Opinion
No. C1-95-2537.
Filed May 14, 1996.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 9411648.
Robert D. Boedigheimer, (for Appellants)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Cory A. Carlson, Assistant County Attorney, (for Respondent)
Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Willis, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)
Unpublished Opinion
Appellant challenges the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing his negligence action against Hennepin County for failure to raise material issues of fact regarding the elements of negligence. We affirm.
Facts
In September 1993, appellant Eugene Stauber was involved in a three-car accident at an intersection maintained by respondent Hennepin County.
The record shows that Eugene Stauber's wife is also an appellant in the case. Following the practice of the parties, we have addressed the case in terms of a single appellant.
Appellant contends that the traffic light at the intersection cycled too quickly, causing vehicles behind him to strike his car when they were unable to stop. Appellant was injured as a result of this accident.
Appellant's negligence claim is based in part on respondent's receipt of three previous reports of a possible malfunction at the pertinent intersection. The record indicates two reports of possible malfunctions with the light in the two weeks before appellant's accident. In both cases, a technician dispatched to examine the light found no malfunction and made no repairs. Further, the record reflects a report of "short timing" for the westbound light on the day of the accident. Again, a technician was dispatched to the light, found no malfunction, and made no repairs.
Decision
To find a municipality liable in a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove all the basic elements of negligence: (1) a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) that the breach of duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) that plaintiff in fact suffered an injury. Schweich v. Ziegler, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 722, 729 (Minn. 1990). In municipal negligence actions, a plaintiff must also show that the municipality had "notice, actual or constructive, of the defective condition" allegedly causing injury. Hansen v. City of St. Paul, 298 Minn. 205, 207-08, 214 N.W.2d 346, 348 (1974); Johnson v. Nicollet County, 387 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn.App. 1986). On appeal from summary judgment we must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990); Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).
1. Notice
Appellant has not raised a material issue of fact with respect to the notice element of municipal negligence. Appellant asserts that three previous reports of possible malfunction with respect to the pertinent traffic light alerted respondent that the light was not functioning properly. But undisputed testimony in the record shows (1) that respondent commonly receives reports of possible traffic light malfunctions, (2) that such reports are often found to be unsubstantiated, and (3) that all the reports cited by appellant were investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. Thus, while the record shows that respondent had notice three times that there might be a problem with the traffic light — notice that lost its effect when respondent checked the light three times and found it functioning properly — it never indicates notice to respondent that the light was malfunctioning in fact. As a matter of law, the three investigated and unsubstantiated reports do not demonstrate that respondent had "notice and knowledge of [an] inherently dangerous condition." Hansen, 298 Minn. at 209, 214 N.W.2d at 349.
2. Foreseeability
It follows from the above that appellants have failed to show that respondent could have foreseen injury such as that sustained by appellant. Foreseeability must be demonstrated before a municipality may be found negligent; no duty is breached where a municipality cannot foresee that its action or inaction could result in injury. See id. at 208, 214 N.W.2d at 348 (noting that recovery may be had against a municipality if injury is foreseeable); Brittain v. City of Minneapolis, 250 Minn. 376, 388, 84 N.W.2d 646, 654 (1957) (stating rule that, "where injuries are caused by occurrences that cannot be reasonably foreseen, [a municipality] is not liable"). Plainly, respondent could not foresee injury as a result of a condition if unaware of that condition. Because respondent had no notice of any defect in the traffic light and had reason to believe the light was working properly, as discussed above, it could not have foreseen accidents or injury as a result of the light's malfunction.
Moreover, even were we to accept appellant's contentions that the traffic light cycled quickly and that respondent was aware of a quick cycling problem, appellant has not demonstrated the foreseeability of injury.
Appellant contends that the short green light violated his "driver expectation" that the light would be longer. Drivers, however, are not entitled to rely on their expectations concerning traffic signals, but must watch and obey the signals whatever their timing. Sonntag v. Atkinson, 251 Minn. 328, 332-33, 87 N.W.2d 845, 848 (1958); Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 399, 10 N.W.2d 406, 410 (1943). In sum, whether the traffic light was functioning properly or cycling too quickly, appellant has failed to demonstrate the foreseeability of any harm in connection with it.
3. Standard of Care
Moreover, appellant failed to demonstrate that respondent breached the its duty to keep its streets safe by showing that respondent deviated from the usual "standard of care" followed by municipalities in circumstances like those presented here. Seaton v. Scott County, 404 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.App. 1987), review denied (Minn. June 25, 1987). The record is clear that respondent dispatched a technician to the traffic light after all reports of possible malfunction, and that the technician in each instance examined the light and its control mechanism for problems.
Appellant implies this response was inadequate, but neither he nor his expert articulates any specific failings offending a standard of care, such as evidence that prudent municipalities generally respond to unsubstantiated reports of traffic signal malfunctions by shutting down the signal or taking other action beyond that taken by respondent here.
Appellant contends generally that respondent failed to take citizen reports "seriously" and asserts that the failure of respondent's technicians to find a malfunction after any of the three citizen reports in August and September of 1993 "could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that those repair efforts were inadequate, and possibly incompetent." These contentions do not exceed "mere conjecture" and cannot survive summary judgement in the face of respondent's copious evidence that the light did not malfunction, including respondent's uncontroverted evidence that the signal continued to work for a year after the accident without repair. See Bob Useldinger Sons v. Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. 1993) (to survive summary judgment, a nonmoving party must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact "[by] some foundation other than mere conjecture").
4. Other Issues
Because appellant fails with respect to notice, foreseeability, and breach of duty, we need not address the causation prong of negligence briefed by the parties. Likewise, having concluded that appellant's negligence claim fails on its merits, we need not reach respondent's asserted defense of municipal immunity. Finally, we need not examine respondent arguments to disregard certain items submitted into the record by appellant. Even taking these items into account, appellant's claim does not survive summary judgment.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)