Opinion
I.D. 0511021501.
January 26, 2007.
Decision After Non-Jury Trial, Defendant Found Guilty But Mentally Ill of Murder First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.
Paul Wallace, Esquire and Colleen Norris, Esquire, for the State of Delaware.
Edmund M. Hillis, Esquire and Lisa A. Minutola, Esquire, for the Defendant.
I.
The defendant, Christopher Wallace ("the defendant" or "Mr. Wallace"), has been indicted by the grand jury on one count of murder first degree (intentional homicide) and one count of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. The defendant waived his constitutional right to a trial by jury, and both the State and the defendant consented to having the issue of guilt or innocence decided by the Court after a bench trial. The trial occurred over a period of six days during which the Court received testimony from twelve witnesses and admitted seventy three exhibits into evidence.
Docket Item ("DI") 37.
For several reasons discussed with counsel, the Court has elected to summarize its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and application of law to the facts in writing rather than state them in open court. The Court has drawn its findings of fact from the entire body of evidence presented at trial, unless specific limitations were stated on the record. When appropriate, the Court will refer to specific witness testimony or specific exhibits. Otherwise, it should be understood that the Court has reached its factual findings from all of the evidence, even if none is specifically identified. The Court has reconciled conflicting testimony, when possible, in an effort to harmonize the evidence. When reconciliation was not possible, the Court has accepted the testimony or evidence that it found most credible and has rejected the contrary evidence. With respect to the State's burden to prove the prima facie elements of the crimes charged, the Court has held the State to its burden of proving these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. With respect to the defendant's insanity defense, the Court has reached its factual findings fully mindful of the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof by which the defendant was obliged to prove this affirmative defense.
The Court has decided to issue this opinion before the transcript for this trial has been prepared. I am satisfied that my recollection of the testimony, aided by the copious notes I took during the trial, is more than adequate to allow me to state my factual findings and apply them to the applicable law. By necessity, however, there will be no references to the trial transcript in this opinion.
See PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE ("PATTERN INSTRUCTION"), § 4.g ("Conflicts in Testimony").
See PATTERN INSTRUCTION, § 4.i ("Presumption of Innocence/Reasonable Doubt").
See PATTERN INSTRUCTION, § 7.b1 ("Mental Illness or Mental Defect").
For the reasons that follow, after careful deliberation, the Court finds the defendant guilty but mentally ill of murder first degree and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony.
II.
A. Christopher Wallace's Background
Mr. Wallace was born on January 17, 1990, in New Orleans, Louisiana. He moved to Tennessee, then to Kentucky and eventually settled in Florida with his mother, father and older brother. The evidence revealed a less than typical childhood. Mr. Wallace's parents reportedly had some substance abuse issues and a tendency not to supervise their children carefully in certain settings, including parties where adults engaged in inappropriate behavior in the presence of children. In the course of the various forensic evaluations of his mental status that have occurred in preparation for trial, Mr. Wallace has reported that he was sexually abused as a child by teenage boys while living in Tennessee. He acknowledged that he has never reported this abuse to anyone prior to his reports to the forensic evaluators, and he offered different descriptions of the abuse to each of the three mental health experts who evaluated him.
Joint Exhibit ("JX") 5-7.
While in elementary schools in Tennessee and Kentucky, and early in his middle school experience in Kentucky and Florida, Mr. Wallace demonstrated some promise as a student; he got average-to-good grades and appeared to be happy. As he moved further into middle school, however, his grades slipped and he began to have disciplinary problems. Ultimately, he was expelled from school for allegedly supplying acne medication to another student in violation of the school's drug policy. Prior to the expulsion, the school district convened a committee to identify whether Mr. Wallace had any special needs that would contribute to his behavioral problems. The committee concluded that "there is no reason to believe that a disability or handicap exists."
JX 8, at 277-377.
Id. at 262.
Id.
After being expelled from middle school, Mr. Wallace was sent to an alternative school but soon after his arrival he was expelled again for being involved in a physical altercation with another student that appeared, at least in part, to have been racially motivated. During this time frame, there are reports in the evidence indicating that Mr. Wallace engaged in some violent attacks on animals, some provoked (an attack on a dog provoked by excessive barking, for instance), some not. There is evidence that Mr. Wallace would consume alcohol, smoke marijuana, and perhaps abuse over the counter cold medication, although the frequency with which he engaged in such conduct is a matter of conflict in the evidence. He also developed a fascination with medieval themes, such as dragons, swords, magic, and medieval combat. These themes were depicted in various video games Mr. Wallace and his friends liked to play. Mr. Wallace took on a nickname among his friends, "Lord Morvaine," derived from a video game called "Morrowind." There is no history of delusional thinking or bizarre behavior reported in the school records or by Christopher's family or friends during this time frame.
Id. at 270, 273.
JX 5-7; TX 8, at 222, 223-25, 234-35, 260-377.
