Opinion
No. C1-02-341.
Filed December 17, 2002.
Appeal from the District Court, Ramsey County, File No. TX0143755.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General,; and Manuel Cervantes, St. Paul City Attorney, Jessica S. McConaughey, Assistant City Attorney, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Theodora Gaitas, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Harten, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Mark Wenzel challenges the district court's denial of his postsentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea to disorderly conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2000). We affirm.
DECISION
A reviewing court will reverse the district court's determination of whether to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea only if the district court abused its discretion. Barragan v. State, 583 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Minn. 1998). While a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, a court must allow the withdrawal of a plea to correct a manifest injustice. Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.05, subd. 1; see also Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 1997) (stating that while a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant may withdraw the plea upon proof to the court that it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice). A manifest injustice occurs if the plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligently entered. Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998).
Appellant first contends that his plea was not intelligently made. In order for the plea to be intelligent and knowing, a defendant must be aware of relevant circumstances and direct consequences of the plea. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468 (1970) (stating a plea is a waiver of the constitutional right to a trial and thus must involve "knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences"); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 675 (Minn. 2000) (holding defendant must have "knowledge of the consequences of the plea"). Direct consequences are those that "flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea, namely, the maximum sentence to be imposed * * * ." Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578. Definite, immediate, and automatic consequences must be punitive and a part of a defendant's sentence in order to constitute direct consequences for purposes of establishing manifest injustice entitling a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn. 2002). "A defendant need not be advised of every consequence for his plea to be intelligent * * * ." Id. at 903 (emphasis in original).
Appellant contends that his plea was not intelligently made because: (1) domestic abuse programming was not a part of the plea agreement; and (2) he was unaware that Ramsey County Community Corrections would classify his amended disorderly conduct conviction as a "crime of violence."
1. Domestic Abuse Programming
As a condition of appellant's probation, the district court ordered him to complete domestic abuse programming. The district court ordered the domestic abuse programming on the recommendation of the presentencing investigation (PSI), which concluded that appellant had a history of domestic violence.
We conclude that domestic abuse programming was not a direct consequence of the plea. First, the domestic abuse programming did not flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea. See Alanis, 573 N.W.2d at 578. The district court was not required to order domestic abuse programming. Rather, the court was allowed to exercise its discretion with regard to the PSI recommendation that appellant attend domestic abuse programming.
Second, required attendance in domestic abuse programming is not punitive in nature. The supreme court in Kaiser stated that consequences like revocation of driving privileges following a drunk driving conviction or loss of the right to possess a gun following a conviction for a violent felony are not direct consequences because the purpose behind these consequences is to protect the public. Kaiser, 641 N.W.2d at 905. The court in Kaiser held that sexual predator registration is also a collateral consequence because it "seeks to increase public safety * * * ." Id. at 906. Likewise, the purpose behind ordering appellant to attend domestic abuse programming is to protect the public from an individual who has a history of domestic violence.
Because domestic abuse programming is not a direct consequence of appellant's guilty plea and it is not punitive in nature, the guilty plea did not result in a manifest injustice. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring appellant to attend domestic abuse programming as part of his guilty plea.
2. Disorderly Conduct as a Crime of Violence
Appellant contends that he was unaware when he pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct that disorderly conduct would be classified as a "crime of violence" by the probation office. Appellant argues that this resulted in a manifest injustice. We disagree.
Appellant was originally charged with domestic abuse pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.2242 (2000). He later pleaded guilty to an amended charge of disorderly conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2000), and the state agreed that appellant would serve no additional jail time. "Crimes of violence" are defined by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5. Disorderly conduct is not listed as a "crime of violence."
The decision of the probation office to classify appellant's conviction as a crime of violence is a collateral consequence of appellant's conviction. It has been held that the decisions of entities separate from the courts are collateral consequences. See State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn.App. 1999) (because revocation of driving privileges depends on action by Minnesota Department of Public Safety, court held that revocation of license is collateral consequence of pleading guilty to driving under the influence); see also Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578 (holding deportation is a collateral consequence of guilty plea because deportation is neither definite, immediate, nor automatic and before a resident alien can be deported, the INS must exercise its discretion to commence deportation proceedings).
Ramsey County Community Corrections and not the district court, decided to treat appellant's conviction as a "crime of violence" for the purposes of its probationary supervision. Thus, this consequence did not follow definitely, immediately, or automatically from appellant's guilty plea, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.