Opinion
I.D. No. 0004010227
Date Received: January 29, 2001
Date Decided: July 26, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER
This 26th day of July, 2001, after a suppression hearing and review of the evidence, this is the Court's decision on the defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
Defendant Jasmin Watkins ("Defendant") moves to suppress all statements provided to the Wilmington Police on April 13, 2000. Defendant contends that the police obtained her statement in violation of the rights afforded to her under Miranda v. Arizona. The defendant also asserts that the statement was obtained during a period of unreasonable delay and was not otherwise voluntarily given. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
On April 12, 2000, Defendant arranged to meet her ex-boyfriend, Wayne Campbell, near her home in Wilmington, Delaware. Campbell, accompanied by his friend, Steven Porter, drove to the defendant's residence late on the night of April 12th. Defendant entered the car and sat in the back seat. Shortly after Defendant entered the car, at approximately 12:15 a.m. on April 13th, two black males approached the vehicle wearing masks. Defendant exited the vehicle and ran toward her home. As she fled, one of the individuals fired a gun at the vehicle, injuring Porter. The two assailants fled the scene and Defendant returned to her home and called 911.
When Wilmington Police arrived on the scene of the shooting, Defendant was identified as a potential witness and questioned by the police at her home. The defendant was then transported to the Wilmington Police station by a uniformed police officer at approximately 12:45 a.m. At approximately 2:24 a.m., two Wilmington Police detectives began interviewing the defendant regarding the shooting. While being interviewed, Defendant provided conflicting information and ultimately stated that she did know one of the attackers and did speak to him at some point on April 12th. Defendant later stated that she had asked this individual to help get Campbell to leave her alone. At 5:07 a.m., Defendant was advised that, based upon the information provided, she was suspected as being involved in the crime. At this point, the detectives read Defendant her Miranda rights, questioning continued and Defendant provided a statement of her role in the assault. Defendant is now charged as an accomplice to the as yet unidentified shooter with assault in the second degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and related offenses.
Defendant argues that her statements to police should be suppressed because: (1) she was "in custody" at the time of the interview without being advised of her Miranda rights; (2) the statement she gave police was given involuntarily; (3) she was illegally detained without probable cause; (4) questioning continued after Defendant's invocation of her right to remain silent; and (5) she did not waive her right to self-incrimination after her Miranda warnings were read to her.
The State argues that the defendant voluntarily accompanied the police to the station for questioning, and while questioned as a witness she was not "in custody." Once Defendant was determined to be a participant in the offense, she was provided a reading of her constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived these rights.
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the custodial interrogation of a person accused or suspected of a crime. Miranda recognized that the interrogation of a suspect in a custodial setting frequently contains "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Consequently, law enforcement officials may not subject an individual to custodial interrogation unless he is advised of specific rights protective of his privilege against compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. If the police take a suspect into custody, and interrogate him without advising him of his fifth amendment rights, his answers cannot be introduced into evidence at a subsequent trial to establish the suspect's guilt.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 467.
DeJesus v. State, Del. Supr., 655 A.2d 1180, 1189 (1995) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
Id.
DeJesus, 655 A.2d at 1190 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984)).
However, a suspect must be advised of his rights under Miranda "only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him "in custody." "[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
DeJesus, 655 A.2d at 1190 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994)).
To determine whether an interrogation has occurred in a custodial setting, thus evoking the need for Miranda warnings, the court must review the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the interrogation by applying an objective, reasonable person standard. The court must determine if a suspect has been taken into custody by analyzing "the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."
DeJesus, 655 A.2d at 1190 (citing Marine v. State, Del. Supr., 607 A.2d 1185, 1193 (1992)).
Stansbury, 114 S.Ct. at 1529.
At issue here is whether the defendant was "in custody" when she was taken to the police station and interrogated by the detectives. The defendant has testified that she did not voluntarily accompany the patrol officer to the police station, but rather was "required" to go with the officers to answer questions. She stated that she was being "taken for questioning" and was told by police that they would bring her back home. She testified that she was handcuffed outside of her apartment building and taken back to the scene of the shooting, after which she was taken to the Wilmington Police station. Defendant testified that she was certain that she was handcuffed and recalls the officer guiding her head into the patrol car because she did not have the use of her hands to balance her. Defendant stated that she was placed in a locked room at the police station and left there alone for over an hour before the detectives arrived.
The State disputes Defendant's contention that she was handcuffed and "required" to accompany police to the station. Rather, the State asserts that Defendant voluntarily agreed to continue speaking with police and was not handcuffed, nor placed under arrest for the transport to the police station. The State does not dispute the fact that there was a delay between her arrival at the station and the arrival of the detectives from the scene.
The State offered the testimony of the officer that transported Defendant to the police station. He testified that the defendant was not under arrest at the time because she was considered a witness and a victim, not a suspect. He testified that Defendant was taken voluntarily and without handcuffs but she was patted down as routine procedure for riding in a police vehicle. Although the officer testified that Defendant was a victim, his police report, which was not available until after the suppression hearing, states: "This officer . . . made contact with victim Watkins who was thought to be a suspect at this time."
Detective Schmid also testified that Defendant was not a suspect but as the third person in the vehicle during the shooting, she was initially listed as a victim. He testified that Defendant was free to leave until the point when she "confessed." He stated that the door was open and if Defendant had asked to go home, he would have permitted her to leave.
In addition to the testimony of the defendant, the patrol officer, and one of the detectives, the Court had the benefit of viewing the videotape of the interrogation. From the hours of videotape, it is clear that, applying an objective, reasonable person standard, Defendant would not have believed she was free to leave. Anyone, in Defendant's situation, would have felt their freedom was restrained.