B. Christopher Wallace Comes to Delaware
After his expulsion from the alternative school, Mr. Wallace's parents sent him to live with family in upstate New York, reportedly so that he would no longer be an embarrassment to his father. While there, he worked for a relative who owned a construction business. He did not return to school. Although the timing is not entirely clear, it appears that Mr. Wallace remained in New York for a relatively brief period of time. Eventually, he was joined there by his mother. Shortly after her arrival in New York, Mr. Wallace, accompanied by his mother and other relatives, traveled to Wilmington, Delaware to visit with Mrs. Wallace's cousin, Gloria Schlor, and her family for the Thanksgiving holiday. They arrived in Wilmington on November 9, 2005, left the Schlor home to visit relatives in Long Island, New York, returned to Wilmington on the Monday before Thanksgiving, and stayed in Wilmington through the holiday.
JX 5.
The Schlor family consisted of Gloria Schlor, her boyfriend Wayne, her twin daughters, and her son Daniel, then nine years old. Mrs. Schlor, Wayne and the two girls slept upstairs. Daniel slept in a finished bedroom located in the basement of the home, adjacent to a finished recreation room. When the Wallace family visited, the adults slept upstairs and Mr. Wallace slept mainly on the floor in the basement recreation room.
All witnesses reported that Mr. Wallace was quite pleasant to be around while visiting the Schlor home. He did not display unusual behavior or violent tendencies toward anyone in the home, including Daniel. A video of Mr. Wallace interacting with two of the Schlor children (the twin girls) appears to bear this out. By all accounts, Mr. Wallace and Daniel got along fine and seemed to enjoy each other's company.
State's Ex. 64.
See e.g., JX 8, at 234.
According to Gloria Schlor, on the morning of November 29, 2005, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Mr. Wallace's mother and his aunt left Delaware by pickup truck en route to Louisiana. There was no room in the truck for Mr. Wallace so his mother bought him an airline ticket to travel alone back to Florida the next day. Witnesses report that Daniel Schlor went to bed late on the evening of November 28 or early morning on November 29. Mr. Wallace was last seen going down to the basement, presumably for bed, around 2:00 a.m. on November 29.
C. Daniel Schlor Is Killed In The Basement of the Schlor Home
On the morning of November 29, 2005, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Mrs. Schlor went to get Daniel ready for school and found him lying dead on the floor of the recreation room in the basement, apparently the victim of a violent knife attack. Mr. Wallace was nowhere to be found. Police and paramedics responded to the Schlor home and a search for Mr. Wallace was commenced immediately thereafter. He was apprehended by the New Castle County Police at approximately 6:30 p.m. on November 29 after having been missing from the Schlor home all day. He apparently had attempted to drive away in one of the Schlor vehicles but could not find the key to start the vehicle on a key ring he had taken from the kitchen. He then walked from the Schlor home to a concealed area near an office complex a few miles away, stayed there for several hours (sleeping some of the time), and then moved on to a nearby gas station where he sat and waited to be apprehended.
The officers who took Mr. Wallace into custody noted that he was cooperative, calm and did not appear to be engaged in delusional behavior. Even though he was placed face down on the ground and handcuffed, there was no indication that he was agitated or slipping into a psychotic state in response to this arguably threatening behavior by police. During the transport back to the New Castle County police station, Mr. Wallace made several incriminating statements while in the police vehicle, including: "I know I'm going to jail for a long time for this one" and a statement to the effect that his "MP3 player would be out of date by the time he got out of prison." He inquired how much jail time he was facing, asked about the officer's bullet proof vest, and asked whether he would be on the television show "COPS." He asked the officer to find some heavy metal music on the car radio, and specifically requested that the officer try to find some "Slayer" (a heavy metal band).
Once at the New Castle County police station, Mr. Wallace filled out the pedigree paperwork without difficulty. In the meantime, at approximately 7:15 p.m. that evening, Detective Shriner contacted Mr. Wallace's mother to advise her that her son had been found and that he was in good health. Another officer spoke with his father by phone seeking permission to interview Mr. Wallace. At 8:03 p.m., Detectives Sczerba and Crowley entered the interview room where Mr. Wallace had been waiting. They advised Mr. Wallace that his father did not give permission for the police to conduct an interview but that Mr. Wallace could nevertheless choose to speak to the police notwithstanding his father's wishes. Without hesitation, Mr. Wallace agreed to speak to the police. As soon as Mr. Wallace agreed to speak with the police officers, he was read his Miranda rights and then signed the "Miranda Warning Form" after initialing each portion of the form as it was explained to him. Once the form was signed, Detective Sczerba left the interview room and Detective Crowley conducted the interview.
The Court has previously determined that the police complied with applicable statutory and constitutional protections in the manner in which they detained the defendant and obtained his consent to conduct the interview over his father's objection, and that they obtained a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights.
