Opinion
No. 01-05-00120-CV
Opinion Issued June 29, 2006.
On Appeal from the 131st District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2004-03444J.
Panel consists of Justices KEYES, ALCALA, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kristal Steadman appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to J.A.F., her minor child. Steadman's counsel has submitted a brief stating that, in his professional opinion, no arguable grounds for appeal exist. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); In the Interest of L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (collecting Texas appellate cases applying Anders to termination of parental rights cases); see also In re D.E.S., 135 S.W.3d 326, 329 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2004, no pet.); In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66, 67 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 2003, no pet.). Counsel served Steadman with a copy of his Anders brief and moved to withdraw as counsel. In his motion to withdraw, counsel represents that he advised Steadman of her right to a copy of the appellate record and transcript, and of her right to file a pro se brief with the court. Steadman did not file a pro se brief. The State waived the filing of an appellee's brief. We have independently reviewed the record on appeal and we affirm.
Background
Steadman gave birth to J.A.F. in October 2003. In April 2004, the State petitioned in family court for the temporary emergency conservatorship of J.A.F. and for termination of Steadman's parental rights. The trial court conducted a bench trial in December 2004, with Steadman present and represented by counsel.
The State also moved to terminate the parental rights of J.A.F.'s father. The father does not appeal the trial court's order of termination of his rights.
Rochelle Harris, the C.P.S. caseworker for J.A.F., testified that in March and early April 2004, C.P.S. had received four referrals implicating Steadman, one for alleged emotional abuse, one for alleged physical neglect and emotional abuse, and two for alleged neglectful supervision. Steadman, age eighteen, was then residing at a shelter in Harris County. She had previously lived in a couple of other shelters. Steadman told Harris that a doctor had diagnosed her with depression, but she did not take her prescribed medication. Steadman admitted to Harris that she used marihuana when she lived on the streets, but not while residing in the shelter.
Harris created a service plan for Steadman that included counseling, a psychological assessment, a drug and alcohol assessment, and parenting classes. Steadman did not participate in these plans at that time, and she refused to submit to drug testing. She completed a parenting class in Fort Worth, approximately three weeks before trial.
Steadman gave birth to a second child in early December. After a July court hearing, Steadman moved to the Dallas/Fort Worth area. The record reveals that Steadman visited J.A.F. one time, immediately after the July hearing. Steadman testified that she attempted to telephone J.A.F. on several occasions, when a calling card was available to her, but had difficulty reaching her foster parents. Steadman did not inform Harris that she had moved away from Harris County until November 22, the day Steadman missed a court hearing in this case. At that time, Harris sent her information about resources in Fort Worth regarding counseling and the necessary drug and psychological evaluations. In addition, Harris arranged for a background check with regard to J.A.F.'s father's mother, Mary, with whom Steadman represented she then resided. The check revealed that the State had removed a child from Mary due to endangerment.
J.A.F.'s father testified that he and Steadman moved in with his mother on November 12.
J.A.F.'s father was the child that the State had removed from Mary's home. He testified that the State removed him because his father had abused him, and his mother was not in a position to protect him from his father, so his aunt raised him.
Steadman testified that she moved to a shelter in Denton, Texas at age seventeen because she was pregnant, the father of the child was in jail, and Steadman's own father was abusive. She did not complete her education beyond the eighth grade. Steadman admitted that, at the time the State removed J.A.F., she did not have a stable place to live, had no job, had been diagnosed with depression, did not take prescribed medication for it, and agreed that it was fair to say that she was not capable of taking care of the child. She has had suicidal thoughts, but not since the birth of J.A.F. Though someone in the shelter accused her of hitting J.A.F., Steadman denied it, saying instead that J.A.F. was crying unattended in her crib.
At the time of trial, Steadman was unemployed, and she resided with Helen, the paternal grandmother of her second child, who has a different father from J.A.F. The second child currently was hospitalized. Steadman was unsure where she planned to live after the trial, but hoped that she and J.A.F. could reside with J.A.F.'s father's aunt, with whom she had lived earlier in the month. She admitted that she had made no living arrangements for the care of J.A.F., should the child be returned to her care, and at the time of trial, had no means of support. She indicated that she might turn the care of J.A.F. over to J.A.F.'s father's aunt. The aunt testified that she was willing to provide J.A.F., J.A.F.'s father, and Steadman a place to live, though Steadman had also lived with Helen during the last month.
J.A.F.'s father had been released from prison, having been convicted of felony burglary, on November 12.
Another caseworker, Theresa Megwa, testified that J.A.F. was doing very well in the foster home in which the State had placed her in April 2004. She stated that termination was in J.A.F.'s best interests.
Following the December trial, in January 2005, the trial court ordered that Steadman's parental rights be terminated. In the order, the trial court found that (1) it had jurisdiction over the parties and the case; (2) the parties waived a jury trial; (3) the State established by clear and convincing evidence that Steadman had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child and had constructively abandoned the child, while J.A.F. was in the temporary conservatorship of the State, for more than six months, after the State made reasonable efforts to return the child, by failing to maintain significant contact with the child and by demonstrating an inability to provide the child with a safe environment; and (4) that State conservatorship was in the best interests of the child.
Steadman's trial attorney filed a request for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a statement of appellate issues, raising legal and factual sufficiency points with respect to the trial court's order. Steadman filed a pro se notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed counsel for the appeal.
Anders Procedure
Steadman's court-appointed counsel states that, in his professional opinion, no arguable ground for reversal of the trial court's judgment exists and thus the appeal lacks merit. See Anders, 368 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400. Counsel's brief meets Anders's minimum requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and representing that no arguable grounds for appeal exist. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969). Steadman's counsel sent a copy of the Anders brief to Steadman and has moved to withdraw as counsel. Counsel advised Steadman of her right to the appellate record and her right to file a pro se brief.
In a case in which court-appointed counsel asserts that no arguable ground for appeal exists, we independently conduct a review of the entire record. Anders, 368 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400 (emphasizing that reviewing court — not counsel — determines, after full examination of proceedings, whether appeal is "wholly frivolous"); see In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. 1998). In reviewing the record, we are mindful that termination of a parent's parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights and that the State must meet its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 273 (Tex. 2002). If we determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist, we abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to allow the court-appointed attorney to withdraw. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). The trial court must then either appoint another attorney to present all arguable grounds for appeal to the appellate court or, if the party chooses, allow the party to proceed pro se. See id. If, on the other hand, we determine from our review that the appeal is frivolous, we may affirm the trial court's judgment. The holding that no arguable ground for appeal exists is subject to further appellate review in the Texas Supreme Court. Cf. Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827 n. 6.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed counsel's brief and the trial court record. We conclude that no arguable ground for appeal exists and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. We grant counsel's motion to withdraw.
In connection with withdrawing from the case, counsel has a duty to inform Steadman of the result of this appeal and that she may, on her own, pursue review in the Texas Supreme Court. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).