Opinion
No. 109,963.
2013-11-8
STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Levi A. WEAVERLING, Appellee.
Appeal from Douglas District Court; Paula B. Martin, Judge. Andrew D. Bauch and Patrick J. Hurley, assistant district attorneys, Franklin Katschke, legal intern, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. John J, Benge, of Benge Law Firm, of Lenexa, for appellee.
Appeal from Douglas District Court; Paula B. Martin, Judge.
Andrew D. Bauch and Patrick J. Hurley, assistant district attorneys, Franklin Katschke, legal intern, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. John J, Benge, of Benge Law Firm, of Lenexa, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., ARNOLD–BURGER and POWELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
POWELL, J.
The State of Kansas appeals the district court's order granting Levi Weaverling's motion to suppress. The district court, making a very difficult decision, held that the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of Weaverling's truck because the stated reason for the stop—that Weaverling made an improper right turn on a red light—was not supported by the facts. The State argues (1) the district court erred by excluding evidence that explained the timing of the traffic light, and (2) the court incorrectly granted the motion to suppress by concluding the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion.
Because the district court's finding of a lack of reasonable suspicion is based upon predicate findings of fact, and because those findings of fact are supported in the record, we must affirm the district court.
Factual and Procedural History
On February 26, 2012, at approximately 1:25 a.m., Trooper Christopher Beas approached the traffic light at the intersection of 19th and Massachusetts Streets in Lawrence, Kansas. Beas observed Weaverling driving a white pickup truck, traveling southbound on Massachusetts Street, then making a right turn onto 19th Street. Beas could not see the traffic light facing the truck, but he believed the truck had run the red light. Beas testified at the hearing that the truck was in “the middle of the intersection” when the light facing Beas turned green. Beas admitted that he could not see the white line in the truck's lane behind which a vehicle should stop when the light was red. Therefore, Beas could not testify as to where the truck was located in relation to the white line when his light turned green.
Beas also clarified he had not made any type of calculations in his mind, such as how long it took the truck to travel from the white line on the street to the middle of the intersection or how long it took to complete the turn. Based on Beas' training and experience, he estimated the truck accelerated through the intersection, traveling at approximately 30 miles per hour.
Believing the truck to have run the red light, Beas followed and stopped the truck. Ultimately, Beas arrested Weaverling for driving under the influence of alcohol. Weaverling was charged under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 8–1567(a)(2). On April 1, 2013, Weaverling filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging that Beas did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Weaverling committed the traffic infraction leading to the stop.
On May 1, 2013, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Weaverling's motion to suppress. Beas testified, the video from his in-car camera was played and admitted into evidence, and the State called city worker Todd Lohman to testify. Lohman began to testify regarding the timing and sequencing of the traffic light at the intersection where Beas witnessed Weaverling turn. Weaverling objected to Lohman's testimony for relevance, arguing that because Beas did not make any determinations as to the time or timing of the phases of the lights, the testimony regarding the timing of the traffic light cycles was irrelevant. The district court sustained the objection explaining that though the timing of the traffic light may be relevant at a later proceeding, the current hearing only involved whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion that Weaverling committed a traffic violation. Beas testified his reasonable suspicion was based on his observations alone; therefore, the timing of the traffic light was irrelevant to the issue before the court.
The State made a proffer for the record of the testimony Lohman would have provided. Lohman would have testified that when one traffic light turns red, there is a 2–second delay before the other direction's traffic light turns green. At the intersection in question, there is a 2–second period of time when all lights are red and no cars are moving.
After a short recess, the district court granted Weaverling's motion to suppress, ruling the traffic stop was not based on reasonable suspicion. The district court found Weaverling was “clearly through [the] intersection by the time the trooper's light turned green. He was three-quarters of the way through while [Beas' light] was still red.... [T]here's no evidence about where the white line was to know where his car was in relation to that. But as far as completing the turn, by the time the trooper's light turned green, [Weaverling] was way past the middle of his turn and had almost completed his turn.”
The State filed a timely interlocutory appeal.
Did the District Court Err in Excluding Testimony Regarding the Timing of the Traffic Light?
The State argues that the district court improperly excluded Lohman's testimony because the timing of the light was at issue and would have lent weight and credibility to Beas' observations and overall experience in conducting traffic stops.
An appellate court exercises de novo review of a challenge to the adequacy of the legal basis of a district judge's decision on the admission or exclusion of evidence. State v. Holman, 295 Kan. 116, 133, 284 P.3d 251 (2012). Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible. K.S.A. 60–407(f). Relevant evidence is defined in K.S.A. 60–401(b) as “evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.” A fact is material if it “has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case and is in dispute.” State v. Stafford, 296 Kan. 25, 43, 290 P.3d 562 (2012). Review for materiality is de novo. State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 857, 295 P.3d 1020 (2013). “Evidence is probative if it has any tendency to prove any material fact.” Stafford, 296 Kan. at 43. An appellate court reviews the district court's assessment of the probative value of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Ultreras, 296 Kan. at 857.
The issue before the district court was whether Beas had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. The issue was not whether Weaverling committed a traffic violation by running a red light.
At the time Beas made his decision to stop Weaverling, Beas had not given consideration to the sequence and timing of the traffic light, the location of the white stop line, or how long Weaverling took to complete the turn. Beas testified that he based the stop solely upon the fact that his light turned green when Weaverling's vehicle was in the middle of the intersection. While the timing of the traffic lights and the 2–second delay may have been material to whether Weaverling committed a traffic infraction, it was not material to whether Beas had reasonable suspicion. The district court did not err in excluding the testimony of Lohman.
Did the District Court Err in Granting Weaverling's Motion to Suppress?