For the next twenty minutes or so thereafter, Detective Crowley and Mr. Wallace had a frank but pleasant discussion about several topics, including Mr. Wallace's experiences at school, his enjoyment of fighting, his family, his visit to Delaware and, eventually, the fact that he had killed his nine year old cousin in the basement of the Schlor home because his cousin had insulted and angered him. While viewing the DVD recording of this interview, the Court was struck by the remarkably poised and confident demeanor displayed by the defendant. He did not appear upset or shaken. Nor did he appear indecisive, confused or delusional. To the contrary, he was congenial in his demeanor and directly responsive to the police officers' inquiries. Detective Crowley, apparently in response to Mr. Wallace's pleasant and calm demeanor, likewise remained pleasant and professional throughout the interview. Indeed, the fact that the discussion was prompted by the homicide of a nine year old child, at times, was completely lost in the interview dynamic. While Mr. Wallace's demeanor and affect by no means appeared appropriate under the circumstances, it did not appear to be the product of obvious delusions, hallucinations or erratic thought content.
For reasons made clear on the record, the State elected to play only a portion of the taped statement in its case in chief. See D.I. 39. The Court considered only this portion of the statement in determining whether the State had proven the prima facie elements of the crimes charged.
There were no eyewitnesses to the crimes. Nevertheless, from the evidence — particularly Mr. Wallace's own statements to the police, the testimony of the Assistant Medical Examiner, Dr. Adrienne Sekula-Perlman, and the physical evidence — the Court has made certain factual findings as to how Mr. Wallace killed Daniel Schlor. The evidence reveals that Mr. Wallace inflicted three wounds upon Daniel Schlor's back with a knife (two of which were "superficial," i.e., where the knife was drawn across the back, and one of which was a stab wound, i.e., where the knife was plunged upwardly into the body through the back and into the spleen and lung). These wounds were inflicted while Daniel Schlor was on his knees facing Mr. Wallace. There was a knife-inflicted stab/incised wound at the back of Daniel Schlor's head. There were also several incised knife wounds around his neck (indicating that the knife was drawn across the neck), including one that was quite large (approximately 3 ½ inches), and a stab wound. Daniel Schlor's hands revealed defensive wounds in the form of scratches and abrasions. The knife wounds were inflicted near the end of a prolonged attack and by two different weapons, one with a non serrated edge and one with a serrated edge. There were no "signatures" left at the crime scene, meaning Mr. Wallace did not inscribe any messages in the physical location of the attack or on the body of his victim, nor did he leave any other markers that would suggest why he committed the crime.
According to Dr. Sekula-Perlman, Daniel Schlor was held down and strangled prior to the knife attack. The autopsy revealed substantial evidence of compression on the chest and upper body. There was hemorrhaging around the muscles in the neck and petechial hemorrhaging around the face. According to Dr. Sekula-Perlman, the strangulation was perpetrated with a ligature of some sort. The degree to which Daniel Schlor's brain was swollen indicates that Daniel Schlor died a slow death. The knife wounds were inflicted when he was near death as evidenced by the relatively minimal loss of blood from the wounds. The toxicology studies revealed alcohol in Daniel Schlor's system. Based on the source of the blood samples that revealed the presence of alcohol, and those that did not, Dr. Sekula-Perlman opined that the alcohol was ingested very near death. Indeed, she opined that Daniel Schlor may have been forced to ingest the alcohol as he was dying.
The evidence indicates that death occurred as a result of the cumulative traumatic injuries suffered by Daniel Schlor, no one of which alone likely would have caused death. At the conclusion of her autopsy, Dr. Sekula-Perlman listed cause of death as "multiple sharp force injuries and asphyxiation."
State's Ex. 60A.
The parties have urged the Court to reach various conclusions as to why Mr. Wallace killed Daniel Schlor. The State has suggested that Mr. Wallace committed the crime simply out of anger and frustration with a young boy who was calling him names. This explanation would be consistent with the explanation offered by Mr. Wallace when he gave his statement to the police. Alternatively, the State suggested in closing arguments that some sort of sexual encounter had occurred or had been attempted between Mr. Wallace and Daniel Schlor that prompted Mr. Wallace to react out of disgust (directed toward himself or Daniel) and/or a desire to silence Daniel Schlor after the encounter. This conclusion, the State alleges, is supported by the positioning of the bodies at the time of the attack, the evidence of alcohol consumption by both Mr. Wallace and Daniel Schlor, a statement Daniel Schlor made on a video tape that "he hated when people try to get him drunk," a statement Mr. Wallace made to Dr. Mechanick to the effect that Daniel Schlor had made a sexual advance toward him, and testimony from the mental health experts that Mr. Wallace is preoccupied with his sexual identity. The defense has argued that Mr. Wallace killed Daniel Schlor because he was psychotic at the time of the attack and unable to appreciate that what he was doing was wrong.
The Court has concluded that the evidence supporting each of these theories is not adequate to allow a meaningful conclusion as to why Mr. Wallace committed this horrific crime. While all of the theories offered by the parties are possibilities, none have been proven to the Court's satisfaction. For now, Mr. Wallace remains the only person who knows why he did what he did and, as discussed below, he is offering contradictory explanations.
