Opinion
No. 4-182 / 02-1338.
June 9, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink, Judge.
Josette Amanda Williams appeals from her conviction for first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan Horvat and Jeffrey Noble, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Defendant Josette Amanda Williams appeals from her conviction for first-degree murder in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2 (2001). She contends the district court erred in admitting evidence that she and her codefendant shoplifted at a mall after Williams shot and killed Tam Minh Vu. We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
During the early afternoon of August 23, 2001, Josette Amanda Williams shot and killed Tam Minh Vu. The shooting occurred while Williams and Porsha Allen were stealing Vu's car. After Williams shot Vu, she and Allen drove Vu's car, a 1993 green Honda Accord, to the home of Williams' sister, Johnysa Williams. Shortly after they arrived, Williams removed the license plates and identifying papers from Vu's car.
Williams and Allen left Johnysa Williams' residence approximately ten to twenty minutes after they arrived. They took the gun used in the shooting with them and drove Vu's car to Merle Hay Mall where they shoplifted some clothing and shoes from two stores. As they were leaving the mall, Allen asked Williams if she felt bad that she shot Vu. Williams laughed.
Williams and Allen then drove to the Drake Liquor Store where Williams bought a cigar with change found in Vu's car. At the liquor store, Williams and Allen ran into La Chay McGruder. They invited him to join them. The three of them then drove to the Central City Liquor Store to get some cigarettes. While they were in the liquor store, a Des Moines police officer spotted Vu's car. Williams, Allen and McGruder left the liquor store and drove away in Vu's Honda. Williams noticed that a police car was following them. Realizing that she had been spotted, Williams sped away. Following a short pursuit, Williams slammed on the brakes and she and Allen ran from the car. Police apprehended both of them after a short chase on foot and transported the pair to the police station.
At the police station, Detective David Ness asked Williams for her name and address. Williams immediately began to cry and said she would take officers to the gun. After Williams waived her constitutional rights in writing, she led Detective Ness to the area through which she had run while fleeing from the police. She then showed Detective Ness the gun used in the shooting, which was hidden behind a piece of sheet-rock in a machine shop. When they returned to the police station, Detective Ness interviewed Williams. Williams told the detective three different stories.
Initially, Williams claimed she and Allen met McGruder at the Drake Liquor Store. She said McGruder was driving a green Honda Accord and that he asked her to drive it. Williams said she agreed and then drove to the Central City Liquor Store. According to Williams, while they were on their way to the liquor store, McGruder showed her a gun that he had in the glove compartment. She also informed Ness she noticed some clothing in the backseat that appeared to be new. When Williams asked McGruder about the clothing he reportedly told her his girlfriend stole clothes and then sold them at half price. When they arrived at the liquor store, Williams claimed McGruder noticed the police and then told her to drive away. According to Williams, McGruder told her where to drive and when to stop and run. She claimed she knew nothing about a shooting involving an Asian man.
After officers interviewed Allen and McGruder, Detective Ness confronted Williams with what he believed were inconsistencies in her initial statement. Williams then gave a second statement. She told Ness that she and Allen had been walking around looking for a ride to Merle Hay Mall. Williams said she and Allen approached Vu at a Kum Go and persuaded him to give them a lift. After Vu took them to where they told him to go, Williams stated she produced a screwdriver and ordered Vu to get out of the car. She claimed she and Allen then drove away. Williams made no mention of a gun. According to Williams, she and Allen drove to Merle Hay Mall in Vu's car where they stole some items from two stores.
After Detective Ness reminded Williams she had already led police to a gun, she gave a third version of the events surrounding the theft of Vu's car. Williams admitted she had used a gun to steal Vu's car from him; however, she claimed the shooting was an accident. She said that after Vu had exited the vehicle, she slid across the front seat to sit behind the wheel. Williams claimed the gun went off accidentally when she was trying to manipulate the steering wheel or gearshift. Williams also contended she did not point the gun at Vu or intend to kill him. Williams told Ness she and Allen went to Johnysa Williams' house after taking Vu's car and then drove to the Merle Hay Mall where they stole some items.
On October 4, 2001, the State charged Williams and Allen with murder in the first degree. Both Williams and Allen moved to sever their trials. The district court granted their motions. Allen subsequently pled guilty to robbery in the first degree and assault while committing a felony and agreed to testify against Williams. Allen was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.
Prior to her trial, Williams filed a motion in limine requesting in part that the State not be allowed to present evidence that Williams shoplifted items from the Merle Hay Mall after the shooting. The court ruled that the challenged evidence was admissible because it bore on Williams' state of mind at the time of the crime and because it completed the story of the crime.
At her trial, Williams defended on the theory that the shooting was accidental. The jury was not persuaded by Williams' defense and returned a guilty verdict on the charge of first-degree murder. Williams was sentenced to life in prison. She now appeals. Williams contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that she and Allen shoplifted after she shot Tam Minh Vu. II. Scope of Review
In the alternative, Williams claims her trial counsel was ineffective if she failed to properly preserve error on her challenge to the admission of the evidence of shoplifting during trial. The record reveals the parties treated the court's ruling on Williams' motion in limine as a final decision regarding the shoplifting evidence. In its brief on appeal, the State acknowledges that Williams preserved her claim for our review. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to address Williams' alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We generally review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." Id. "A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law." Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000).
