Opinion
No. CV 06 4001271S
August 25, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The petitioner, George Staton, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on August 22, 2006, challenging the legality of his detention. He was originally charged with kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92, attempted sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-70(a)(1) and 53a-49, assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(3), and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(1). Attorney Scott Jones was appointed to represent the petitioner. Jones negotiated a plea bargain by which the petitioner would plead guilty to sexual assault, assault, and risk of injury in exchange for a recommended sentence of twenty-five years incarceration suspended after fifteen years. On February 21, 2002, the petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement.
The petitioner was sentenced to twenty years incarceration, execution suspended after fifteen years plus ten years probation on attempted sexual assault, twenty years incarceration, execution suspended after fifteen years plus five years probation, to be served concurrently, for assault, and five years incarceration, execution suspended, plus ten years probation, to be served consecutively to the two prior sentences, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years incarceration suspended after fifteen years plus ten years probation. The conditions of probation included registration as a sex offender, sex offender evaluation and sex offender evaluation and treatment.
In an amended petition filed April 20, 2009, the petitioner now claims that Mr. Jones rendered ineffective assistance in that he failed to ensure that the pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, failed to consider that the petitioner was on medications at the time he pleaded, failed to adequately discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the state's case with the petitioner, failed to explain the consequences of a sexual assault conviction such as sex offender registration and treatment, and failed to explain the petitioner's prospects were he to take the case to trial. He requests that his pleas be withdrawn and that the case be restored to the docket. The respondent filed a return on May 7, 2009, denying the material allegations of the petition and raising the special defense of procedural default. The petitioner filed a reply on May 20, 2009, denying that procedural default is applicable because his claims are based on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The matter came before the court for a trial on the merits on July 9, 2009. Both the petitioner and attorney Jones testified. The parties submitted a number of exhibits including the crime lab report of the victim's clothing and person, statements given by the petitioner to the police, and the transcripts of the petitioner's plea and sentencing hearings.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On October 18, 2000, the petitioner approached the victim, who was caring for a two-year-old child, in East Rock Park in New Haven. He told her to come with him and that he had a gun; when she asked to see the gun, however, he became angry and threatened both her and the child. He then dragged the victim into the nearby woods and beat her with both his fists and a tree branch. He then fled, leaving the victim bruised and bloodied to crawl for help. When she was seen by passersby, her pants were open and there was blood on her underclothes. Subsequent tests conducted found no evidence of sexual trauma, although the victim told police that she had been raped. The petitioner called the police, initially saying he had seen a man running out of the woods around the time of the incident, only to later confess that he had committed the acts and turn himself in. While he admitted to dragging the victim and beating her, however, he staunchly denied that he had ever sexually assaulted her or that he had intended to sexually assault her. He claimed he "blacked out" and could not remember much of the incident, perhaps due to his cocaine use at the time.
The petitioner testified that he was taking medications at the time of his plea that impeded his ability to think and make decisions. No evidence was presented as to what his medication was, however. He also maintains that if he knew the extent of the requirements of his probation as a sex offender, he would not have pleaded guilty but instead would have gone to trial. He testified that Mr. Jones did not discuss the registration or treatment requirements with him, nor did he discuss the state's evidence or his likelihood of success at trial.
Mr. Jones testified that he came up with several strategies prior to trial that he discussed with the petitioner. The most favorable evidence came from the medical report, finding no evidence of sexual trauma; however, it was not dispositive because the lack of any other apparent motive — including a refusal of money when offered by the victim — and the victim's own statement, along with the blood found on her underclothes and fact that her pants were unbuttoned when she was found weighed against the petitioner. The petitioner's confession and the physical evidence made the chances of conviction on all other counts "a lock" for the state, and exposed the petitioner to a far greater sentence than the fifteen years secured by his guilty pleas. Moreover, even if the petitioner were acquitted of attempted sexual assault, he could still be subject to required sex offender registration if the court found that the kidnapping was committed for a sexual purpose. He credibly testified that he did not specifically recall going through the consequences of a sexual assault conviction with the petitioner, but that it was his standard practice to do so. He did discuss the state's evidence and the likelihood of success at trial with the petitioner. While he was aware the petitioner was taking medications, nothing on the date of the plea or beforehand suggested to Mr. Jones that the petitioner's ability to understand the proceedings was compromised.
Statutes § 54-254(a) provides in relevant part: "Any person who has been convicted . . . of any felony that the court finds was committed for a sexual purpose, may be required by the court upon release into the community to register such person's name, identifying factors, criminal history record and residence address with the Commissioner of Public Safety, on such forms and in such locations as the commissioner shall direct, and to maintain such registration for ten years . . ."
Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.
DISCUSSION
Before addressing the merits of the petitioner's claims, the court must address the respondent's special defense of procedural default. Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 284 Conn. 433, 447 n. 18, 936 A.2d 611 (2007). Contrary to the respondent's position, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of a guilty plea, as in the present case, are not subject to the cause and prejudice standard but, rather, are analyzed under the familiar Strickland/Hill standard for guilty pleas, because "[i]f a petitioner can prove that his attorney's performance fell below acceptable standards, and that, as a result, he was deprived of a fair trial or appeal, he will necessarily have established a basis for `cause' and will invariably have demonstrated `prejudice.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 571-72, 941 A.2d 248 (2008). Therefore, the court will address the merits of the petitioner's claims.
