Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 13-0166
01-21-2014
STEPHANIE C., Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, R.C., R.C., Appellees.
Denise Lynn Carroll, Esq., Scottsdale By Denise Lynn Carroll Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek Counsel for Appellees
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD21135
The Honorable Aimee L. Anderson, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Denise Lynn Carroll, Esq., Scottsdale
By Denise Lynn Carroll
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek
Counsel for Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Randall M. Howe, delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge John C. Gemmill joined. HOWE, Judge:
¶1 Stephanie C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Mother is the biological parent of R.C. and R.C. (collectively "the Children"). Both Children have special needs, requiring occupational and speech therapy. Mother suffers from a serious mental illness and has received mental health treatment for more than fifteen years, with varying degrees of efficacy.
The caption has been amended to safeguard the identity of the juveniles pursuant to Administrative Order 2013-0001.
¶3 In September 2011, police officers reported that Mother failed to supervise the Children, exposing them to various safety hazards. As a result, Child Protective Services (CPS) intervened, offering Mother foster care services so that she could pursue mental health treatment. CPS also provided Mother with visitation, transportation, and parenting resources.
¶4 When Mother failed to complete her mental health treatment, the Arizona Department of Economic Security (DES) filed a dependency petition, the Children were found dependent as to Mother, and the juvenile court adopted a case plan of family reunification. After placing the Children in foster care, CPS instituted a reunification plan that required Mother to (1) engage in mental health treatment, (2) acknowledge that her mental illness impacted her ability to parent, (3) demonstrate an understanding of child development, and (4) demonstrate that she could satisfy the Children's needs and ensure their safety.
¶5 While the Children were in foster care, DES provided Mother mental health treatment, including psychotherapy and psychiatric evaluation. After consulting with a psychologist, DES also referred Mother for psychological evaluation. At her March 2013 evaluation, a psychologist recommended that Mother seek individual psychotherapy, psychiatric evaluation, and parent-aid services. After Mother pursued these services, the psychologist ultimately concluded that Mother's emotional and family problems were persistent and did not markedly change. The psychologist also concluded that reunification would jeopardize the Children's health and well-being.
¶6 Between February 2012 and March 2013, DES twice referred Mother for parent-aide services. Despite teaching Mother a variety of parenting strategies, Mother's first parent aide expressed concern that Mother could not care for the Children and thus an extra supervisor would be needed to keep the Children safe. A second parent aide also taught Mother parenting skills, but agreed with the first parenting aid's concerns.
¶7 At a permanency planning hearing, DES sought to change the case plan to severance and adoption. Over Mother's objection, the juvenile court granted the request and DES moved to terminate Mother's parental rights on mental-illness and time in care grounds. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court terminated mother's parental rights on both grounds.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Mother argues (1) that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that DES provided her with reasonable reunification services and (2) that DES failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests.
I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Finding that DES Made Diligent Efforts to Provide Mother Reunification Services.
¶9 To terminate parental rights, a court must first find by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one statutory ground for severance and, as to the grounds for termination alleged in this case, that DES made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (B)(7); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(C); see also Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 191 ¶ 31, 971 P.2d 1046, 1052 (App. 1999) (addressing reunification services required when severance is sought pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3)). Clear and convincing evidence is that which makes the alleged facts highly probable or reasonably certain. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep]t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 93 ¶ 2, 210 P.3d 1263, 1264 (App. 2009). The court must also find by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the best interests of the child. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005).
¶10 As we found in Mary Ellen C., a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services means that DES must reasonably attempt to rehabilitate the parent by offering services designed to improve the parent's ability to care for the child. 193 Ariz. at 192 ¶¶ 33-34, 971 P.2d at 1053. However, DES is not required to provide every conceivable service, Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 234, 239 (App. 1994), or to provide futile services, Pima Cnty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. 574, 577, 780 P.2d 407, 410 (App. 1989); see also Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-5209 & No. JS-4963, 143 Ariz. 178, 189, 692 P.2d 1027, 1038 (App. 1984) (holding that DES's failure to provide ongoing psychotherapy did not foreclose severance of parental rights).
¶11 Here, DES made a reasonable effort to provide reunification services before it sought to terminate Mother's parental rights. DES offered Mother an array of services, including psychological, psychiatric, and neuropsychological evaluations; individual counseling; parent-aide services; supervised visits; and transportation to and from appointments. Thus, the juvenile court did not err in finding that DES discharged its obligation to provide appropriate reunification services.
II. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Finding that Severance was in the Children's Best Interests.
¶12 "[A] determination of the child's best interests must include a finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship." Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (1990). "In combination, the existence of a statutory ground for severance and the immediate availability of a suitable adoptive placement for the children frequently are sufficient to support a severance order." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 335 ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 943, 946 (App. 2004). The court may also consider whether the present placement is meeting the child's needs. Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998).
¶13 The evidence at the termination hearing included testimony that the Children are adoptable, are in a potential adoptive placement, and were thriving in their placement. By contrast, the psychologist who had provided services to Mother concluded that reunification would jeopardize the Children's health and well-being. This evidence properly supports the juvenile court's determination that severance was, by a preponderance of the evidence, in the Children's best interests.
CONCLUSION
¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.