Opinion
Nos. 26768-3-II, c/w 27611-9-II.
Filed: May 17, 2002. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County, No. 99-1-01823-2, Hon. Rosanne N. Buckner, November 17, 2000, Judgment or order under review.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Patricia A. Pethick, Attorney At Law, P.O. Box 111952, Tacoma, WA 98411-1952.
Counsel for Respondent(s), John M. Neeb, Pierce Co. Deputy Pros. Atty., Co City Bldg, 930 Tacoma Ave So Rm 946, Tacoma, WA 98402-2177.
Russell Anthony Williams appeals his conviction of two counts of murder in the first degree, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. We affirm.
Facts
On April 28, 1999, the State charged Williams and codefendant Dwayne Batemon with two counts of aggravated murder in the first degree. On October 5, 2000, the State asked the court to allow both defendants to plead guilty to two counts of murder in the first degree pursuant to an amended information. The prosecutor explained that one reason for the amendment and guilty pleas was to avoid requiring the victims' children to be interviewed and to testify. The children, ages 8 and 11, witnessed their parents' murders.
The court accepted the amended information and then considered Williams' pleas. Williams' attorney stated that his client was submitting a Newton plea and had not admitted guilt but added that he had thoroughly reviewed the defendant's statement on plea of guilty with Williams. After Williams stipulated to the admission of the affidavit of probable cause, the court questioned him closely about his statement. Williams denied that anyone was either forcing him to plead guilty or promising him anything in return for his guilty plea. Williams added that he was satisfied with his attorney's legal advice. After examining Williams, the court concluded that his pleas of guilty to two counts of murder in the first degree were entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
A Newton plea is entered when the defendant denies guilt but pleads guilty to obtain a lesser penalty. State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 372-73, 522 P.2d 682 (1976).
On November 17, 2000, the matter came before the court for sentencing.
At the start of the hearing, the State noted that Williams had sent a letter to the court arguing that his plea should be withdrawn because they were part of an unconstitutional `package deal.' Williams argued in the letter that he had been forced to accept the State's proposed offer because the State offered it on the condition that both he and Batemon accept.
After the State argued that Williams' motion to withdraw was not perfected because his request was made by a letter sent to the court rather than by a motion filed by his attorney, the court ordered the motion denied without prejudice and proceeded to sentencing. In arguing for its recommendations for both Batemon and Williams, the State said that the most important reason for the pleas was to spare the victims' children from further emotional trauma. In each instance, the court noted that it accepted the State's sentencing recommendation for the sake of the children. The court sentenced Williams to standard range sentences of 271 months on Count I and 240 months on Count II, with the sentences running consecutively.
On June 8, 2001, the court heard Williams' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Williams argued that his pleas should be withdrawn because the court was not advised when he entered them that the pleas were part of a package deal with his codefendant and therefore involuntary. He testified that he pleaded guilty only so his codefendant could take advantage of the deal the State offered. Although he admitted his guilt to Count II, Williams said, `I don't feel I should have had to have been put in the position as to put his life in my hands, as well as mine.' RP at 16-17. Williams also said that he pleaded guilty to Count I after his attorney explained the principle of accomplice liability. Williams further admitted that the State's offer allowed him to avoid the possibility of life in prison without parole on the original charges and saved him a substantial amount of time in prison on the amended charges.
In ruling on Williams' motion, the court noted first that it had presided over the case since July 1999 and was very familiar with it. It was clear to the court that although the term `package deal' was never used by the prosecutors, the goal was the same; that is, to reduce the charges against both defendants so that the children would not have to relive their parents' execution. The court also noted that the pleas were very favorable to both defendants. The court denied Williams' motion after making the following observation: `I did understand that this was a package deal at the time. And I believe that I made the appropriate inquiry as to whether you agreed you were pleading to this freely and voluntarily and without pressure.' RP at 40. The court then entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT I.
On October 5, 2000, an Amended Information, reducing the charges . . . to two counts of Murder in the First Degree, was submitted to the Court in anticipation of guilty pleas by this defendant and by his co-defendant[.]
II.
