No. 05-08-01114-CR
Opinion issued July 8, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the County Court at Law, Kaufman County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 08CL-0579.
Before Justices MORRIS, WRIGHT, and MOSELEY.
Opinion By Justice WRIGHT.
The State of Texas appeals the trial court's order granting Christopher Shawn Wrenn's motion to suppress in a misdemeanor driving while intoxicated case (DWI). In two issues, the State contends the trial court abused its discretion by suppressing the evidence because the officer had the authority to search Wrenn without a warrant under articles 14.03(a) and 14.01(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We sustain the State's first issue, reverse the trial court's order, and remand for further proceedings.
The State refers to 14.01 without specifying a subsection. But the language in the State's brief tracks the language of 14.01(b), including the State's emphasis on the word "any" in noting that "the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that Trooper Mendez lacked probable cause to arrest Wrenn for any offense committed in his view."
Background
Robert James Mendez, a Texas state trooper, testified that he was dispatched to the scene of an accident on Highway 80. When Mendez arrived at the scene, he saw a pickup truck parked on the shoulder, and a trailer in the median. Tools and toolboxes were scattered on the roadway. Mendez saw Wrenn standing outside his truck. Wrenn's wife was parked nearby in her own vehicle. Wrenn told Mendez that the trailer became unhitched from his truck while he was driving around a curve. Mendez smelled alcohol on Wrenn's breath. Upon questioning, Wrenn said he drank about two beers before driving. Mendez then administered field sobriety tests, including a horizontal-gaze nystagmus test (HGN), a walk-and-turn test, a one-legged stand test, and a breathalyzer. After administering the breathalyzer, Mendez arrested Wrenn for DWI. Wrenn filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the results of the field sobriety tests, claiming his detention and the officer's search were illegal. The State maintained, among other things, that Mendez was authorized to arrest Wrenn pursuant to article 14.03(a)(1) because (1) Mendez had probable cause to believe Wrenn committed a breach of the peace, specifically, driving while intoxicated, public intoxication, and involvement in an accident, and (2) Wrenn was found in a "suspicious place." After a hearing, the trial court granted Wrenn's motion. Upon the State's request, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court made the following conclusions of law: (1) Mendez needed a warrant because he did not see Wrenn driving while intoxicated; (2) Mendez lacked probable cause to arrest appellant for driving while intoxicated; (3) Mendez lacked reasonable suspicion to investigate appellant for driving while intoxicated; (4) the accident scene was not a suspicious place; and (5) the accident was not a breach of the peace. This appeal followed. Discussion
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We give "almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts" and review de novo the court's application of the law of search and seizure. Id. Here, the relevant facts are undisputed. Thus, the proper standard of review is de novo. See Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Article 14.03(a)
In its first issue, the State contends Mendez had the authority to arrest Wrenn without a warrant because (1) Mendez had probable cause to believe a breach of peace, public intoxication, was committed; and (2) the detention and search occurred at a suspicious place. After reviewing the record, we agree. Article 14.03(a) authorizes a peace officer to make an arrest for breach of peace without a warrant (1) if there is probable cause, and (2) if the arrest occurs at a suspicious place. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(a) (Vernon 2007); Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460, 462-64 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Public intoxication and a DWI are both a breach of peace. Trent v. State, 925 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex.App.-Waco 1996, no pet.). An arrest is valid for a DWI, provided there is no proof of sham or fraud, even though the officer only had probable cause for the offense of public intoxication because the two offenses are closely related. See Warrick v. State, 634 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (citing United States v. Fossler, 597 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1979)); Elliott v. State, 908 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, pet. ref'd). A person commits public intoxication if that person "appears in a public place under the influence of alcohol or any other substance to the degree he may endanger the person or another." Tex. Penal Code § 49.02(a) (2003). The State only needs to prove that the person poses a potential, not an actual, danger. See Segura v. State, 826 S.W.2d 178, 184 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). "Probable cause exists where the police have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe a particular person has committed or is committing an offense." Tex. Dept. of Public Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). The State first argues Mendez had probable cause to detain and search Wrenn because a reasonable person could believe that Wrenn was intoxicated in a public place and might endanger himself or others. We agree. Mendez was dispatched to investigate an accident that occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a public highway. Once he arrived, Mendez saw the truck parked on the shoulder and the trailer resting in the median. The trailer hitch was damaged and the contents of the trailer were scattered over the roadway. Wrenn told Mendez he was driving the pickup truck when the trailer became unhitched. Mendez smelled alcohol on Wrenn's breath, and Wrenn admitted he drove his truck after drinking about two beers. Wrenn failed field sobriety tests and a breathalyzer showed the presence of alcohol. After reviewing the record, we agree with the State that Mendez had probable cause to believe Wrenn was committing the offense of public intoxication. See Reynolds v. State, 902 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) (officer had probable cause to arrest for public intoxication where appellant had slurred speech, unsteady balance, odor of alcohol, failed field sobriety tests, and was potential danger to himself or others because if not arrested "would have been free to depart in his car"); Segura, 826 S.W.2d at 185 (officer had probable cause to arrest for public intoxication where appellant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, was unsteady and posed danger to himself or others because he "could have run or driven from the scene in an intoxicated manner"). With respect to the second requirement of 14.03(a), after reviewing the record we conclude appellant's detention occurred in a suspicious place. "The determination of whether a place is a `suspicious place' is a highly fact-specific analysis." Dyar, 125 S.W.3d at 468. Any "place" may become suspicious when (1) a person at that location and the accompanying circumstances raise a reasonable belief that the person has committed a crime, and (2) exigent circumstances call for immediate action or detention by police. Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 366 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). The scene of an accident is not a suspicious place per se, but it may become one once a peace officer suspects the accused is intoxicated. See Gallups v. State, 151 S.W.3d 196, 201 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). "Accident" is defined as "an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated." Black's Law Dictionary 15 (8th ed. 2004). An accident does not necessarily include negligence. See Id. Here, contrary to Wrenn's suggestion, the location of the arrest was an accident scene. When the trailer became unhitched, in an unintended and unforeseen manner, it caused an injury or loss. It rolled or flipped, which damaged the trailer hitch and tools were scattered about the roadway. Further, Mendez reasonably suspected that Wrenn was intoxicated. When Mendez arrived at the scene in the early morning hours, he smelled alcohol on Wrenn's breath, and Wrenn admitted to consuming about two beers prior to driving. Finally, there were exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances include the need for an immediate search to prevent the destruction of evidence. See Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). The necessity of preserving evidence of a DWI suspect's blood alcohol level constitutes a contingency to preserve evidence. E.g., Gallups, 151 S.W.3d at 202; Winter, 902 S.W.2d at 575. A search becomes necessary because a suspect's blood alcohol level would dissipate in the time it took to obtain a warrant, and the State would be deprived of key evidence. Winter, 902 S.W.2d at 575. If Mendez had taken the time to obtain a warrant, the evidence probably would have been destroyed. Wrenn makes no allegation of fraud or sham, and we find no proof of it in the record. Because the record shows (1) Mendez had probable cause to believe a breach of peace, public intoxication, was committed; and (2) the detention and search occurred at a suspicious place, we conclude Mendez was authorized to arrest Wrenn without a warrant pursuant to article 14.03(a). We sustain the State's first issue. Having done so, we need not address the State's second issue. We conclude the trial court erred in granting Wrenn's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting Wrenn's motion to suppress and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.