The Court notes that the "why" question — why the defendant committed the crime — is not a prima facie element of either of the crimes charged. "Why" may be relevant when evaluating the defendant's insanity defense and, to the extent it is, the Court will address the issue when discussing its application of the law to the facts. In any event, the Court is satisfied that it need not answer the "why" question in order to reach a proper verdict on the evidence in this case.
After the attack, Mr. Wallace covered Daniel Schlor's body with a blanket. According to police reports, he later explained that "it [was] the right thing to do because of what he did to these people." Mr. Wallace then gathered some clothes, placed them in a bag he had taken from Daniel Schlor's room and went upstairs. There, he wrote a note, presumably to the Schlor family, which simply read "sorry." He gathered some food, took a butcher's knife from a knife block in the kitchen, took some keys and left the home. He later indicated that his initial plan upon leaving the Schlor home was to try to make his way back to Florida. When he could not find a key to start any of the Schlor vehicles, however, he realized that his interstate travel plans were not realistic. As stated, he then walked a few miles from the Schlor home, slept in a concealed ditch area by the side of a road, and eventually was apprehended by police in the early evening hours while sitting on the curb outside of a busy gas station.
JX 7.
The Court was struck by the fact that the note, although comprised of only one word, was written with considerable care and effort. The letters were elaborately drawn and accompanied by a drawing of a sad face. State's Ex. 39.
D. Christopher Wallace's Behavior While Incarcerated
Mr. Wallace has been incarcerated since his arrest, first at the New Castle County Detention Center ("NCCDC"), and then at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution ("HRYCI"). He has had disciplinary problems while incarcerated including violent outbursts, insubordination, and fighting. On the other hand, he has received awards for excelling in his studies to achieve a GED. He has been evaluated by mental health professionals working within the correctional system and has received various differential diagnoses, ranging from malingering to various Axis I mental illnesses, some with psychotic features. When first incarcerated, he completed an intake form in which he denied hearing any voices that others can't hear or having his thoughts controlled by others. Likewise, he denied having feelings that don't seem real or dreamlike experiences. He denied ever having "something very bad or terrifying" happen to him. He acknowledged that he had seen someone be killed "tonight" (November 29, presumably referring to Daniel Schlor).
JX 8, at 255-56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The early reports from the mental health professionals at NCCDC were consistent with Mr. Wallace's answers on the intake form — he said that he sometimes thought he heard sounds that others did not hear but denied hearing voices. He described a "rich medieval fantasy life" in which he sees himself as the evil "Sauron" from J.R.R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings. He reported that his nickname was Lord Morvaine but did not, at this time, incorporate this character into his fantasy.
Id. at 61-62.
Id.
Shortly after these initial evaluations, Mr. Wallace began to report that he was Lord Morvaine. The "rich fantasy life" described by Mr. Wallace earlier had referred had now become a delusion. Mr. Wallace reported that his body was a "shell" for Lord Morvaine and that he (Lord Morvaine) was awaiting the "days of chaos" during which there would be anarchy followed by a new world order of evil. Thereafter, the delusion took on slightly different forms — for instance, in some reports, Mr. Wallace was Lord Morvaine, in others he spoke to Lord Morvaine — but the primary character and themes remained constant. When Mr. Wallace moved to HRYCI, reports of hallucinations emerged.
Id. at 58-59.
Id.
See e.g. Id. at 101, 226-230.
On October 25, 2006, during a monitored telephone call between Mr. Wallace and his father, Mr. Wallace is heard to say: "I think the insanity thing is looking good, like — I have a whole thing planned." Needless to say, this evidence is troubling. At best, it suggests that Mr. Wallace is calculating the most effective means by which to present an insanity defense (hardly a design consistent with debilitating mental illness). At worst, it suggests that Mr. Wallace may be feigning symptoms, including the delusions he has reported, in order to support an insanity defense.
State's Ex. 65.
From the collection of evidence that has been presented from Mr. Wallace's time in prison, it appears that reports of Mr. Wallace's psychosis intensified the longer he was incarcerated and the closer he drew towards trial. There were inconsistencies in the reports, both in the history provided by Mr. Wallace, and the observations and conclusions of the mental health professionals who were evaluating him. His reports of intense delusional thought are suspect. Yet, one thing is clear, the care providers were convinced that Mr. Wallace was not in good mental health. Malingering or not, something was wrong with Mr. Wallace and the mental health professionals were struggling to make the diagnosis. They also chose to treat what they were seeing with antipsychotic medications.
E. Christopher Wallace's Mental Status at the Time of The Crimes
The last three days of the evidence presentation at trial were consumed by evidence related specifically to Mr. Wallace's mental status at the time of the offenses. Mr. Wallace provided proper notice of his intent to raise an insanity defense at trial, and thereafter was evaluated by three forensic mental health experts, two retained on his behalf and one retained on behalf of the State. The Court's findings of fact with respect to this evidence will be summarized seriatim in the order of the experts' presentations at trial.
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. P. 12.2.
Before addressing each individual expert, the Court has made certain predicate findings of fact applicable to all of the experts that must be expressed at the outset. First, the Court has found that each expert is an honorable, extremely well-qualified professional within his field of practice. Each has endeavored thoroughly to evaluate Mr. Wallace and to reach objective conclusions. And, each has expressed clear and decisive conclusions. As expected, the experts who testified on behalf of the defendant have reached vastly different conclusions from those reached by the State's expert. Some reconciliation of the opinions is possible but, in many instances, the Court has accepted one expert's opinion over the others.
1. Mandell J. Much, Ph.D.
Dr. Much is a highly qualified psychologist who was retained by defense counsel to evaluate Mr. Wallace in order "to assess general psychological functioning and to determine if psychological factors contributed to recent behaviors." He met with Mr. Wallace on three occasions for several hours. He administered three psychometric tests to Mr. Wallace, two of which had built-in validity scales to test the accuracy of the data being collected. The test data revealed that Mr. Wallace was unusually preoccupied with his body, had a low tolerance for frustration and was prone toward emotional outbursts, was severely impaired in his reality testing abilities, and had difficulty separating reality from fantasy.
Of the three experts, only Dr. Much administered tests to Mr. Wallace. As explained by each of the experts, psychologists most typically administer psychometric tests and then, if appropriate, provide the results of the tests to psychiatrists for use in treatment or evaluation.
JX 8, at 189-217; JX 5.
Based on the test results, his review of the history, and his own clinical observations, Dr. Much opined that Mr. Wallace suffered from an Axis I diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid type. He ruled out malingering based, in part, on the test data, and also based on his clinical findings. He stated that a person simply cannot sustain manufactured acute symptoms of psychosis for as long as Mr. Wallace has demonstrated such behavior. He also opined that the reason Mr. Wallace did not share his delusions with others prior to his arrest is because he is paranoid and not trusting of others. He acknowledged that Mr. Wallace never told him that Lord Morvaine was a character in a video game, but he did not believe that this non disclosure undermined his diagnosis because delusions, by definition, have a basis in reality. Nor was he concerned that Mr. Wallace had offered varied accounts of his delusional beliefs. The themes were consistent and the essential features of the delusions remained intact. When asked to identify the specific timing of various phases of the mental illness, Dr. Much had difficulty pinpointing when one phase began and another ended, even though the timing of symptom onset is an essential component of the diagnosis.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4[th] Ed.) ("DSM IV"), upon which Dr. Much relied in making his diagnosis, requires that a person must display delusions for a significant portion of one month (unless treated), and must show continuous signs of illness for at least six months, in order to be diagnosed with schizophrenia.
Ultimately, Dr. Much found that Mr. Wallace met the statutory definition of insanity — "he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act [the killing of Daniel Schlor] or its consequences." When asked for the evidence that supported this opinion, he referred to the history of delusional thoughts and the consistency of the criminal act with those thoughts. He acknowledged that he could not point to evidence of delusional behavior in the days leading up to the killing or in the immediate aftermath of the event. Indeed, he acknowledged that Mr. Wallace appeared to have appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time he wrote the "sorry" note shortly after the killing. His best explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that Mr. Wallace was slipping in and out of a mental state that would allow him to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. He was out of this state of mind when he committed the act, but back in it when he wrote the note. According to Dr. Much, Mr. Wallace apparently remained free of debilitating delusional thoughts during his apprehension and subsequent interview by police.
JX 5.
2. Kenneth J. Weiss, M.D.
Dr. Weiss is a board certified forensic psychiatrist. He examined Mr. Wallace on two occasions for several hours. He reviewed the extensive documentary history of Mr. Wallace as assembled by defense counsel as well as certain information regarding the crimes at issue. He relied upon Dr. Much's testing and believes it yielded reliable results. He described Mr. Wallace's behavior during the interview as demonstrating an inappropriate affect marked by a "diminution of range of emotional expression" and evidenced by inappropriate grinning throughout the interview. Mr. Wallace's expression of his thoughts was "cogent but indicative of bizarre thinking." Based on his experience, he concluded that Mr. Wallace "was not playing with him." In essence, Dr. Weiss was of the view that his extensive training and experience allowed him to determine when someone was malingering, and his training told him that Mr. Wallace was not.
Dr. Weiss concurred in Dr. Much's diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, paranoid type. He testified that he was not bound by the DSM IV and, therefore, he did not focus on the particular criteria set forth there, including the time considerations noted above. He believes Mr. Wallace was in the active phase of his illness for months, but did not identify specific facts to support this conclusion. He explained Mr. Wallace's inconsistent accounts of the illness by stating that a certain level of disorganized thought is common in people suffering from schizophrenia. He later acknowledged that disor ganized thought is not typical in schizophrenia, paranoid type.
Like Dr. Much, Dr. Weiss believes that Mr. Wallace was legally insane at the time he committed the crime. Curiously, his report of Mr. Wallace's account of the killing does not reveal a mind set that is consistent with a young man who could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, by reason of delusional thinking or otherwise. Instead, he describes someone who does not know why he committed the crime, and who did not think of the "moral dimension of his behavior" at the time he engaged in it. Indeed, he acknowledged that Mr. Wallace never told him that the crime was committed in the midst of delusional thinking. When asked to identify the facts he relies upon to support his opinion regarding the insanity issue, Dr. Weiss, in essence, referred to his diagnosis and then identified the peculiar circumstances of the crime itself: a young man kills a younger relative for no apparent reason in brutal fashion.
JX 5.
Dr. Weiss also shares Dr. Much's view that Mr. Wallace "reacquired his moral compass" (Dr. Weiss' words) after the killing, as evidenced by the "sorry" note and his statements to the poli ce. He did not, however, offer an understandable explanation as to what triggered this sudden reacquisition of morality, or how or why someone would slip in and out of this state of mind.
3. Stephen M. Mechanick, M.D.
Dr. Mechanick is a board certified psychiatrist. He was retained on behalf of the State to determine if Mr. Wallace suffered from a mental illness at the time of the crimes and, if so, whether he fit the legal definition of insanity or guilty but mentally ill. He met with Mr. Wallace two times for several hours. He reviewed extensive documentary information, including school records and prison records, and most of the materials generated during the criminal investigation. He also considered the reports of the defense mental health experts and the results of the psychometric testing. As he is obliged to do by the DSM IV and applicable ethical rules governing his profession, his first focus was to determine if Mr. Wallace was malingering, i.e., if his reports of suffering from delusions and hallucinations were real. He did not get much beyond this inquiry because he concluded, based primarily on the pervasive inconsistencies in the history of the illness as reported by Mr. Wallace and others, that there was no psychotic element to explain Mr. Wallace's behavior. He also pointed to features of Mr. Wallace's behavior that were inconsistent with psychosis, including his effort to avoid apprehension and his effort to minimize his crime. Accordingly, he disagreed with the diagnosis of Drs. Much and Weiss of schizophrenia (which, by definition, requires psychotic behavior).
See JX 7.
Although he disagreed with the specifics of their diagnosis, Dr. Mechanick did agree with Drs. Much and Weiss that Mr. Wallace does suffer from an Axis I mental illness: conduct disorder. The criteria for this diagnosis include persistent "aggression to people and animals, destruction of property, deceitfulness or theft, and serious violations of rules." Absent from the criteria are any signs of psychosis. According to Dr. Mechanick, the conduct disorder from which Mr. Wallace suffers did not diminish his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the killing. He believes that this opinion is borne out by Mr. Wallace's conduct before the killing, during which he demonstrated no signs of psychosis, and immediately after the killing, when he covered the victim's body, wrote a note of apology to the victim's family, and then fled the scene of the crime to avoid apprehension. Mr. Wallace's statements and description of the event to the police are also consistent with a young man who was fully capable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time he committed the crimes.
Dr. Mechanick acknowledged that the mental health professionals who evaluated Mr. Wallace during his incarceration, and who had no reason to exaggerate findings, regularly listed psychosis in their differential diagnosis and prescribed antipsychotic medication to treat the condition. He explained that these clinicians simply did not have available to them all of the data that he has been able to review in order to inform their differential diagnoses. He also suggested that they did not have the time to give the same level of consideration to the big picture that he has been able to give in his role as a forensic evaluator. He discounted the import of the psychometric testing as a basis to diagnose schizophrenia because the results can be skewed when the test taker is not truthful. Moreover, according to Dr. Mechanick, the results are just as consistent with a diagnosis of conduct disorder as they are with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.
IV.
A. Murder in the First Degree (Intentional Murder)
To find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory that the defendant intentionally killed Daniel Schlor, as set forth in the Indictment, the Court must find that the State proved the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Christopher Wallace caused the death of Daniel Schlor; and (2) that he acted intent ionall y, meaning that "it [was his] conscious object or purpose to cause the death of Daniel Schlor."
See PATTERN INSTRUCTION, § 9.f1.
The Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has met its burden to prove murder in the first degree. The evidence proves that Mr. Wallace's attack on Daniel Schlor was prolonged, starting with strangulation and ending with a vicious knife attack. According to Dr. Sekula-Perlman's unrebutted and credible description of the attack, Mr. Wallace literally would have seen and felt Daniel Schlor's life escape his body while the boy was in his grasp. He then followed the manual attack with multiple knife strikes to Daniel Schlor's back, head and neck. The slice wound across Daniel Schlor's neck reveals a strategically placed physical insult to Daniel Schlor's body that, by all appearances, was meant to seal his fate at or near the end of a brutal attack. In the absence of a legally recognized affirmative defense, the physical evidence, when coupled with Mr. Wallace's confession that he killed Daniel Schlor, leaves no reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged of murder in the first degree.
B. Possession of a Deadly Weapon During The Commission of a Felony
To find the defendant guilty of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, the Court must find that the State has proven the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant possessed a deadly weapon at the time and place charged in the indictment; (2) the defendant knew that he was in possession of a deadly weapon; and (3) the defendant committed a felony while he was in possession of a deadly weapon. The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a knife, a deadly weapon, and knowingly used it to commit murder in the first degree. Accordingly, in the absence of a legally recognized affirmative defense, the defendant is guilty of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony.
PATTERN INSTRUCTION, § 36.e.
C. The Insanity Defense
In Delaware, as in most jurisdictions, the insanity defense has evolved from its common law roots and is now a creature of statute. Delaware's insanity statute reads:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the conduct charged, as a result of mental illness or mental defect, the accused lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the accused's conduct. If the defendant prevails in establishing the affirmative defense provided in this subsection, the trier of fact shall return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(a) (2001).
The law recognizes a distinction between "insanity" and "mental illness." As Justice Walsh succinctly explained in one of a handful of seminal Delaware decisions explaining the role of mental illness in assessing criminal culpability:
See Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 123 (Del. 1990).
Insanity is a legal concept that comprises a narrow class of symptoms; mental illness is a medical concept that embraces a wide range of diseases. Thus, while both mild neuroses and debilitating psychoses may be included under the heading of mental illness, legal insanity exists only if the defendant's illness undermines his culpability to such an extent that punishment becomes inappropriate. In a psychiatrist's eyes, a person may be ill in varying degrees, but in the law's eyes, he is either sane or insane, either blameworthy or not blameworthy.
Id. See also Daniels v. State, 538 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Del. 1988) (explaining the distinction between insanity and guilty but mentally ill); Stansbury v. State, 591 A.2d 188, 191-92 (Del. 1991)(same); Aizupitis v. State, 699 A.2d 1092, 1095 (Del. 1996)(same).
The crux of the insanity test is whether a mental illness or defect has "deprive[d] the defendant of the ability to know that he is committing a wrongful act." The use of terms like "capacity" and "ability" suggest that the question is not whether the defendant appreciated at the moment he committed a criminal act that the act was wrong, but rather whether he had the "capacity" or "ability" to do so if he had reflected on his conduct immediately prior to acting. In other words, the fact that someone acts intentionally but without thinking of the wrongfulness of his conduct, or acts out of uncontrolled impulse without a second thought, does not necessarily mean that the person "lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct." It is against this legal backdrop that the Court has considered Mr. Wallace's conduct at the time he killed Daniel Schlor.
Sanders, 585 A.2d at 123 (citing McNaghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843)).
In closing arguments, both parties urged the Court to focus on the temporal sequencing of the evidence. For its part, the State emphasized Mr. Wallace's relatively normal and lucid behavior immediately before and after the killing as the best evidence of Mr. Wallace's state of mind at the time of the killing. The defense emphasized the consistent escalation of psychotic symptoms before the crime, and consistent reports of delusional thoughts and behavior after the crime. While both approaches to the analysis of the evidence make sense, at the end of the day, under the applicable law, the Court must determine the most reliable means by which to assess Mr. Wallace's mental status at the time he committed the crimes. The fact that he may have entertained delusional beliefs of an alternative personality at some time prior to, or at some time after the crime, does not mean that he probably was not able to appreciate that killing Daniel Schlor was wrong as he was committing the crime. In this regard, the Court found Dr. Mechanick's testimony to be more credible than either of the defense experts. Simply stated, Dr. Mechanick's approach to the question of whether Mr. Wallace was legally insane at the time of the killing was more logical and, in the final analysis, more persuasive because he focused on the circumstances surrounding the crime and not just on abstract observations of behavior.
As stated, there were no eyewitnesses to the murder. Thus, as a fact finder, the Court must look at circumstantial evidence to draw reasonable inferences both as to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime, and his appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct. Before the crime, Mr. Wallace displayed no signs of psychosis to the members of his family who were present at the Schlor home. The one visual depiction of his behavior, the DVD depicting his interaction with Mrs. Schlor's daughters, reveals a happy young man who was enjoying the moment. The crime scene itself reveals no clear sign of a killer who was consumed by psychosis; the brutal nature of the killing is as easily explained by calculated rage as by psychosis. After committing the crime, he covered the body and later explained that this gesture was the "right thing to do because of what he did to these people." He wrote a note of apology to the Schlor family. He then took what he thought he would need to survive from the Schlor home, quietly departed the house to avoid detection, and tried to flee the State in one of the Schlor's vehicles to avoid apprehension. If he was truly delusional, he would have stayed put, content that he had done what had to be done and believing that others would understand his actions.
See PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS, §§ 4.e, 4.h (circumstantial evidence and state of mind, respectively).
It is not just the temporal circumstantial evidence that belies Mr. Wallace's claim of insanity. His own words to the police at the time he was apprehended and during his police interview demonstrate that he was fully aware of the wrongfulness of his actions and of the potential consequences at the time he committed the crimes. The fact that he may have acted out of impulse, and may not have considered the wrongfulness of his actions until after the deed was done, does not mean that he was incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct during the commission of the murder. He cannot be excused for his conduct simply because he did not bother to consider the propriety of it before he acted.
