Summary
stating the elements of laches
Summary of this case from Ravenswood Inv. Co. v. Estate of WinmillOpinion
C.A. No. 16455
Date Submitted: June 20, 2002
Date Decided: September 20, 2002
Donna L. Schoenbeck, Esquire of SCHOENBECK SCHOENBECK, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Douglas A. Shachtman, Esquire of DOUGLAS A. SHACHTMAN ASSOCIATES, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorney for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending is the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing this action on the ground of laches. The plaintiffs seek an injunction ordering the defendants to remove a fence that the plaintiffs contend was improperly built on their land. The parties are neighbors who live on contiguous parcels. The fence was erected by the defendants' father ten years before the filing of this lawsuit. For a decade the plaintiffs never objected nor raised any issue regarding the fence or its location. Only after the defendants insisted that the plaintiffs pay for the damage they caused to the fence, did the plaintiffs take the position that the fence encroached upon their land. For the reasons discussed below, I find that this action is timebarred by laches. The motion for summary judgment must therefore be granted.
I. FACTS
A. The Parties
The material facts are undisputed. Since February 15, 1973, the plaintiffs, William Steele ("William") and Rosemary Steele have lived at 1069 Red Lion Road, in New Castle County, Delaware. The defendants, Mary Ratledge ("Mary") and Susan Ratledge have lived on the adjoining parcel at 1071 Red Lion Road all their lives. Mary's and Susan's parents, Edwin Ratledge ("Edwin") and Abigail Ratledge ("Abigail"), also lived at that residence until they died in 1993 and 1996 (respectively).
B. Facts Pertaining to the Claim
The parties live, respectively, on two adjoining parcels. A creek passes between the two parcels, but the creek does not constitute the boundary line. One of the plaintiffs, William Steele, claims that the actual property line is located about 25-30 feet beyond the creek on the Ratledges' parcel. That claim is disputed.
The plaintiffs' figure is an estimate. In their opening brief, the defendants state that they do not plan to debate the precise location of the boundary line at this stage.
After the Steeles moved next door in 1973, the Ratledges concluded that the Steeles had repeatedly been trespassing on their property. According to their affidavits, the Ratledges came to believe that the Steele children had stolen money from the petty cash drawer in their home, had parked in their yard with their boyfriends, and had stolen fruit from their garden. In addition, William Steele had been seen using the Ratledge swimming pool while the Ratledge family was attending church. Moreover, while tending to his yard work, William would mow the grass on the Ratledges' side of the creek, and each time William did that, he would further encroach onto the Ratledges' property. The defendants claim that Edwin told William that although William had permission to mow that portion of the Ratledge parcel, the Ratledges still owned all the land on "their side" up to the pipe in the center of the creek bed. William did not dispute that statement, and from that point forward until 1988 there were no disputes of significance regarding the property line.
In 1988, that changed when at approximately 3 a.m. one night, the Ratledges saw lights flashing in their house. Hearing the sound of footsteps fleeing down the outside steps of the Ratledge home, Mary looked outside and saw a flashlight trail leading from their house to the Steeles' house. After that incident, the die was cast: Edwin decided to erect a fence to separate the Ratledge and Steele properties.
In preparation for installing the fence, Edwin hired a surveyor to survey the property. After the survey was completed, a six-foot high chain link fence topped with barbed wire was installed in 1988 at Edwin's direction and expense, at a cost of $10,790. William contends that shortly after the fence was installed, he concluded that the fence encroached upon his land. Despite holding that belief, William never communicated it to Edwin, either before or at any time after the fence was constructed.
In March 1993, about five years after the fence was installed, Edwin died, leaving his widow, Abigail, as the sole owner of the Ratledge property. Later, Abigail created the Abigail Ratledge Trust (the "Trust") and appointed herself as the sole trustee. Some time thereafter, Abigail appointed her daughter, Mary, as the successor trustee. The Trust beneficiaries were Mary and her sister, Susan. In June 1996, Abigail deeded the Ratledge property to the Trust. Two months later, she died.
This action was brought in June 1998, precipitated by a dispute between Mary Ratledge and William Steele. Mary objected to William cutting down certain tree limbs that overhung the fence, because these limbs extended over her property. William told Mary that he would pay for any damage that resulted from the trimming. While William was cutting down the branches, a limb fell and crushed a section of the fence. Despite his promise to pay for the damage, William never did. Instead he brought this lawsuit to force the removal of the fence.
