexington. After speaking with the manager, Devasher learned that Room 315 was registered to Eric Kleisteich, with an address of Ward Drive. Standing outside the room, Devasher believed he could hear Stephens talking inside, although there was no response when Devasher knocked on the door. Ultimately, two officers from probation and parole arrived to investigate whether Stephens was in violation of his release conditions by being outside of Scott County. The parole officers forced entry to the room, where Stephens was pouring a smoking liquid into the sink. Keller and her thirteen-year-old son were sitting on the bed. Stephens and Keller were arrested and subsequently indicted on charges of manufacturing methamphetamine.
Keller and Stephens were also indicted on charges of controlled substance child endangerment (fourth-degree), and Stephens was indicted as a first-degree persistent felony offender.
Both Stephens and Keller filed motions to suppress, arguing that their constitutional rights were violated by the warrantless entry and search of the motel room. A joint suppression hearing was held on the motions, and two witnesses testified on behalf of the Commonwealth, Trooper Devasher and Officer Jeremy Frick of probation and parole. The trial court denied the motions to suppress, concluding that the parole officers properly entered the motel room because they believed Stephens was there in violation of his release conditions. Thereafter, Stephens and Keller entered conditional guilty pleas to amended charges of facilitation to manufacture methamphetamine. Stephens also pled guilty to second-degree PFO, and he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Keller received a sentence of one year, probated for three years. Stephens and Keller now appeal the denial of their motions to suppress.
When this Court reviews a determination on a motion to suppress evidence, we are bound by the factual findings of the trial court if they are supported by substantial evidence. Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998). We then review de novo the application of the law to the facts. Id.
Stephens and Keller claim their constitutional rights were violated by the warrantless entry and search of the motel room, and they assert that no exception to the warrant requirement applied.
We need not address the arguments raised by Stephens and Keller. The record clearly reveals that neither Stephens nor Keller established standing to challenge the search of the motel room. Although the issue of standing was not the basis for the trial court's ruling, "an appellate court may affirm a lower court for any reason supported by the record." McCloud v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 780, 786 n. 19 (Ky. 2009).
In Ordway v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Ky. 2011), the Kentucky Supreme Court explained:
A defendant bears the burden of establishing standing to challenge a Fourth Amendment search. United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1510 (6th Cir.1988). That burden requires proof that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980).In Ordway, the defendant challenged the search of his girlfriend's apartment; however, the Court asserted that there was no evidence the defendant was a legal resident of the apartment, that he had unfettered use of the premises, had a key, or paid bills at the apartment. Id. The Court concluded:
There was proof that Appellant was, at times, a frequent visitor to the apartment. However, no evidence was presented to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. Therefore, Appellant cannot now complain of a Fourth Amendment violation. See Sussman v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Ky. 1980) (appellant lacked standing to challenge search of girlfriend's apartment, though she gave him a key to the residence for limited use); Combs v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky. App. 1961) (appellant lacked standing to challenge search of residence owned by grandfather, though he lived in the home).Id.
In this case, the testimony established that Room 315 was registered to Eric Kleisteich, an individual who was not present at the motel when the officers entered the room. No evidence was presented as to how Stephens and Keller came to be in Room 315 or what possessory interest or status they held in the room. The United States Supreme Court has held that "an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90, 119 S. Ct. 469, 473, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998). Here, the evidence established, at best, that Stephens and Keller were "merely present" in Room 315. Stephens and Keller failed to establish that they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Room 315; consequently, they lacked standing to challenge the search of the room. The trial court properly denied the motions to suppress evidence.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgments of the Fayette Circuit Court in 2014-CA-000599 and 2014-CA-000971.
JONES, JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT
Thomas John Stephens:
Benjamin Brock Taylor
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT
Jenny Keller:
Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky