Opinion
No. 07-1224.
April 2, 2008. NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEAL FROM THE THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, NO. CR-867-05 HONORABLE HERMAN I. STEWART, DISTRICT JUDGE.
David W. Burton, District Attorney, Richard F. Blankenship, Assistant District Attorney, Counsel for: State of Louisiana.
Mark O. Foster, Louisiana Appellate Project, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Bryan K. Williams.
Court composed of John D. Saunders, Michael G. Sullivan, and James T. Genovese, Judges.
Bryan K. Williams appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress cocaine found on his person during a weapons pat-down search. We affirm.
Facts
On August 24, 2005, at approximately 6:30 p.m., police officers with the DeRidder Police Department received information from a reliable confidential informant who advised that Defendant was in DeRidder, Louisiana, selling crack cocaine and was driving a green Pontiac car with a temporary license plate. At approximately 8:40 p.m., he was spotted driving a green Pontiac with an expired temporary license plate. He was stopped and during a pat-down search, the officer observed a clear plastic bag in his navel area. The bag contained nine rocks of crack cocaine.
Defendant was charged by bill of information with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A). He filed a Motion to Suppress, which was denied after a hearing. Following the denial of his motion, Defendant entered a Crosby plea of guilty in exchange for the State's agreement not to file a habitual offender bill. The State reserved its right to charge him as a habitual offender in the event the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress is reversed on appeal.
Pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976), an accused may enter a guilty plea but reserve his right to appellate review of pre-plea assignments of error.
Thereafter, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, which the trial court denied. He was sentenced to nine years at hard labor, the first two years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence and ordered to pay a fine of $2,500.00. The sentence was ordered to run consecutively to any other sentence to which he was subject. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied without a hearing.
Defendant appeals and assigns one error: the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
Motion to Suppress
Defendant makes numerous arguments in support of his claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and cites La. Code Crim.P. art. 703(D) and U.S. Supreme Court and Louisiana jurisprudence in support of his claim, including: 1) the traffic stop was invalid because the cocaine was seized during an invalid traffic stop, i.e., the stop and search were conducted without a warrant and the officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to do so; 2) under the Fourth Amendment, a search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se and while there are exceptions to this general rule, neither exception is applicable here; 3) the police did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop and search him and should have set up a more extensive surveillance of him until they observed suspicious or unusual behavior; 4) the informant's reliability was questionable because the informant reported that Defendant would possess a large amount of cocaine, but he only had nine rocks on his person; 5) the traffic offense used as a pretext to stop and search him was an expired temporary license plate; therefore, when he provided the officer with the required documentation, the officer had no further reason to detain him, arrest him, or issue him a summons.
Defendant cites Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983) and State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293 (La. 1985) as support for his argument that the police did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop and search him. In Raheem, as here, the information relied upon by the police to establish probable cause was provided by a confidential informant. The supreme court in Raheem discussed probable cause and whether information provided by a confidential informant is sufficient to establish probable cause:
Probable cause to arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to justify a man of ordinary caution in believing that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Probable cause must be judged by the probabilities and practical considerations of everyday life on which average men, and particularly average police officers, can be expected to act. State v. Tomasetti, [ 381 So.2d 420 (La. 1980)]. . . . In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned an inflexible application of [the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969), which required a showing of facts relating to the informant's basis of knowledge, veracity, or reliability] in favor of a "totality of the circumstances analysis." However, although the informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of knowledge" are no longer controlling, they are still relevant factors in the totality of the circumstances examination. As stated by the Court in Gates:
[A]n informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. . . . Rather, . . . they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. [Footnotes and references omitted.]
Corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police investigation is also valuable in applying the totality of the circumstances analysis. Illinois v. Gates, supra.
Raheem, 464 So.2d at 296.
The trial court applied the totality of the circumstances analysis enunciated in Gates and found that the information provided by the confidential informant established probable cause to stop and search Defendant; therefore, the seizure was valid. We find no error with the trial court's conclusion in light of the following facts which were established by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress: the informant had provided the police with accurate, reliable information over a twelve-year period which was used to make twenty-five to thirty arrests and convictions and the informant's knowledge of Defendant's actions was based on personal knowledge and corroborated by his purchase of the cocaine, his description of Defendant's vehicle, and his knowledge of Defendant's location. We further note that the reliability of the confidential informant was not challenged at the hearing; therefore, it is not properly before this court. La. Code Crim.P. art. 841.
Having found that the trial court's conclusion that the seizure of the cocaine found on Defendant's person was valid because the police had probable cause to stop and search him, we need not address individually all arguments Defendant makes in support of his claim that his arrest and the seizure of the cocaine on his person was not legal.
Disposition
The trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress is affirmed, as is his conviction.
AFFIRMED.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules — Courts of Appeal. Rule 2-16.3.