Opinion
No. 109396
03-11-2021
STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMES WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.
Appearances: Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. Rick L. Ferrara, for appellee.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-10-544610-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. Rick L. Ferrara, for appellee. LISA B. FORBES, J.:
{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals from the trial court's granting James Williams's ("Williams") motion for judicial release. After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent law, we reverse the trial court's judgment because Williams is not an eligible offender under the judicial release statutes.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On April 18, 2011, Williams was convicted of multiple counts of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping, each with firearm, notice of prior conviction, and repeat violent offender specifications. In addition, Williams was convicted of having a weapon while under disability. On April 26, 2011, the court merged the burglaries and kidnappings into the robberies and sentenced Williams to 13 years in prison as follows: 5 years for the first count of aggravated robbery, consecutive to 5 years for the second count of aggravated robbery, consecutive to 3 years for firearm specifications. The court also sentenced Williams to 5 years in prison for having a weapon while under disability and ran that concurrent to the 13 years in prison.
{¶ 3} On direct appeal, this court vacated one of Williams's burglary convictions "because only one residence was invaded * * *" and affirmed the remainder of his convictions and the 13-year prison sentence. State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96752, 2012-Ohio-1043, ¶ 22, 40 ("Williams I").
{¶ 4} On November 29, 2018, Williams filed his first motion for judicial release, and on August 22, 2019, Williams filed his second motion for judicial release. The trial court held a hearing on the motions on December 20, 2019, and granted Williams's request, finding that he "is eligible for judicial release and has served any mandatory prison time." It is from this order that the state now appeals alleging two assignments of error:
The trial court's decision granting judicial release and modifying appellee's sentence which was imposed for felonies of the first degree
was contrary to law where appellee's mandatory sentence precludes him from being an "eligible offender" for judicial release pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(6).
The trial court's decision granting judicial release and modifying appellee's sentence which was imposed for felonies of the first degree was contrary to law where the trial court failed to make findings on the record and list the factors presented at the hearing as required by R.C. 2929.20(J).
II. Law and Analysis
A. Judicial Release
{¶ 5} A trial court may reduce an eligible offender's nonmandatory prison term through judicial release. R.C. 2929.20(B). R.C. 2929.20(A)(1)(a) defines an "eligible offender" as "any person who, on or after April 7, 2009, is serving a stated prison term that includes one or more nonmandatory prison terms."
{¶ 6} R.C. 2929.01(X) defines "mandatory prison term" as "the term in prison that must be imposed for the offenses or circumstances set forth in divisions (F)(1) to (8) * * * of section 2929.13 * * *. [U]nless the maximum or another specific term is required under * * * the Revised Code, a mandatory prison term described in this division may be any prison term authorized for the level of offense * * *."
{¶ 7} In the case at hand, Williams was sentenced to three years in prison for his firearm specification conviction, and it is undisputed that this prison term is mandatory. R.C. 2941.145 and 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii). Williams was also sentenced to two five-year prison terms for two counts of aggravated robbery, which are first-degree felonies, punishable by a prison term between three and 11 years. See R.C. 2911.01(C) and 2929.14(A)(1). The issue at the crux of this case is whether these two five-year prison terms are mandatory as a matter of law. If they are mandatory, then Williams's entire 13-year prison sentence is mandatory, and he is not an eligible offender under R.C. 2929.20(A)(1)(a).
{¶ 8} Each of Williams's robbery convictions was accompanied by a notice of prior conviction specification.
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.13(F) governs sentencing on notice of prior conviction specifications, and it states in pertinent part as follows:
the court shall impose a prison term or terms * * * and except as specifically provided in section 2929.20 * * * shall not reduce the term or terms pursuant to section 2929.20 * * * for any of the following reasons:
(6) Any offense that is a first or second degree felony * * * if the offender previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to * * * any first or second degree felony * * *.
{¶ 10} The Ohio Supreme Court has analyzed R.C. 2929.13(F), concluding that it addresses mandatory prison terms. In State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, ¶ 3, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "R.C. 2929.13(F)(6) requires a mandatory prison term for a first- or second-degree felony if the offender has previously been convicted of or pled guilty to a first- or second degree felony." See also State v. Ware, 141 Ohio St.3d 160, 2014-Ohio-5201, 22 N.E.3d 1082, ¶ 14 (In a case involving a notice of prior conviction, R.C. 2929.13(F) prohibited the court from subsequently granting judicial release. "Even if it wanted to grant judicial release in the future, R.C. 2929.13(F) explicitly prohibited it from doing so."); State v. Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 541, 2008-Ohio-69, 880 N.E.3d 896, ¶ 9 ("R.C. 2929.13(F) addresses mandatory prison terms * * *.").
{¶ 11} Accordingly, we are constrained to agree with the state that Williams's two five-year sentences are mandatory under the notice of prior conviction specification pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(6). It is undisputed that the trial court convicted Williams of the notice of prior conviction specifications attached to each of his aggravated robbery convictions. See Williams I, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96752, 2012-Ohio-1043, at ¶ 1. Therefore, Williams's ten-year aggregate prison sentence for aggravated robbery is mandatory as a matter of law. Compare State v. Caldwell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106456, 2018-Ohio-3370 (upholding a prison sentence as mandatory even where the defendant's indictment did not include a notice of prior conviction specification).
{¶ 12} We find that Williams's entire 13-year prison sentence is mandatory, and he is not eligible for judicial release. We are not insensitive to the facts of this case; however, we are bound by the Ohio Supreme Court's holdings in Hand and Johnson that notice of prior conviction specifications result in mandatory prison terms and preclude judicial release. Therefore, the court erred by granting Williams's motion for judicial release and the state's first assignment of error is sustained. Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c), the state's second assignment of error is moot.
{¶ 13} Judgment reversed. Case remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. /s/_________
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR