Opinion
Argued May 7, 1980
September 4, 1980.
Workmen's compensation — Pneumoconiosis — The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Act 1915, June 2, P.L. 736 — Substantial evidence — Burden of proof.
1. A finding that an employe was disabled from pneumoconiosis and entitled to benefits under The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Act 1915, June 2, P.L. 736 is erroneous as unsupported by substantial evidence when one medical witness found evidence of the disease but no resulting disability, a second found evidence of disability resulting from another disease, and a third found no evidence of disease or disability. [621]
2. In a workmen's compensation case a claimant seeking compensation for an occupational disease must prove that he has sustained a disability resulting from such disease and that his disease is one arising in the course of his employment. [621]
Argued May 7, 1980, before Judges WILKINSON, JR., CRAIG and WILLIAMS, JR., sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 1052 C.D. 1979, from the Order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in case of Philip L. Stegner v. Canterbury Coal Company, No. A-74953.
Petition with the Department of Labor and Industry for disability benefits. Benefits awarded. Employer and Commonwealth appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. Case remanded. Benefits awarded by referee. Employer and Commonwealth appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. Award reversed. Petitioner appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
Benjamin Costello, with him J. Scott Leckie and Kenneth J. Yablonski, for petitioner.
Paul E. Sutter, with him George H. Thompson, Hirsch, Weise Tillman, for respondents, Canterbury Coal Company and Old Republic Insurance Company.
Laurence W. Dague, Assistant Attorney General, with him William O'Toole and Sandra S. Christianson, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Philip L. Stegner, Jr. (Claimant) appeals from an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board) which reversed his award and dismissed his claim for compensation under The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act.
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, §§ 101 et seq., as amended, 77 P. S. § 1 et seq.
The Claimant's petition for compensation alleged that he was totally disabled due to coal worker's pneumoconiosis (coal miner's lung), and that the condition was caused by his exposure to coal dust during his employment with the Canterbury Coal Company (Company), one of the respondents herein. After a hearing, the referee awarded Stegner benefits under the Act, finding that the Claimant was permanently partially disabled "as a result of coal worker's pneumoconiosis."
Both the Company and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, another respondent before this Court, appealed the referee's decision to the Board. The Board remanded the case to the referee for further determination, giving the Claimant leave to amend his petition and to offer other evidence. At the remand hearing no additional evidence was offered; and again the referee awarded compensation to the Claimant. The Company and the Commonwealth took another appeal to the Board, which on that occasion reversed the referee's award without taking additional evidence. Claimant Stegner then appealed to this Court.
The sole question presented by the parties for review, is whether the evidence sufficiently supports the referee's finding that the Claimant had a permanent partial disability due to pneumoconiosis.
The competent evidence concerning the existence, cause, and degree of the Claimant's disability came from three doctors: one presented by the Claimant, one by the Company and another by the Commonwealth. The Claimant's physician testified by deposition that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled due to a chronic obstructive lung disease with associated asthmatic bronchitis, chronic bronchitis, and emphysema. The Company's medical witness agreed that the Claimant had asthmatic bronchitis, but concluded that he was not suffering from any respiratory impairment and that there was only minimal evidence of pneumoconiosis. That doctor was also of the opinion that Claimant Stegner could have returned to work. The report of the Commonwealth medical witness declared the Claimant to be free of significant respiratory impairment, with no evidence whatsoever of pneumoconiosis.
The notable feature of the medical evidence is the lack of any testimony by the Claimant's physician that the Claimant had pneumoconiosis. Although the Claimant's physician stated that his patient was permanently disabled, that doctor did not include pneumoconiosis as a cause of the disability. The minimal evidence of that lung condition found by the Company physician did not cause that witness to consider the Claimant disabled. And, the opinion of the third doctor contravened Stegner's claim entirely.
The medical evidence presented three alternative conclusions: (1) the Claimant was disabled but not due to pneumoconiosis; (2) the Claimant had minimal signs of pneumoconiosis but was not disabled; or (3) the Claimant had no signs of pneumoconiosis and was not disabled.
On the medical evidence in this case, the referee found that the Claimant had a permanent partial disability due to pneumoconiosis. In order to make such a finding the referee had to conclude that the minimal showing of pneumoconiosis was enough to establish that the Claimant was disabled due to pneumoconiosis. To reach such a conclusion the referee had to supplement the record evidence with his own medical opinion, blended from those given by the doctors and resting on a finding that none of them made. We recognize that it is within the province of the referee to draw inferences from testimony. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 24 Pa. Commw. 403, 356 A.2d 375 (1976). That principle does not apply where the inference to be drawn is one that only a medical expert can make, such as whether or not a person has a certain lung condition or is disabled from it.
In sum, the referee's decision that the Claimant was permanently disabled and that such disability resulted from pneumoconiosis is not supported by substantial evidence.
In all workmen's compensation cases, the claimant has the burden of proving all the elements necessary to support an award. E.g., Mountz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 33 Pa. Commw. 583, 382 A.2d 507 (1978). Under the Act, a claimant seeking compensation for an occupational disease must show two things; (1) that he has sustained disability resulting from such disease, and (2) that his disease is one arising in the course of his employment. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 37 Pa. Commw. 412, 391 A.2d 14 (1978). It is our conclusion that the evidence in the instant case was not sufficient to sustain a finding that the Claimant was disabled from pneumoconiosis. Therefore, the Board was within its power to reverse the referee's determination, for lack of substantial evidence. Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Krawczynski, 9 Pa. Commw. 176, 305 A.2d 757 (1973). Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Board in this case.
ORDER
AND NOW, the 4th day of September, 1980, the order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in the above matter, entered April 19, 1979 at No. A-74953, is affirmed.