The Steeles seek relief based on their claim that the fence encroaches upon their property. After discovery, the defendants brought the pending motion for summary judgment of dismissal on the ground of laches.
II. THE APPLICABLE LAW AND THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
The defendants contend that this action is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches and that therefore they are entitled to summary judgment dismissing this action. The plaintiffs argue that the laches defense is inapplicable and that the entry of summary judgment would be improper.
The plaintiffs argue that their delay in bringing the action is not unreasonable because under the doctrine of adverse possession, they would be entitled to wait twenty years to sue the defendants. However, their argument is not responsive to the issue of whether their lawsuit is time-barred by laches. This action for an injunction is not based on adverse possession, and the plaintiffs have made no persuasive argument that establishes that their ten-year delay in filing their suit was reasonable.
Laches is an equitable defense, which is grounded upon the principle that "a person with knowledge of an impending transaction should not be permitted to sit by in silence while positions are fundamentally changed by potential adversaries and the rights of third parties accrue." To establish the equitable defense of laches, the defendants must demonstrate that the Steeles, once having learned of their claim, (I) unreasonably delayed in asserting their rights and (2) that the defendants were prejudiced by the plaintiffs' failure to assert their claim in a timely manner.
Fike v. Ruger, 752 A.2d 112, 113 (Del. 2000) (quoting Elster v. American Airlines, 128 A.2d 801, 805 (Del.Ch. 1985)).
Id.
To grant summary judgment, the Court must determine from the record that there are no genuine, material issues of fact and that the moving parties (here the defendants) are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. All inferences must be resolved in favor of the party against whom judgment is sought (in this case, the plaintiffs), and those inferences must be drawn from facts, not suppositions.
Williams v. Grier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Del. 1996).
Liboff v. Allen, 1975 Del. Ch. LEXIS 255, at *14 (Del.Ch. January 14, 1975).
III. ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the undisputed facts establish the elements of laches. If any material fact required to establish laches is disputed, summary judgment would be improper. In this case, the undisputed material facts establish that the plaintiffs knew of their rights, that they unreasonably delayed in bringing their claim, and that the defendants were prejudiced as a result. Thus, the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on their laches defense.1. Was the Delay Unreasonable?
The first of the two elements of laches is that the plaintiffs must have delayed unreasonably. I conclude that in these circumstances, the plaintiffs' ten-year delay in bringing this action was unreasonable.
Unlike a statute of limitations, the equitable doctrine of laches does not prescribe a specific time period as "unreasonable." Laches is defined as an unreasonable delay by a party, without any specific reference to duration, in the enforcement of a right. An unreasonable delay can range from as long as several years to as little as one month. The temporal aspect of the delay is less critical than the reasons for it, because in some circumstances even a long delay might be excused.
State v. Phillips, 1980 LEXIS 545, at *30 (Del.Ch. Oct. 14, 1980). See also Skouras v. Admiralty Enterprises, 386 A.2d 674 (Del.Ch. 1978).
Cooch v. Grier, 59 A.2d 282 (Del.Ch. 1948).
Stengel v. Rotman, 2001 LEXIS 22 (Del.Ch. Feb. 26, 2001).
Cooch at 286-87.
Here, William was immediately put on notice of a possible encroachment upon his property when the fence was installed in 1988. William admits that despite having actual knowledge of that fact, he waited ten years to bring this action for injunctive relief William claims that he did not raise the boundary line issue with Edwin, because at that time they were friends and also had a professional relationship. There is evidence to the contrary, but be that as it may, after Edwin died, William still never objected to the fence, nor did he institute an action for its removal. Only after William himself damaged the fence while cutting down certain overhanging tree limbs and only after further tension had erupted between the families, did William assert (for the first time) his claim that the fence constituted an encroachment.
The plaintiffs have failed to articulate any credible reason for their abysmal tardiness in filing this lawsuit. Not once during the preceding ten years did they ever broach the topic of the alleged encroachment until Mary took the position that William was liable for the damage he had inflicted on the fence. Manifestly, the ten-year delay was unreasonable.
2. Were the Defendants Prejudiced by the Delay?
The second element of the laches defense is resulting prejudice. The issue is whether such prejudice was established here. I find that it has.
