Opinion
Case No. 20030625-CA.
Filed April 14, 2005. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, Judge.
D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
John Edward Young appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2004). Young argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that police officers obtained as a result of an encounter at his residence. In search and seizure cases, we review the district court's factual findings "under a clearly erroneous standard." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 15, 103 P.3d 699. We review "the application of law to fact . . . for correctness," granting no deference to the district court's conclusions. Id.
Young argues that the district court erroneously concluded that his encounter with the officers did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Young testified that after answering his door: "[T]he officer reache[d] up and grab[bed] my hand and pull[ed] me out of the trailer." However, the officer testified that when Young opened the door, the officer merely asked Young to step outside without grabbing or pulling him. The officer's partner testified that he could not recall whether the officer physically touched Young. In weighing this conflicting evidence, the district court found that Young was not forced outside. Because this finding is supported by adequate evidence in the record, there is no clear error. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Furthermore, the district court correctly applied the law in determining that, under these facts, there was no seizure. See State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (noting that although an officer's "physical touching of an individual" is indicative of a seizure, "simply approach[ing] an individual . . . and ask[ing] questions" is not a seizure).
Young also contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officers conducted a warrant check, which revealed an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Young argues that an officer cannot conduct a warrant check without probable cause. However, contrary to Young's contention, an officer is not required to have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrant check unless the officer seizes the suspect in the course of performing the warrant check. See State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Utah 1994) ("Because [the defendant] was not seized when the warrants check was run, the evidence subsequently obtained for a search incident to . . . arrest was admissible."); Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ¶ 13 n. 2, 998 P.2d 274 ("A warrant check will not per se escalate the encounter into a level two stop."). As previously noted, the district court properly determined that Young was not seized. Thus, the officers did not need probable cause to conduct the warrant check, and the district court properly denied Young's motion to suppress.
Therefore, we affirm the conviction.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge, William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.