Opinion
No. 11-15-00089-CR
04-07-2016
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. JERRY LYNN WILLIAMS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 106th District Court Dawson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 13-7261
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Jerry Lynn Williams for possession of morphine with intent to deliver and for possession of morphine. The trial court granted Williams's motion to suppress evidence, and the State appeals that decision. We reverse and remand.
I. Evidence at Suppression Hearing
Wally Garza, a trooper with the Texas Department of Public Safety, observed a vehicle as it traveled southbound along U.S. 87 in Dawson County. He determined that the vehicle's speed was 72 miles per hour, two miles per hour above the posted speed limit. Based on the radar reading, Trooper Garza stopped the vehicle. He approached the vehicle and made contact with Appellee and a passenger, Pamela Battle. He then asked Appellee to exit the car. Afterward, Trooper Garza questioned Appellee about where he had traveled from and asked about the nature of his trip and his intended destination. Battle was asked the same questions. Appellee's and Battle's statements were inconsistent as to the purpose of their trip and their destination.
Trooper Garza returned to Appellee, who stood at the side of the road, and requested that Appellee have a seat in the patrol vehicle while Trooper Garza "complete[d] the enforcement action." Trooper Garza determined that Battle owned the vehicle. Trooper Garza issued Appellee a warning for speeding and returned his driver's license and the insurance card. Trooper Garza then asked Appellee if there was anything illegal in the car. When he asked this question, Appellee "became very nervous." Trooper Garza asked him whether he was nervous, to which Appellee responded, "I am now."
Trooper Garza asked Appellee for consent to search the vehicle because Appellee was "in care, custody, and control" of the vehicle. Officer Garza also asked Battle for her consent because she was the owner. Both parties consented. Trooper Garza searched the car and found a clear pill bottle in the backseat. The bottle contained Xanax, hydrocodone, Singulair, lisinopril, Coumadin, and methadone. Trooper Garza also saw Appellee's cell phone "laying within view." Trooper Garza did not touch or manipulate the phone, but he observed a text message conversation in which an unknown sender told Appellee, "[S]he doesn't have all the money for the pills. What do you want me to do?" Appellee's reply read, "[T]ake the money she has and give her the pills." Morphine was also found in the car and seized by Trooper Garza.
Appellee moved to suppress the evidence seized. The trial court granted the motion and informed the parties in a letter that the trial court had found that the search "was not valid because it was obtained after the traffic stop was concluded when the warning was issued."
II. Standard of Review
We review the trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). We afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court evaluated witnesses' credibility and demeanor as part of the basis of its findings of fact. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-89. We review de novo the trial court's application of the law. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-89; Davila v. State, 4 S.W.3d 844, 847-48 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision and will uphold that decision if it is reasonably supported by the record. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327.
III. Analysis
The State argues that the trial court erred when it granted Appellee's motion to suppress because both Appellee and Battle gave Trooper Garza consent to search the vehicle. Neither party challenged Trooper Garza's initial stop. Therefore, we limit our analysis to the subsequent search of the vehicle. The trial court found that the consent to search was invalid "because it was obtained after the traffic stop was concluded when the warning was issued." The State asserts that "[t]he reasoning underlying the trial court's ruling is not supported by the record or by existing law." We agree.
It is well established that an officer may request consent to search a vehicle after the purpose of the traffic stop has been accomplished, as long as the request is reasonable under the circumstances and the officer has not conveyed a message that compliance with the officer's request is required. Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref'd); Leach v. State, 35 S.W.3d 232, 235-36 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.); Simpson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). Appellee did not testify or call any witnesses to refute Trooper Garza's testimony, and there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Trooper Garza's request was unreasonable or that he required compliance. We hold that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the search was invalid just because it occurred after Trooper Garza had issued the warning and concluded the traffic stop. See Leach, 35 S.W.3d at 235-36.
Appellee also argues that his consent was not voluntary. Appellee did not challenge the voluntariness of his consent during the hearing on his motion to suppress. However, Appellee raised the issue in his brief in support of his motion to suppress. Appellee also referred to the issue in his appellate brief when he wrote, "[T]he only question before this Court is whether the search was consensual." Appellee argues that the State failed to meet its burden to establish voluntariness. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
Although Appellee challenges the voluntariness of his consent, Battle's consent is uncontested. Thus, Appellant's consent was unnecessary. See Young v. State, 842 S.W.2d 364, 364-65 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1992, no pet.) (citing Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)) (holding that police who obtained consent from the owner of the car that they searched were not required to obtain driver's consent to search the car). Because Battle consented to the search, evidence collected from the search was admissible against Appellee. We hold that the trial court erred when it granted Appellee's motion to suppress.
IV. This Court's Ruling
We reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MIKE WILLSON
JUSTICE April 7, 2016 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
Willson, J., and Bailey, J.