The State raises three objections to the district court's granting of Weaverling's motion to suppress. First, it argues the district court failed to properly defer to Beas' judgment. Second, the State argues the district court ruled on whether Weaverling was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the traffic violation rather than merely deciding whether Beas had reasonable suspicion to stop Weaverling. Third, the State argues the court incorrectly held that Beas did not have reasonable suspicion.
Review of a district court's decision on a motion to suppress uses a bifurcated standard. The appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. In reviewing the factual findings, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Martinez, 296 Kan. 482, 485, 293 P.3d 718 (2013). Substantial evidence refers to legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as being adequate to support a conclusion. State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 862, 269 P.3d 1260 (2012). The ultimate legal conclusion is reviewed using a de novo standard. Martinez, 296 Kan. at 485. The State bears the burden to demonstrate that a challenged search or seizure was lawful. State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 5, 251 P.3d 618 (2011).
The State cites to State v. Butts, 46 Kan.App.2d 1074, 269 P.3d 862 (2012), to support its first allegation that the district court failed to defer to Beas' judgment. The Butts court deferred to the police officer's estimation of the speed of the vehicle when considering whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Butts was speeding. See 46 Kan.App.2d at 1081–87. However, Butts does not support the State's argument in this instance. Though the court may choose to defer to a law enforcement officer's testimony of the speed of a vehicle based upon the officer's training and experience (the factual predicate necessary to support reasonable suspicion under the facts in Butts ), in this case the State does not explain why Beas' training and experience somehow aids the court in determining whether Weaverling made an improper right turn—the stated reason for the traffic stop. The district court was not required just to accept the trooper's testimony on its face. See State v. Anguiano, 37 Kan.App.2d 202, 205, 151 P.3d 857 (2007) (“there must be reasonable suspicion, based upon objective facts”). Therefore, the district court was entitled to make an independent judgment of the facts to aid its evaluation of whether reasonable suspicion existed and was not required to defer to Beas' judgment in this instance.
For its second argument, the State contends the district court erred by applying the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt to hold that Weaverling was not guilty of running a red light rather than using the lesser standard to decide whether Beas had reasonable suspicion. The State points out that even if Weaverling was not guilty of the traffic violation itself, it would not play a role in determining whether Beas had reasonable suspicion. The court's findings centered on the evidence showing that Weaverling's headlights were a “big flash” on the screen because the lights were already angled directly at the police cruiser's camera, indicating a near completion of the turn, when the trooper's light turned green. The court did not make findings regarding when Weaverling's light turned red or where Weaverling was in relation to the white stop line. Such findings would have been necessary to decide whether Weaverling committed the traffic violation. The district court's ruling from the bench does not support the State's allegation that the court applied the wrong standard.
The State's third and ultimate argument is the district court incorrectly granted Weaverling's motion to suppress by holding Beas, despite his testimony and the video of the stop, did not have reasonable suspicion. Weaverling argues the district court's findings of fact were supported by substantial competent evidence and the district court correctly concluded those facts were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. We agree with Weaverling because of our very narrow standard of review in a case like this.
While we may review the record to determine whether it supports the district court's factual findings, we may not “invade the district court's province of determining witness credibility or weighing the evidence.” State v. Garcia, 297 Kan. 182, 187, 301 P.3d 658 (2013) (quoting State v. Diaz–Ruiz, 42 Kan.App.2d 325, 329, 211 P.3d 836 [2009] ).
The district court made the following findings of fact.
1. Weaverling's truck was through the intersection by the time Beas' light turned green.
2. Weaverling's truck was past the middle of the turn, and had almost completed the turn, when Beas' light turned green.
3. Weaverling's truck was three-quarters of the way through the intersection while Beas' light was still red.
4. When Beas' light turned green, Weaverling's headlights made a “big flash” on the video screen because he was headed directly towards Beas' vehicle.
5. Beas did not know where the white stop line was in relation to Weaverling's truck.
Beas' testimony reveals that the district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. Beas testified that Weaverling's truck had begun the turn and was pointing in a southwesterly direction when Beas' light turned green. Beas noted that the video would show the exact location of the car. Beas admitted he did not know where the white stop line was located in Weaverling's lane, and he did not make any determinations of the timing of the lights or Weaverling's turn.
The video of the traffic stop is also included in the record on appeal. The video further supports the district court's findings regarding the location of Weaverling's truck when Beas' light turned green and Weaverling's headlights flashed on the video as they pointed towards Beas' vehicle. In light of this record, we must conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the district court's findings of fact.
Next, we have unlimited review of the district court's legal conclusions based on the supported findings of fact. Since a traffic stop is considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “ ‘an officer must have articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion....’ “ State v. Moore, 283 Kan. 344, 349–50, 154 P.3d 1 (2007); see K.S.A. 22–2402(1).
“ ‘Reasonable suspicion means a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped is involved in criminal activity. Something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch must be articulated. Reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Both reasonable suspicion and probable cause are dependent upon the content of information possessed by the detaining authority and the information's degree of reliability. Quantity and quality are considered in the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.’ “ State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 890, 190 P.3d 234 (2008) (quoting State v. Toothman, 267 Kan. 412, Syl. ¶ 5, 985 P.2d 701 [1999] ).
It is admittedly a very close call. While in our view the evidence did not conclusively show that Weaverling did or did not improperly turn when his light was red, and given the inconclusive nature of the evidence, the district court could have decided that Beas had articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion. But we are bound by the district court's findings of fact since they are adequately supported by the record. Those findings of fact compel the legal conclusion that reasonable suspicion did not exist. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting Weaverling's motion to suppress.
The district court is affirmed.