Opinion
No. 31420-7-II
Filed: February 23, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Clark County. Docket No. 03-8-00974-7. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 02/04/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Edwin L. Poyfair.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Suzan L. Clark, Attorney at Law, 1101 Broadway St Ste 250, Vancouver, WA 98660-3320.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Julie Christine Carmena, Attorney at Law, 1200 Franklin St, PO Box 5000, Vancouver, WA 98666-5000.
Kenneth D. Warhurst appeals the juvenile court restitution order that followed his plea of guilty to two counts of making bomb threats. We affirm.
Facts
On October 1 and 2, 2003, Warhurst made six calls to 911 claiming that he had top-secret information regarding terrorist threats to blow up the Interstate 5 bridge connecting Clark County and Oregon. In one call on October 1, he indicated that on the following day at 8:00 p.m., the steel bridge between Vancouver and Portland would be destroyed completely. Warhurst made a similar threat in another call and stated that `if you think this is a prank, may God have mercy on your soul.' Clerk's Papers (CP) at 75.
The United States Coast Guard was dispatched in response to these calls. The Marine Safety and Security Team was deployed out of Seattle and included bomb dogs, divers, vertical jumpers, and the Anti-Terrorist Team. Additional vessels, vehicles, and other personnel were dispatched, including two vessels out of Cape Disappointment and a helicopter out of Astoria. The cost of this deployment was $232,150.82.
Warhurst, then 16 years old, pleaded guilty to two counts of making a bomb threat. He was sentenced to two 52-65 week terms in the juvenile institution. Following a separate hearing, the court ordered that restitution be set at $232,150.82, payable to the United States of America and mailed to the Coast Guard. Warhurst now appeals that restitution order.
Discussion
Warhurst contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution because the United States Coast Guard was not a victim to whom restitution is owed and because the funds it expended are not recoverable as restitution under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), ch. 13.40, RCW.
Two purposes of the JJA are to make juvenile offenders accountable for their criminal behavior and to provide restitution for crime victims. State v. A.M.R., 147 Wn.2d 91, 95, 51 P.3d 790 (2002). Restitution is a required part of juvenile sentencing, and the restitution provisions of the JJA are to be liberally construed in favor of imposing restitution. A.M.R., 147 Wn.2d at 95 (citing RCW 13.40.190); State v. Sanchez, 73 Wn. App. 486, 489, 869 P.2d 1133 (1994).
`[A]ny persons who have suffered loss' as a result of the juvenile's offense are entitled to restitution. RCW 13.40.190(1). In addition, the JJA defines `restitution' as `financial reimbursement by the offender to the victim . . . limited to easily ascertainable damages for injury to or loss of property.' RCW 13.40.020(22). Accordingly, one must be both a `person' and a `victim' to be entitled to restitution under the JJA. A.M.R., 147 Wn.2d at 96. These terms are undefined in the JJA but have been interpreted to include artificial persons such as insurance companies as well as third parties. A.M.R., 147 Wn.2d at 96-97; Sanchez, 73 Wn. App. at 489; see also State v. Davison, 116 Wn.2d 917, 921, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991) (recipient of restitution may be one other than immediate victim of adult crime).
Washington courts may use decisions interpreting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) in cases arising under the JJA when no contrary intent or authority exists. State v. Ashbaker, 82 Wn. App. 630, 632, 919 P.2d 619 (1996). Several cases interpreting the restitution provisions of the SRA have held that funds expended as the result of a crime may constitute a loss of property that is recoverable as restitution.
The Washington Supreme Court held that expenditures by a bank for labor and supplies needed to unload, load, and reset surveillance cameras following a burglary constituted an `injury to or loss of property' within the meaning of the SRA's restitution statute. State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 385, 386, 831 P.2d 1082 (1992) (citing RCW 9.94A.142). The court rejected the contention that the SRA permitted restitution only where there was injury to or loss of a tangible piece of property. Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 387. Because the funds spent by the bank were `property' lost as a direct result of the defendant's crime, they were recoverable as restitution. Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 390. As support, the court cited its decision in Davison, where it held that wages paid by the City of Seattle to an assault victim while he was unable to work as a firefighter constituted property which was lost as a result of a crime and a proper item of restitution. 116 Wn.2d at 921-22.
Division Three cited both Smith and Davison in holding that an employer's investigative expenses incurred to prove monetary loss due to embezzlement were recoverable as restitution. State v. Wilson, 100 Wn. App. 44, 48-50, 995 P.2d 1260 (2000). But for the embezzlement, the victim would not have incurred the investigative costs. Wilson, 100 Wn. App. at 50. The court distinguished State v. Martinez, 78 Wn. App. 870, 899 P.2d 1302 (1995), review denied, 128 Wn.2d 1017 (1996), where this court held that an insurance company's costs in investigating an arson were not recoverable as restitution. Wilson, 100 Wn. App. at 49-50 (citing Martinez, 78 Wn. App. at 881-82). As the Wilson court noted, the insurance company in Martinez was not a victim of the arson under the restitution statute. Wilson, 100 Wn. App. at 50.
Here, the Coast Guard incurred significant costs as a direct result of Warhurst's criminal actions. Consequently, it is both a victim and a person to whom restitution for loss of property is owed. See A.M.R., 147 Wn.2d at 96; see also In the Matter of the Welfare of D.D.G., 532 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn.App. 1995) (wages that school district paid custodians for time not worked during bomb threat evacuation of school building, as well as reward fund, were recoverable as restitution). The trial court did not err in entering its restitution order.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MORGAN, A.C.J. and ARMSTRONG, J., concur.