Opinion
No. CR02-184460
June 24, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
After a jury trial, the petitioner, Gregory Winot, was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94, attempt to commit kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-94(a) and 53a-49(a)(2) and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(1). The petitioner was sentenced to 8 years incarceration followed by 10 years of special parole.
General Statutes § 53-94(a) provides, "A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person."
The petitioner's sentence was partially reversed. The judgment was reversed with respect to the conviction of kidnapping in the second degree and risk of injury to a child and the case was remanded with direction to render judgment of not guilty of those crimes. The judgment was affirmed with regard to all other respects. (See State v. Winot, 95 Conn.App. 332, rev'd in part (2006).) The petition by the state of Connecticut for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court was granted and limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that General Statutes § 53a-94 is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case?"
The kidnapping and risk of injuries charges were reversed as the touching of the victim's arm was insufficient to support convictions of those charges.
The appeal to the Supreme Court is pending. However, the petitioner elected to go forward in front of the Sentence Review Division. The sentence imposed by the trial court of 8 years incarceration followed by 10 years of special parole on attempted kidnapping in the second degree remand. It is from this sentence the petitioner seeks revision.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of July 19, 2002, at approximately 6 p.m., the twelve-year-old female victim was walking alone on Spruce Street in Manchester when she noticed a green car moving slowly along the opposite side of the street. The defendant, the driver of the car, stopped the car in the middle of the road and lowered the driver's side window. He pointed his finger at the victim and yelled, "I'm going to get you. You're getting in my car." He then got out of the car and walked across Spruce Street toward the victim with his arms stretched in front of him as if he was going to give the victim a bear hug. When he was approximately six feet from the victim, she ran away toward her house on Bissell Street. It took her only a matter of seconds to reach her house, where she told her mother what had transpired. The incident was not reported to the police.
Four days later, on July 23, 2002, at approximately 5 p.m., the victim was again walking home on Spruce Street when she noticed the same green car and driver. The defendant stopped the vehicle and rolled down the window. This time, without saying anything to the victim, he left the car and began walking toward her. She began to walk faster, but the defendant forcibly took her right arm. When she asked him to let go, he refused, yelling, "[n]o, it's too wet out here; you're getting in my car today." He tried to pull her toward his car, but she resisted, pulling back in the opposite direction. To get him to release her, the victim then leaned over to bite the defendant, at which point he quickly let go and rushed back to his car. In doing so, the defendant was almost hit by a maroon car. Upon being released, the victim ran home and told her mother what had transpired. The entire incident lasted only a few seconds.
The victim's mother called the police, and the victim gave a signed statement regarding the incidents, which took place on July 19, and 23, 2002. The victim also provided the police with a license plate number.
The police traced the license plate number to the defendant. Upon arriving at his residence that same day, the police observed a turquoise Ford Thunderbird with plates matching the number provided by the victim. Officer David Evans of the Manchester police department asked the defendant whether he had been on Spruce Street around 5 p.m. Although the defendant admitted that he had driven though that area on his way home from work, he initially denied having spoken to anyone. Subsequently, however, he admitted to Sergeant Jeffrey Lampson that he had offered a young woman a ride. The police brought the victim to the defendant's house, where she positively identified him as the man who had approached her on both occasions. The defendant was then arrested, handcuffed and placed in a police cruiser. Thereafter, Officer Evans obtained the defendant's permission to search his car.
The subsequent search revealed a rope noose and various debris in the trunk. Only the noose was seized. At the police station, the defendant admitted that on his way home from work, he had offered a young girl a ride home because it was raining, but denied any wrongdoing. See State v. Winot, 95 Conn.App. 332 (2006).
Counsel for the petitioner argues his client who was originally charged with Kidnapping in the First Degree was acquitted of the most serious charges. The petitioner is now forty and was in the National Guard at the time of the offense. His record indicates he was a good soldier. He believed no court would sentence his client to 8 years followed by 10 years special parole on just the attempted kidnapping in the second degree. Counsel states the charges were overreaching. There was a noose found in the petitioner's trunk, but there was nothing to connect it to this crime. Counsel refers to page twenty-one of the sentencing transcript where the court refers to the noose as little concern. The court stated he (the court) was half convinced the defendant did not know what he was going to do.
The state countered these claims by declaring there was enough evidence produced for a conviction of attempted kidnapping in the second degree. This was the petitioner doing the same thing to the same victim for the second time in four days. The act was never completed so we will never know what the petitioner was going to do. The sentence was appropriate.
Pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book § 43-23 et seq., the Sentence Review Division is limited in the scope of its review. The Division is to determine whether the sentence imposed "should be modified because it is inappropriate or disproportionate in light of the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the protection of the public interest and the deterrent, rehabilitative, isolative and denunciatory purposes for which the sentence was intended."
The Division is without authority to modify a sentence except in accordance with the provisions of the Connecticut Practice Book § 43-23 et seq., and Connecticut General Statutes § 51-194 et seq.
The trial court carefully reviewed all the facts and evidence in this case. The trial court remarked, ? . . . the defendant acted twice to the same victim and that was not a coincidence . . ." (See sentencing transcript, p. 28.) It would appear the sentencing court relied heavily on the fact that the evidence produced at trial demonstrated the petitioner had attempted to abduct the same girl twice in the same week. This is serious and dangerous behavior. Society needs to be protected from the petitioner, but in particular young children need to be protected from the petitioner. This could have had a catastrophic ending. The victim and her family were very fortunate. Taking all of the evidence adduced at trial and considered by the trial court, the sentence was appropriate.
In reviewing the record as a whole, the Division Finds that the sentencing Court's actions were in accordance with the parameters of Connecticut Practice Book § 43-23 et seq.
The sentence imposed was neither inappropriate or disproportionate.
The sentence is AFFIRMED.