"In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction . . . That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense . . . Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nieves v. Commissioner of Correction, 92 Conn.App. 534, 536, 885 A.2d 1268 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 903, 891 A.2d 2 (2006). "For ineffectiveness claims resulting from guilty pleas, we apply the standard set forth in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), which modified Strickland's prejudice prong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dawson v. Commissioner of Correction, 106 Conn.App. 614, CT Page 14435 623-24, 942 A.2d 519, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 909, 950 A.2d 1285 (2008). "In Hill v. Lockhart . . . the court determined that the same two-part standard applies to claims arising from the plea negotiation process . . . [but] modified the prejudice standard. As in Strickland, the prejudice standard for plea negotiations is intended to determine whether, but for counsel's constitutionally deficient performance, the outcome of the plea process would have been different . . . [I]n order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial . . .
"The . . . court also stated that the petitioner must show that such a decision to plead not guilty would have been based on the likelihood that the introduction of the evidence or the defense that was not identified because of ineffective assistance of counsel would have been successful at trial." (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 571 n. 11, 941 A.2d 248 (2008).
The petitioner claims that his attorney failed to ensure that the petitioner did not enter his pleas knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The petitioner never evinced a strong desire to go to trial; rather, he held out only because he did not want to admit to a sexual assault that he maintained he did not commit. Upon the advice of his attorney and urging of his family, however, he ultimately accepted the deal voluntarily. The transcript of the plea hearing indicates that the court conducted a complete and proper canvass, and informed the petitioner of the possible consequences of a conviction of sexual assault. The court also informed the petitioner that he would not be allowed to withdraw his pleas once made absent court permission. The petitioner stated that he was making the plea freely and voluntarily and was not coerced or pressured to do so. "[A habeas] court may properly rely on . . . the responses of the [petitioner] at the time [he] respond[s] to the trial court's plea canvass." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carey, 86 Conn.App. 180, 185, 860 A.2d 776 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 915, 866 A.2d 1283 (2005) (upholding denial of habeas petition where petitioner testified at habeas trial that he was on medication at time of plea, in contrast to statement to court at plea hearing). The petitioner also stated at the plea hearing that he was not on any medications that would influence his decision. Despite now claiming that he was on strong antidepressive medications that made it difficult for him to think and answer questions, the petitioner has presented no evidence of what the medications were or what effect they would have had on his cognitive functioning.
In Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 284 Conn. 433, 936 A.2d 611 (2007), the court upheld the habeas court's denial of the petition where "the petitioner presented no testimony at the habeas trial, either from one or more . . . medical professionals . . . or from anyone else, demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the medication had adversely affected the petitioner's ability to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense." Id., 453. The petitioner in the present case has adduced even less supporting evidence, neglecting to even mention the specific medications he was taking. Mr. Jones credibly testified that he was aware the petitioner was on some sort of medication at some point prior to the plea, but that he never had trouble communicating with the petitioner, that he engaged in extensive conversation with both the petitioner and his family, and that, on the day of the plea, the petitioner's judgment and understanding did not appear to be impaired. There is no basis for a finding of deficient performance in failing to recognize the petitioner's alleged impairment, nor resulting prejudice to the petitioner therefrom. This claim is without merit.
Although the original petition mentions that the petitioner was on Thorazine, the amended petition does not so allege, nor was the specific medication or medications the petitioner was taking mentioned at trial; thus, this court was not presented with any evidence of exactly what medications the petitioner was taking. The petitioner's self-serving testimony that he felt the medication was strong and was making it harder for him to think and make decisions is insufficient to support his claim. Cf. Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 284 Conn. 452-53.
The petitioner also claims that his attorney failed to properly advise him of the strengths and weaknesses of the state's case, his prospects before a jury and the collateral consequences of a sexual assault conviction. These claims are readily refuted on the second prong of the Strickland/Hill test, which requires that a petitioner demonstrate that absent the deficient performance of counsel he would have gone to trial and achieved a better result than that obtained by pleading guilty. This the petitioner has failed to do. He faced, on all the crimes initially charged by the state, a potential sentence of seventy-five years incarceration, plus all the consequences of a sexual assault conviction he now laments. The state's case on the assault, risk of injury and kidnapping charges, both from this court's analysis of the record and from Mr. Jones's credible testimony, was extremely strong. While the sexual assault evidence was somewhat less compelling, there was still a grave risk of conviction — either on sexual assault or attempted sexual assault — based on the victim's testimony and the state of undress in which she was found. Moreover, even if he were acquitted of the sexual assault, he would still face fifty-five years incarceration on the remaining charges. The state's offer of fifteen years effective jail time was vastly more favorable than he was likely to obtain though a trial. Additionally, as Mr. Jones testified, even if acquitted of the sexual assault charge, the petitioner still might have suffered similar collateral consequences anyway if the sentencing court found that the kidnapping had been committed for a sexual purpose. See General Statutes § 54-254; see also State v. Pierce, 269 Conn. 442, 849 A.2d 375 (2004) (no plain error in trial court's finding that, even absent a committed or attempted sexual assault, kidnapping was committed for sexual purpose without evidentiary hearing on the matter). Thus, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by Mr. Jones's representation even if deficient performance were to be presumed, and his ineffective assistance claim is without merit.
The testimony of the victim, in concert with the petitioner's signed confession and with "really limited challenges" to the evidence made the state's case, as stated by Mr. Jones, "a lock."
CONCLUSION
Having failed to demonstrate that his guilty pleas were the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. Should the petitioner wish to appeal, counsel shall file a judgment file with the court within thirty days.