Opinion
Nos. 9802012812, 1K98-02-0810-R1.
Decided: March 28, 2000. April 17, 2000
Upon Defendant's Motion, For Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
John R. Garey, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for the State of Delaware.
Mr. Ricardo L. Williams, pro Se.
ORDER
On this 17th day of April, 2000, upon consideration of the defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief, the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, the defendant's submission concerning the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) The defendant, Ricardo L. Williams ("Williams") pled guilty on the day his trial began, March 4, 1999, after the jury was sworn in, to one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree ("USI 1st"), 11 Del. C. § 775. Williams was facing trial on two counts of USI 1St with the possibility of 30 years minimum mandatory incarceration and up to life, if found guilty of both charges. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State nolle prossed the second count of USI 1St and a presentence investigation was ordered. Williams was sentenced on May 7, 1999 to thirty years incarceration suspended after twenty five years for varying levels of probation. Williams did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the Delaware Supreme Court. Instead, Williams chose to file a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
(2) The Court referred this motion to Superior Court Commissioner Andrea M. Maybee pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512 (b) and Superior Court Criminal Rule 62 for proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. The Commissioner has filed a Report and Recommendation concluding that the motion for postconviction relief should be denied as procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3) and as meritless. By letter dated March 2, 2000, Williams concurred with the Commissioner's findings.
NOW THEREFORE, after careful and de novo review of the record in this action, and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation dated March 28, 2000,
IT IS ORDERED that:
(A) The well-reasoned Commissioner's Report and Recommendation is adopted by the Court;
(B) The defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED . __________________ President Judge
cmh oc: Prothonotary xc: Hon. Andrea M. Maybee John R. Garey, Esq. Ricardo L. Williams Order Distribution (w/Report Recommendation)
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Defendant, Ricardo L. Williams ("Williams") pled guilty on the day his trial began, March 4, 1999, after the jury was sworn in, to one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree ("USI 1st"), 11 Del. C. § 775. Williams was facing trial on two counts of USI 1st with the possibility of 30 years minimum mandatory incarceration and up to life, if found guilty of both charges. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State nolle prossed the second count of USI 1st and a presentence investigation was ordered. Williams was sentenced on May 7, 1999 to thirty years incarceration suspended after twenty five years for varying levels of probation. Williams did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the State Supreme Court, instead he filed the instant motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In his motion, Williams alleges several grounds for relief including that his trial counsel was ineffective.
Under Delaware Law this Court must first determine whether Williams has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (i) before it may consider the merits of his postconviction relief claim. This is Williams' first motion for postconviction and it was filed within three years of his conviction becoming final, so the requirements of Rule 61(i)(1) — requiring filing within three years — and (2) — requiring that all grounds for relief be presented in initial Rule 61 motion — are met. None of Williams' claims were raised at the plea, sentencing or on direct appeal, therefore, they are barred by Rule 61(i)(3) absent a demonstration of cause for the default and prejudice. Several of Williams' contentions are based on ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, he has alleged cause for his failure to have raised these issues earlier. Rule 61(i)(3) does not bar relief as to those claims at this point should Williams demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
In his first ground for relief, Williams claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file pretrial motions concerning the indictment. This claim is meritless as Williams' guilty plea waived any claim based on alleged errors in the indictment. In Haskins the Delaware Supreme Court stated that "[a] `voluntary and intelligent' plea agreement waives all defects allegedly occurring before the defendant enters the plea with the exception of subject matter jurisdiction." Clearly this ground for relief is meritless.
See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Simon v. State, Del. Supr., No. 224, 1992, Veasey, C.J. (August 10, 1992) (ORDER); Haskins v. State, Del. Supr., No. 188, 1991, Moore, J. (August 19, 1991) (ORDER); Downer v. State, Del Supr., 543 A.2d 309, 312-313 (1988).
Haskins, supra, at 2-3.
Williams' second claim for relief similarly alleges error with respect to the charges. Williams claims there was "multiplicity." This claim was not raised earlier and is thus barred by Rule 61 (i)(3). Even on the merits, however, this claim is meritless as Williams waived the claim when he plead guilty. Finally, Williams has made no concrete allegations of prejudice as to either his first or second grounds for relief.
See Petition of Palmer, Del. Supr., No. 298, 1996, Hartnett, J., (August 19, 1996) (ORDER). See also Henderson, supra; Simon, supra; Haskins, supra; Downer, supra.