For purposes of laches, prejudice may occur in different ways. The prejudice might be procedural in nature, for example, where the delay prevents a party from calling crucial witnesses who could either help prove the party's case or refute the opposing party's claims, but where those witnesses have become unavailable because of intervening disappearance, illness, or death. Prejudice can also be substantive, such as where a party suffers a financial detriment by relying on the plaintiffs' failure to seek relief in a timely manner. I conclude that the defendants here have been prejudiced both procedurally and substantively by the plaintiffs' unreasonable delay in asserting their claim. My reasons follow.
Fike at 113-14.
a. Procedural Prejudice
The procedural prejudice in this case arises because the defendants have raised the defense of equitable estoppel, as to which the testimony of Edwin (who is now deceased) would have been critical. An equitable estoppel arises "when a party by his conduct intentionally or unintentionally leads another, in reliance upon that conduct, to change position to his detriment" To establish estoppel, the party claiming the estoppel must be shown to have: (i) lacked knowledge or imputed knowledge of the truth of the facts in question, (ii) relied on the conduct of the party against whom estoppel is claimed, and (iii) suffered a prejudicial change of position as a result of such reliance.
The plaintiffs' conduct may also give rise to a defense of acquiescence. Acquiescence is an equitable defense that can be asserted against a party who has remained inactive despite his knowledge of the complained of conduct, or who recognizes the validity of the complained of act, or who acts in a manner inconsistent with his subsequent repudiation of that conduct, thereby leading the other party to believe that the conduct had been approved. See Julin v. Julin, 787 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. 2001). In this case, William Steele waited ten years to assert that the Ratledges' fence lies on his property. William's inaction led Edwin Ratledge and his family to believe that William had approved of the location of the fence.
Wilson v. Am. Ins. Co., 209 A.2d 902, 903-04 (Del. 1965).
Id.
To defend against William's claim for the removal of the fence, the defendants presumably would seek to present evidence of the 1988 conversation between their father and William regarding the fence's location. The understanding of the parties at that time is an important element of proof and Edwin's testimony would bear critically on whether William had led Edwin to believe that he (William) had consented to the construction of the fence at the (now-disputed) location.
11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 67.
To elaborate, shortly after the property survey was completed, Edwin and William discussed the impending fence construction. The substance of that discussion (from Edwin's point of view) will never be known. It may be that Edwin and William attempted to — or did — resolve any disagreement regarding the exact boundary line. In any event, William did not object or raise any issue regarding the fence installation at that time. It may also be that Edwin, in reliance on the understanding he reached with William and upon William's tacit approval, went ahead with the fence installation at a substantial cost to himself. But only Edwin's testimony would establish the nature and extent of that reliance. Had William filed this action in a reasonable, timely fashion, Edwin's testimony on those points would have been available.
William, however, waited five years after Edwin's death to assert his present claim. The result is that the defendants are now disabled from proving the substance of the conversation between the two men. The defendants' inability to present Edwin's testimony is clearly prejudicial. Equally clearly, that prejudice is the result of the plaintiffs' delay in asserting their claim.
In Cooch v. Grier, this Court held that a party was prejudiced where the only person who could competently testify about a critical issue had died during an unreasonable period of delay in filing the case. Similarly, in Fike v. Ruger, key witnesses who would have been instrumental in refuting the plaintiffs claims, had died. Those authorities underscore the procedurally prejudicial nature of the plaintiffs ten-year delay in bringing this action.
Cooch at 287.
Fike at 114.
b. Substantive prejudice
Although the procedural prejudice discussed above is, without more, sufficient to establish the laches defense, the defendants have suffered substantive prejudice as well. Specifically, the defendants incurred the cost of installing the fence at the specific location that is now in dispute. After their conversation, and without any objection by William, Edwin proceeded to construct the fence at a cost to himself of $10,790. Had William voiced his objection before the construction took place, that cost (and the cost of defending this lawsuit) could have been avoided. If this action is permitted to proceed, the defendants will have suffered significant financial prejudice by reason of the plaintiffs' delay.
McAllister v. Kallop, 1995 WL 462210, at *56 (Del.Ch. July 28, 1995).
Fike at 113-14.
For these reasons, I find that this lawsuit is time-barred by operation of the doctrine of laches.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing this action on the ground of laches is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.