Opinion
No. CV 08 5009444
July 23, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
FACTS
The plaintiff, Katherine Stein, alleges the following facts. On January 28, 2007, her husband, Wayne Lacardo, was a passenger in an Audi driven by John Geise. That night, as a result of John Geise's negligence, the Audi collided with another car in Groton, Connecticut. Wayne Lecardo sustained severe injuries in the accident and died as a result,
In count XlV of the plaintiff's revised complaint, she alleges that the defendant, Volkswagen of America, Inc., is vicariously liable for her husband's death pursuant to General Statutes § 14-154a because it leased to John Geise the Audi involved in the accident. In count XV of her revised complaint, the plaintiff seeks loss of consortium damages relating to the death of her husband.
On February 18, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts XIV and XV of the plaintiff's revised complaint on the ground that § 14-154a applies only to vehicle lessors who also own the vehicles they lease and that without a sufficient underlying claim of liability, the plaintiff's loss of consortium claim should also fail. On May 12, 2009, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to strike in which she argues that the Connecticut Supreme Court, in Gionfriddo v. Rent A Car Systems, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 472 A.2d 306 (1984), stated that § 14-154a applies equally to both owner and non-owner lessors. On May 15, 2009, the defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's objection in which it argues that the statements relied on by the plaintiff in Gionfriddo are either non-binding dicta or invalid as a matter of law because they contravene the specific language of § 14-154a. On May 22, 2009, the plaintiff filed a sur-reply in which she argues that the court should apply the reasoning found in Gionfriddo and deny the defendant's motion to strike.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 294, 914 A.2d 996 (2007).
"[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).
I. Count XIV of the plaintiff's revised complaint.
In its motion to strike, the defendant's sole ground for striking count XIV of the plaintiff's complaint is that General Statutes § 14-154a does not apply because it is not the owner of the Audi involved in the accident. General Statutes § 14-154a(a), in relevant part, provides that "[a]ny person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner . . ." The defendant, in its memoranda in support of its motion to strike argues that the statute, on its face, limits the extension of liability to cases where a lessor rents a vehicle which he or she owns. However, when construing the statute, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Gionfriddo, supra, 192 Conn. 287, stated that "[t]he legislature has determined that the owner or the lessor of a motor vehicle shall be liable `to the same extent the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner.'" (Emphasis added.) Id. The court also stated that § 14-154a "expressly makes owners and lessors liable [for damages caused by the authorized driver of a leased vehicle]." (Emphasis added.) Id., 288. The court went on to state that "General Statutes § 14-154a covers both owners and lessors. [The court has] been able to discern no reason of policy . . . to distinguish between the liability of owners and of lessors." (Emphasis added.) Id., 289 n. 4.
In the present case, the plaintiff, in its revised complaint has alleged that the defendant leased the Audi involved in the accident to John Geise. As such, pursuant to the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation of § 14-154a as stated in Gionfriddo, the defendant can be held liable for the allegedly negligent actions of John Geise that caused the death of Wayne Lecardo.
The defendant, in its memoranda in support of its motion to strike argues that the language in Gionfriddo regarding § 14-154a is either non-binding dicta or, if the language is not dicta, the court should decline to follow the Connecticut Supreme Court's reasoning because it contravenes the plain language of the statute. I disagree.
Black's law dictionary defines dicta as "[o]pinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the specific case before the court. Expressions in the court's opinion which go beyond the facts before court and therefore are individual views of the author of the opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent." Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). In Gionfriddo, the meaning and legislative intent motivating the liability imposed by § 14-154a were essential to the determination of whether the defendants in that case could be found liable for treble damages as the result of an accident involving a leased automobile. Indeed, at the very outset of the decision, the court stated that "the principle issue in this case is the scope of our statutes imposing liability upon owner-lessors of motor vehicles for the misconduct of a driver-lessee." Id., 282. At least one other Connecticut Superior Court decision has noted that the Supreme Court's holding in Gionfriddo clearly states that § 14-154a applies to both owners and mere lessors. Bonitto v. Oppel, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No, CV 970156855 (July 14, 1997, Karazin, J.) ( 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 202). Because the court's interpretation of § 14-154a was central to the issues presented in Gionfriddo, its comments regarding the scope of the statute were not dicta and as such are binding on this court.
Because of the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that § 14-154a applies to both owners and lessors of motor vehicles, the defendant's motion to strike count XIV of the plaintiff's revised complaint is denied.
II. Count XV of the plaintiff's revised complaint.
The defendant argues, in its memoranda in support of its motion to strike, that because the plaintiff has not stated a legally sufficient basis for holding the defendant liable for the death of Wayne Lecardo, her loss of consortium claim should also be struck. Because the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient basis for finding the defendant liable for the death of her husband, her loss of consortium claim is also legally sufficient and the defendant's motion to strike count XV of the plaintiff's revised complaint is denied.