Williams' remaining ground for relief is that his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty and was ineffective. This contention superficially raises the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams must meet the two prong test of Strickland v. Washington. In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires that a defendant show: 1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 2) that counsel's actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that the result of a trial would have been his acquittal. In addition, Delaware courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable. This standard is highly demanding. Strickland mandates that when viewing counsel's representation, this Court must endeavor to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight."
466 U.S. 668 (1984) (" Strickland"); Larson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 200, 1994, Hartnett, J. (June 23, 1995) (ORDER); Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53 (1988), Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1992).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; Accord Larson v. State, supra, at 3-4; Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 18, 1994) (ORDER); Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d at 1172; Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 58.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556; Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., No. 318, 1993, Holland, J. (March 31, 1994) (ORDER).
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 689); see also Larson v. State, supra, at 4; Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 at 753 (1990).
Id. at 754.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 639.
Following a complete review of the record in this matter, including the presentence report, it is abundantly clear that Williams has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his attorney was ineffective. I find counsel's affidavit, in conjunction with the record, more credible than Williams' contention that he did not knowingly enter his plea or that his counsel and the State "manipulated" him into entering the clearly beneficial plea agreement. Williams was facing trial on two charges of USI 1st with a ten year old girl and risked being sentenced to thirty years minimum mandatory incarceration or life imprisonment. Williams' counsel was able to negotiate a plea bargain with the State after the jury was sworn in which limited the potential amount of minimum mandatory time. Williams and his attorney discussed the case prior to the entry of the plea. The plea bargain was clearly advantageous to Williams. Counsel's representation was certainly well within the range required by Strickland. Additionally, when Williams entered his guilty plea he stated he was satisfied with defense counsel's performance. He is bound by his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Consequently, Williams has failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective under the Strickland test.
Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 18, 1994) (ORDER); Mapps v. State, Del. Supr., No. 3, 1994, Holland, J. (March 17, 1994) (ORDER) (citing Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (1994)).
Even assuming, arguendo that counsel's representation of Williams was somehow deficient, Williams must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk dismissal. Williams simply asserts that his counsel didn't do enough in an attempt to show prejudice. Williams does not suggest what more counsel could have done. This statement is insufficient to establish prejudice. Williams' current self-serving claims of innocence are not credited. In fact, Williams confessed to the police that he had intercourse with the victim twice. The confession was videotaped. The case against Williams was very strong indeed. Williams has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from counsel's representation.
Larson v. State, supra, at 5; Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556.
To the extent Williams alleges his plea was involuntary, the record clearly contradicts Williams' allegation. When addressing the question of whether a plea was constitutionally knowing and voluntary, the court looks to the plea colloquy to determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary. At the guilty plea hearing, the Court asked Williams whether he understood the nature of the charges, the consequences of his pleading guilty and whether he was voluntarily pleading guilty. The Court asked Williams if he understood he would waive his constitutional rights if he pled guilty, if he understood each of the constitutional rights listed on the guilty plea form and whether he gave truthful answers to all the questions on the form. The Court asked Williams if he had discussed the guilty plea and its consequences fully with his attorney. The Court asked Williams if he was giving the plea of his own free will because he was in fact guilty. The Court asked Williams if he understood the maximum sentence he could receive by pleading guilty was life incarceration. The Court also asked Williams if he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. Finally, the Court asked Williams if he was in fact, guilty of the charge. Williams answered each of these questions clearly and affirmatively.
Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.C-1 2680, 2687 (1993).
Transcript of guilty plea at 3-9.
Furthermore, prior to entering his guilty plea, Williams filled out a Guilty Plea Form and signed it. Williams wrote that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charge listed in the plea agreement. Williams is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty Plea Form unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. Consequently, I confidently find that Williams entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that these grounds for relief are completely meritless.
Hickman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 298, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 11, 1994) (ORDER); Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 465, 1989, Walsh, J. (January 4, 1990) (ORDER). See also Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 938 (1994) (ruling the fact that defendant filled out Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form in defendant's own handwriting supported the Superior Court's conclusion that defendant's decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary).
I find that Williams' counsel represented him in a competent and effective manner and that Williams has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that Williams' guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. As to Williams' remaining claims, they are all barred by Rule 61(i)(3). I recommend that the Court deny Williams' motion for postconviction relief. ________________________________ Commissioner Andrea M. Maybee
oc: Prothonotary cc: Hon. Henry duPont Ridgely John R. Garey, Esq. Ricardo L. Williams File