III. Analysis
Williams' claims the district court erred in admitting evidence that she and Allen shoplifted at a mall after the shooting occurred. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404 (b) controls the admissibility of bad-acts evidence. It provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Iowa R. Evid. 5.404( b).
An important question regarding bad-acts evidence is whether the disputed evidence is relevant and material to some legitimate issue other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts. State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1987). If challenged evidence is relevant to a material issue in dispute, then it is prima facie admissible. State v. Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Iowa 2001).
Courts employ a two-step analysis to determine whether evidence of bad-acts is admissible. Id. First, the court must decide whether such evidence is relevant to a legitimate factual issue in dispute. Id. If the court determines the evidence is relevant, then the court must decide whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Id.; Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. If the answer to the second question is yes, this overcomes the prima facie admissibility of the evidence and the court must exclude the evidence. Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d at 298-299. We will reverse the district court's decision to admit bad-acts evidence only on finding a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
Williams first contends the disputed evidence was not relevant. She argues that because the shoplifting incidents took place "well after" she shot Vu, the evidence was not relevant to any material fact at issue. The State argues that the challenged evidence was relevant to several legitimate issues in this case including Williams' intent, the question of whether she acted with malice aforethought, and the question of whether the pistol used in the shooting discharged accidentally as Williams contended. The State also challenges the defendant's suggestion that the evidence was too remote in time from the shooting to be relevant.
Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Iowa 1997). Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Iowa R. Evid. 5.402. Unless the prosecutor can articulate a valid, noncharacter theory of admissibility of bad-acts evidence, such evidence should not be admitted. See State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 28 (Iowa 2004) (district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant possessed crack cocaine with intent to deliver three years before he allegedly committed the offense of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver).
The record in this case reveals the shooting was reported at 12:42 p.m., shortly after it occurred. Police officers spotted Williams at the Central City Liquor Store at 3:18 p.m. that same day. During the time between the shooting and when Williams was spotted in possession of Vu's car, Williams and Allen drove to the residence of Williams' sister, drove to the mall, entered the mall and stole clothing from Old Navy, left the mall, drove to another location in the mall parking lot, and then re-entered the mall and stole some shoes. Williams and Allen then drove to the Drake Liquor Store for a cigar. After leaving that location, they drove to the Central City Liquor Store where they were spotted. The State suggests that reasonable jurors could conclude Williams and Allen were at the mall shoplifting within one hour of the shooting. We agree that this is a reasonable inference. Based on the evidence presented at trial, reasonable jurors could also have concluded that Williams knew she had shot Vu when she went to the Mall with Allen.
Although Williams gave conflicting accounts regarding the shooting, she did admit that she saw Vu lie down after she fired the gun. Allen testified she saw Williams stick her hand out the car window and shoot Vu. She knew that Vu had been shot because Williams had pointed the gun right at him before she fired. Allen also testified that she saw Vu clutch the middle of his chest after Williams shot him. Later on, when Allen and Williams were leaving Merle Hay Mall, Allen asked Williams if she felt bad for shooting Vu. Williams laughed.
The fact that Williams went to the mall to shoplift about an hour after the shooting supports the State's argument that Williams was indifferent to Vu's fate. Reasonable jurors could conclude that Williams' behavior shortly after the shooting makes it more probable that she shot Vu intentionally and with malice aforethought, and not accidentally as she claimed. Williams' behavior after the shooting was inconsistent with the behavior one would expect from a person who sincerely believed that she had just accidentally shot another person. See State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d 557, 562-63 (Iowa 1995) (evidence of a defendant's behavior after a shooting, which is inconsistent with the defendant's claim that the shooting was accidental, supports the inference that the shooting was in fact intentional). We conclude the challenged evidence was relevant.
The disputed evidence also discredited Williams' initial statement to Detective Ness which suggested that when Williams first observed the Honda Accord, it was being driven by La Chay McGruder, and that the new clothing found in the victim's vehicle was connected to McGruder's girlfriend rather than to Williams and Allen.
Williams also contends that any probative value of the evidence of her shoplifting was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. If the probative value of the challenged evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence should not have been admitted. State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Iowa 1997). "Unfair prejudice is an undue tendency to suggest decisions by the fact finder based on an improper basis, often an emotional one." State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 1988). Of course, the whole purpose of evidence is to persuade the fact finder to find in favor of one party, so most evidence that damages a party's case is not to be considered unfairly prejudicial. Id. "Unfairly prejudicial evidence is evidence that appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action [which] may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case." Brown, 569 N.W.2d at 117.
Williams argues the shoplifting evidence was prejudicial because it suggested that she had a "propensity" to commit crimes. We believe there was little risk that the jury would infer Williams had a propensity to commit murder based on the evidence of her shoplifting. No reasonable juror could conclude that since Williams shoplifted she must have shot Vu. Moreover, the record does not support the conclusion that the challenged evidence was offered and admitted to show Williams' criminal disposition. The shoplifting evidence was offered to show the complete story of the crime, which began with Williams and Allen's desire to steal a car to go to the mall and get clothing, and ended with them acting on their intention. The fact that evidence of the circumstances immediately surrounding Vu's murder included some evidence that Williams committed a relatively minor offense soon after the shooting did not result in unfair prejudice to Williams. We find the probative value of the challenged evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Because we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the shoplifting evidence was relevant, and not unduly prejudicial, we affirm Williams' conviction.