In identical written explanations of the reasons for the reductions of the charges in these two cases, the State made it clear to all concerned the most important reason for the charge reductions was the desire to spare the two children of the murdered victims the agony and trauma of having to testify at trial.
III.
The Court understood at that time that the two defendant's pleas were linked, that is both defendants had to plead guilty in order for either to get the reduced charges, in order for the goal stated in the Finding of Fact II to be achieved.
IV.
The defendant was represented by Wayne Fricke and Lance Hester at the time he entered his guilty plea on October 5, 2000, which attorneys had represented him since July 15, 1999.
V. This Court was assigned this case on July 20, 1999. VI.
After a very extensive colloquy with the defendant and his attorney concerning the defendant's written Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty and the State's recommended sentence, the Court accepted the defendant[']s pleas of guilty to two counts of Murder in the First Degree. Sentencing was scheduled for November 17, 2000. The co-defendant also plead guilty to identical charges that same afternoon.
VII.
Shortly after the pleas were accepted, the defendant communicated to the Court in writing that he wished to withdraw his pleas.
VIII.
On November 17, 2000, the defendant was sentenced pursuant to his guilty pleas and the sentencing agreements. His motion to withdraw his pleas was preserved for later hearing.
IX.
On January 25, 2001, the Court allowed Wayne Fricke and Lance Hester to withdraw, at the defendant's request, and Keith MacFie was appointed to represent the defendant.
X.
On June 8, 2001 at the hearing on the defendant[']s motion to withdraw his pleas, the defendant testified that although no one else had threatened or coerced him to plead guilty, he had `felt pressured' to plead so his co-defendant could get the benefit of the reduced charges and reduced sentences.
XI.
The defendant testified that he knew he himself, also benefited in a substantial way, `mathematically', from the reduced charges and reduced sentences.
XII.
The defendant testified that he plead guilty to Count II of the Amended Information because he was in fact guilty of that murder.
XIII.
The defendant further testified that after having his liability as an accomplice . . . explained to him by his attorney, he plead guilty to Count I of the Amended Information because he was guilty of that murder also.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter.
II. The linked nature of the guilty plea resolution in this case did not coerce the defendant into pleading guilty.
III. There is no risk of a false guilty plea in this case inasmuch as the defendant admitted his guilt under oath.
IV. The defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas on October 5, 2000.
V. No manifest injustice exists with respect to entry of those guilty pleas which would necessitate withdrawal of the guilty pleas.
CP 107-110. Williams now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw.
Analysis
A defendant does not have a constitutional right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Olmsted, 70 Wn.2d 116, 118, 422 P.2d 312 (1966). Such a motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and a reviewing court will set aside the trial court's exercise of discretion only upon a clear showing of abuse. Olmsted, 70 Wn.2d at 118.
Under CrR 4.2(f), a court must allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn whenever withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635, 641, 919 P.2d 1228 (1996). This rule imposes a demanding standard on the defendant to demonstrate "an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure." Branch, 129 Wn.2d at 641 (quoting State v. Saas, 118 Wn.2d 37, 42, 820 P.2d 505 (1991)). This standard applies to all guilty pleas, including Newton pleas. See State v. Dixon, 38 Wn. App. 74, 76, 683 P.2d 1144 (1984). Courts have found a manifest injustice where a defendant was denied ineffective counsel, where the defendant did not ratify the plea, where the plea was involuntary, and where the prosecution did not keep the plea agreement. State v. Wakefield, 130 Wn.2d 464, 472, 925 P.2d 183 (1996).
Williams argues that his pleas were involuntary because the court was not informed that they were part of a package deal and because he felt pressured to plead guilty for his codefendant's sake. As support, he cites several federal cases holding that in describing a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11, the prosecutor must alert the district court to the fact that codefendants are entering a package deal so that the court may make special inquiry into the plea's voluntariness. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11; see, e.g., United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657, 659-60 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1984). These courts have recognized that although package deal plea agreements are not per se impermissible, they pose an additional risk of coercion not present when the defendant is dealing with the government alone: `Quite possibly, one defendant will be happier with the package deal than his codefendant(s); looking out for his own best interests, the lucky one may try to force his codefendant(s) into going along with the deal.' Caro, 997 F.2d at 559.