First, regardless of whether Defendant was handcuffed while being transported to the station, she was patted down and placed in a patrol car in the middle of the night. Once Defendant arrived at the station she was placed in a room alone for over an hour with no communication with her family or friends. While the patrol officer testified that Defendant was left on a couch at the entrance of the Detective Division, the officer's report reads: ". . . transported Watkins to Central (Detective Division) and secured same in interview room 1." The Court concludes that a defendant, transported by police to the station and left waiting in an interview room for over an hour in the middle of the night, would have reason to believe that they were in police custody and not free to leave.
Second, the videotape shows the detectives leaving the interview room at 3:09 a.m. telling Defendant only to "sit tight." The detectives do not return for 50 minutes. During that period of time, the defendant can be seen on the videotape knocking on the door several times with no response. The Court is unable to discern if the door was locked or if anyone heard the defendant, but it is clear from her actions that Defendant did not believe she was at liberty to open the door or leave the room, or that she was in fact locked in.
Third, at 3:59 a.m. when the detectives returned to the room, Defendant asks "am I going to go home anytime soon?" The State offers that if the defendant wanted to go home, she could have said "I want to go home now" or "can I leave?" The State contends that Defendant's question was not a clear indication of her desire to go home. The Court finds that the question, as posed by Defendant, is sufficient enough to indicate to the detectives that the defendant wished to leave. By continuing to ask questions, it was reasonable for the defendant to assume that she was not free to leave.
The Court concludes that given the totality of the circumstances here, a reasonable person would believe they were not free to leave and therefore "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. Because the defendant was not advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, Defendant's statement to police was illegally obtained and cannot be introduced into evidence at trial to establish Defendant's guilt.
While Defendant raises alternative arguments that the statement was involuntary and that Defendant was illegally detained without probable cause, the Court need not address these arguments as Defendant's statements are suppressed because Defendant was not advised of her Miranda rights prior to the interrogation. Those statements made after Defendant was advised of her Miranda rights are suppressed as a product of the illegally obtained statement from which they are clearly derived. The reading of Miranda rights after an admission followed immediately by additional questions as to that admission does not cure the initial violation of rights.
The Court notes that from viewing the videotape, there is some question as to the voluntariness of this statement. Defendant was kept in a small interview room from 12:45 a.m. until after 6:00 a.m. Defendant was pregnant. She was obviously exhausted, laying her head down on the table in an attempt to sleep. Defendant was never offered anything to eat or drink while the detectives ate and drank in front of her. Defendant was not afforded an opportunity to use the restroom. And perhaps most questionable is the detectives implication that unless the defendant were to cooperate, her son and unborn child might be taken away from her.
In addition, Defendant argues that she invoked her right to remain silent after 5:29a.m. and that the questioning should have ceased then. Because it did not, Defendant argues that all the statements thereafter should be suppressed. The Court finds that Defendant did in fact invoke her right to remain silent once she was advised of her Miranda rights and detectives continued to question Defendant illegally.
As set forth above, before the police can conduct a custodial interrogation of a suspect, the individual must be advised of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as outlined in Miranda. Once Miranda warnings have been given and an individual indicates that he/she wishes to remain silent or stop the interview, the interrogation must cease and the police may not initiate continued interrogation on the crimes at issue but must scrupulously honor such invocation. The cessation of police questioning arises only when a suspect has clearly asserted his right to silence. In addition, the determination of whether a suspect clearly asserted his right calls for an objective inquiry, i.e. whether a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an invocation of silence. The objective standard for evaluating a purported invocation of the right serves the purpose of providing "clear and unequivocal" guidelines to law enforcement officers for determining when questioning must be cut off. When an individual is unclear in their invocation, the police may continue to ask questions, but only for the limited purpose of clarifying the individual's intent. Under the Delaware constitution, the police are required to clarify the statement before continuing with the interrogation. Any statement made after a suspect clearly exercises his right to remain silent must be suppressed as a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Miranda v. Arizona, 284 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 473-74.
Dodson v. State, Del. Supr., 513 A.2d 761, 763 (1986).
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988).
State v. Culp, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. 11 (98-08-0027, Ridgely, J. (Aug. 2, 1999)(ORDER) (applying the clarification approach set forth in Crawford v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 571, 577 (1990) to ambiguous or equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent).
State v. Deangelo, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. 9903023368, Cooch, J. (March 21, 2000) (Mem. Op.) at 5 (citing Crawford, 580 A.2d at 577).
DeShields v. State, Del. Supr., 534 A.2d 630, 65 1-52 (1987).
The State argues that Defendant did not invoke her right to remain silent, but rather, her statement was an ambiguous inquiry. The State compares this case to State v. Jamison where the Court ruled that when the defendant stated "I'd rather not say" and "I'd rather just be quiet," that the comments went to a particular line of questioning and were not an invocation of his right to remain silent. The Court found that neither cessation of the interview, nor clarification of the comments were required.
Del. Super., Cr.A. No. 9910021436, Carpenter, J. (Sept. 21, 2000) (Mem. Op.).
Id. at 8.
The Court finds that the statement by Defendant in this case is very different from the statements made by the defendant in Jamison. While in Jamison the defendant said "I'd rather not say" regarding a particular line of questions, here there is little doubt that when Defendant stated "Can I stop answering questions?" that she was referring to the entire interview. The Court finds that at that point the detectives had an obligation to stop asking questions and clarify Defendant's intent. Because the detectives continued to question Defendant, any statements made after that point were clearly obtained in violation of Defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the defendant's motion to suppress is GRANTED as to the statements made by Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.