Opinion
No. COA11–1344.
2012-08-21
STATE of North Carolina v. Joe WILLIAMS, Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State. Duncan B. McCormick for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 24 February 2011 by Judge Richard A. Baddour, Jr. in Franklin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 March 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State. Duncan B. McCormick for defendant-appellant.
GEER, Judge.
Defendant Joe Williams appeals from his convictions of assault on a government officer and assault on a law enforcement officer inflicting serious bodily injury. On appeal, he argues only that the trial court erred in excluding records reflecting statements made to paramedics by Deputy James A. Williamson, the officer who was the alleged victim of the assault inflicting serious bodily injury. Because the evidence indicated that those statements were made when Deputy Williamson was suffering the effects of a serious brain injury, defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding these records under Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.
Facts
The State's evidence tended to show the following facts. On 27 February 2010, at about 10:30 p.m., Officer Elliott Coker of the Louisburg Police Department was called to the parking lot of a Citgo gas station in Louisburg, North Carolina. When he arrived, he found the parking lot filled with cars and the store full of people. The store owner asked for assistance in clearing out the store. As Officer Coker was doing so, one of the men inside the store confronted him, and Officer Coker took him outside to arrest him. At that point, the crowd surrounded the officer. Concerned that the situation was getting dangerous, Officer Coker called for backup.
As Officer Coker was attempting to take his prisoner to his car, defendant ran up behind him and either took off his shirt or pulled it up while yelling at Officer Coker: “Fucking shoot me, fucking shoot me. We're gonna fuck y'all up.” Officer Coker pulled his weapon and told defendant to stay back. Although another officer had arrived, Officer Coker felt the situation was getting even more out of control and called for additional backup.
As Officer Coker moved to restrain defendant, Deputy Williamson of the Franklin County Sheriff's Department arrived and tried to calm down defendant. When defendant continued to resist, Deputy Williamson attempted to use his pepper spray to subdue defendant. Officer Coker, defendant, and Deputy Williamson then fell to the ground. Officer Coker's finger was broken in three places. Other deputies arrived, helped Deputy Williamson up off the ground, and walked him towards a patrol car.
Subsequently, Deputy Williamson was transported to the Franklin County Regional Medical Center emergency room. At 11:30 p.m., less than an hour after the incident, an emergency room doctor attempted to evaluate Deputy Williamson, but he responded to the doctor's questions only intermittently because he was drowsy. At 12:40 a.m., the doctor determined that Deputy Williamson was deteriorating and, after reviewing a CAT scan, telephoned a Duke University neurosurgeon. Deputy Williamson was then transported by “life flight” to the Duke University Medical Center where he underwent brain surgery. Deputy Williamson remained at Duke until the end of March, at which point he was transported to Wake Medical Center where he remained until 18 May 2010.
Defendant was indicted for assault on a government officer, disorderly conduct, failure to disperse on command, and assault on a law enforcement officer inflicting serious bodily injury. At the close of the State's evidence, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the charges of disorderly conduct and failure to disperse on command. On 24 February 2011, a jury found defendant guilty of assault on a government officer (with respect to Officer Coker) and assault on a law enforcement officer inflicting serious bodily injury (with respect to Deputy Williamson). The trial court sentenced defendant to a presumptive-range term of 16 to 20 months imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.
Discussion
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by not admitting records relating to Deputy Williamson's treatment by emergency medical personnel immediately following his injury. Defendant points to the following statements in the records as being relevant:
History of Present Illness
Pt stated that he sprayed him self [sic] with Pepper spray.
....
EMS 2 Enroute and On scene. Found 61 y/o M sitting in front passenger seat c/o headache and his eyes burning. Assessed pt w/ Pt stated that he sprayed hm self [sic] with pepper spray. Flushed pt's eyes.
....
Loaded pt to truck reassessed pt obtained vitals. Pt stated that his head was hurting. Pt denies of falling or getting hit in the head. Reflushed pt's eye's [sic].... Noted: Pt's motor was off pt not acting right, pt confused and talking funny like he isn't in his right mind.
At trial, defendant argued that Deputy Williamson's statements that he had sprayed himself with pepper spray and that he denied falling or getting hit in the head were particularly relevant to the cause of his injury-in other words, whether the brain injury was the result of an assault by defendant. However, even assuming without deciding that the statements were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule, as defendant contends, the trial court also excluded the evidence pursuant to Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence.
Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” We review a trial court's decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion. State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 160, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial judge's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason.” State v. Summers, 177 N.C.App. 691, 697, 629 S.E.2d 902, 907 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court concluded with respect to the statements in the medical records that “in light of the other evidence regarding his mental and physical state in that time frame[,] that any relevance is outweighed by the potential danger of unfair prejudice or confusion due to the confusion of Mr. Williamson or himself [sic], or potential confusion.” The court stated further that “under the 803 and 403 analysis ultimately the Court decides that it will exclude these records finding that the potential prejudice or confusion of issues outweighs any probative value.” We cannot, under the circumstances of this case, conclude that the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence was manifestly unreasonable.
Evidence was presented at trial that Deputy Williamson did not remember being questioned by the paramedics. The paramedics themselves recorded their observations that the deputy's speech was slurred and that, in their opinion, he was not “in his right mind.” There was also no dispute that Deputy Williamson was immediately taken to an emergency room and, shortly thereafter, deteriorated to the extent that he was flown to the Duke University Medical Center for brain surgery.
Whatever the cause of the brain injury, statements that Deputy Williamson made immediately before being taken to the hospital were of extremely low probative value because of his mental condition. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the potential for confusion and unfair prejudice resulting from these statements to the paramedics outweighed any very limited probative value. See State v. York, 347 N.C. 79, 95, 489 S.E.2d 380, 390 (1997) (holding that trial court properly excluded under Rule 403 witness' testimony about letter she co-wrote when voir dire showed witness' “recall of significant events surrounding the drafting of the letter was questionable (including not knowing which portions of the letter were attributable to which of the three women), and that she was speculating on the ultimate purposes underlying the writing of the letter”).
No error. Judges McGEE and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).