In Caro, the remedy ordered after the State failed to inform the district court that a package plea was involved was a full hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea. Caro, 997 F.2d at 660. In Castello, the district court's hearing satisfied the requirements of Rule 11 where the court found that there were no threats or promises made to the defendant when she entered her plea; her attorney did not advise her improperly; the government did not engage in misconduct; the government would be prejudiced if the plea were withdrawn; and there was strong evidence of the defendant's guilt. Castello, 724 F.2d at 815.
We disagree with the State's contention that these cases do not apply to Washington because of differences between Rule 11 and CrR 4.2. Both Washington courts and the federal courts require prosecutors to state on the record the nature of a plea agreement and the reasons for that agreement. State v. Jones, 46 Wn. App. 67, 70, 729 P.2d 642 (1986) (citing CrR 4.2(e) and RCW 9.94A.090); Castello, 724 F.2d at 815 (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2)). We conclude, however, that the necessary information was provided and the necessary inquiry was made in this case. Here, the trial court held the usual inquiry into voluntariness when Williams entered his pleas. See State v. Stephan, 35 Wn. App. 889, 893-94, 671 P.2d 780 (1983) (when the defendant acknowledges the truth of his written statement on plea of guilty and the court questions the defendant and satisfies itself on the record that the various criteria of voluntariness exist, the presumption of voluntariness is `well nigh irrefutable'). Williams stated at that time that no one had made any threats or promises regarding his pleas and that he was satisfied with his legal advice. After he moved to withdraw the pleas, the court held a full hearing during which Williams testified. After that hearing, the court found that Williams had acknowledged his guilt on both counts as well as the benefit of the agreement's reduced charges and reduced sentences.
Furthermore, the court stated that it understood when Williams entered his pleas that the codefendants' pleas were linked, as both defendants had to plead guilty in order to achieve the goal of sparing the children `the agony and trauma of having to testify at trial.' CP at 107. While acknowledging Williams' testimony that he felt pressured to plead guilty for his codefendant's sake, the court concluded that the linked nature of the guilty plea resolution did not coerce him into pleading guilty; that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his pleas; and that no manifest injustice existed that would necessitate withdrawal of the pleas.
Williams assigns error to several of the court's findings and conclusions, but supports that assignment with argument directed only to finding of fact III and conclusions II-V. Where a defendant fails to support a challenge to the court's findings, we decline to review those assigned errors. RAP 10.3(a)(5); In re Estate of Lint, 135 Wn.2d 518, 532, 957 P.2d 755 (1998). Where review is appropriate, we determine whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and, if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of law. State v. Macon, 128 Wn.2d 784, 799, 911 P.2d 1004 (1996).
Finding III explains that the court knew the two defendants' pleas were linked because both had to plead guilty to protect the children from the trauma of testifying. This finding is supported by evidence showing that both the State and the court asserted, during the original hearing as well as the hearing on the motion to withdraw, that the main purpose of the pleas was to spare the children, and that such a goal could not be achieved if only one of the defendants pleaded guilty. The court was fully aware of the circumstances of the case, and its statement that it knew that the pleas were linked is fully credible and supported by the record.
Williams also challenges the court's conclusions that the linked nature of the pleas did not coerce him into pleading guilty, that there was no risk of a false guilty plea, and that the pleas were made voluntarily such that no manifest injustice was involved. During the hearing on the motion, Williams admitted his guilt as to Count II and said that he pleaded guilty to Count I after his attorney explained to him the concept of accomplice liability. This evidence supports the court's conclusion that there was no risk of a false guilty plea. Williams testified that no one made threats or promises in an attempt to compel him to plead guilty, and that testimony, as well as the considerable benefits Williams received from pleading guilty, supports the court's conclusion that he was not coerced into entering his pleas. Because the pleas were not coerced, there was no evidence to undermine the court's conclusion that they were made voluntarily and without indication of a manifest injustice. In short, the evidence shows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
WE CONCUR: HOUGHTON, J., HUNT, C.J.