To be sure, the Court recognizes that it has focused primarily on behavior immediately before and after the murder to reach its conclusion that Mr. Wallace has not proven that he was legally insane at the time of the murder. In the Court's view, this is the best evidence available to assess Mr. Wallace's state of mind at the time of the crime. The notion that Mr. Wallace would slip in and out of a state of mind where he could appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, and that this is what occurred here, simply was not credibly supported by either Dr. Much or Dr. Weiss. Likewise, the opinion that Mr. Wallace's diagnosis of schizophrenia, and his history of psychosis, alone are sufficient to establish that Mr. Wallace was legally insane misses the mark set by Delaware's insanity statute. As discussed above, a person can suffer from mental illness but still not be legally insane. At times, both Dr. Much and Dr. Weiss seemed to blend the two concepts in a manner that diluted their ultimate conclusions. Their inability credibly to explain away the powerful evidence of Mr. Wallace's consciousness of guilt spoke volumes to the Court and, along with the other matters discussed, brought the defendant short of his burden to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
D. The Guilty But Mentally Ill Statute
Before answering the question of whether Mr. Wallace's conduct falls within the statutory definition of "guilty but mentally ill," the Court must consider whether it is appropriate even to address the question in the first place. Neither party squarely raised the issue. The State contends that Mr. Wallace is unconditionally guilty of both indicted charges; Mr. Wallace contends that he is not guilty by reason of insanity. Nevertheless, the Court is satisfied that it would have been obliged sua sponte to instruct a jury on the concept of guilty but mentally ill based on the evidence presented at trial. Thus, the Court must, sua sponte, consider the question as fact finder without regard to whether or not either party seeks the verdict here.
See Daniels, 538 A.2d at 1112 (noting that Delaware's guilty but mentally ill statute states that the Court "shall" instruct the jury on the concept "where warranted by the evidence.").
Delaware's guilty but mentally ill statute reads:
Where the trier of fact determines that, at the time of the conduct charged, a defendant suffered from a psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbed such person's thinking, feeling or behavior, and/or that such psychiatric disorder left such person with insufficient willpower to choose whether the person would do the act or refrain from doing it, although physically capable, the trier of fact shall return a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill."
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 401(b) (2001) (emphasis supplied).
The term "psychiatric disorder," as used in the statute, means "any mental or psychotic disorder recognized within the realm of psychiatry as affecting a person's behavior, thinking, feeling or willpower." The statute is purposefully phrased in the disjunctive thereby allowing the fact finder to reach a guilty but mentally ill verdict under any of three factual scenarios if supported by the evidence. As the Supreme Court of Delaware stated in Aizupitis:
[A]ccording to the plain meaning of the GBMI statute, there are three possibilities that follow from the "and/or" language. The "first basis" for a GBMI verdict is where "a defendant suffered from a psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbed such person's thinking, feeling or behavior." The "second basis" for a GBMI verdict is where "a defendant suffered from [an ongoing] psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbed such person's thinking, feeling or behavior and. . . such psychiatric disorder left such person with insufficient willpower to choose whether the person would do the act or refrain from doing it." The "third basis" for a GBMI verdict is where a "psychiatric disorder left such person with insufficient willpower to choose whether the person would do the act or refrain from doing it."
PATTERN INSTRUCTION § 7.b2 (guilty but mentally ill), cited with approval, Aizupitis, 699 A.2d at 1095.
Aizupitis, 699 A.2d at 1096 (internal citation omitted, emphasis in original).
The Court's factual analysis of whether the evidence indicates that Mr. Wallace suffers from a psychiatric disorder, at first glance, appears straight forward. Both the State's and the defendant's experts have concluded that Mr. Wallace has an Axis I diagnosis — Dr. Mechanick says the diagnosis is conduct disorder and Drs. Much and Weiss say the diagnosis is schizophrenia, paranoid type. Although he initially testified that Mr. Wallace did not qualify for a finding of guilty but mentally ill, when asked directly by the Court whether he was opining that Mr. Wallace's conduct disorder had not "substantially disturbed [Mr. Wallace's] thinking or behavior" at the time of the murder, Dr. Mechanick candidly acknowledged that he could render no such opinion. Thus, regardless of whether the Court accepts the defense experts' opinions that Mr. Wallace was guilty but mentally ill (as a subset of their insanity opinions) as a result of schizophrenia, or the State's expert's tacit acknowledgment that he was guilty but mentally ill as a result of ongoing conduct disorder, the resulting verdict is the same.
See Aizupitis, 699 A.2d at 1097 (recognizing that the "first basis" for a GBMI verdict applies when the "underlying pathology of the defendant's psychiatric disorder [is] ongoing."). As Dr. Mechanick explained, conduct disorder, as defined in DSM IV, involves a "repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior."
The Court's conclusion in this regard does not rely solely upon the trial experts' respective diagnoses. The mental health clinicians who have evaluated Mr. Wallace while he has been incarcerated consistently have diagnosed him with various mental illnesses or psychiatric disorders. Notwithstanding Dr. Mechanick's skeptical view of these diagnoses, the Court finds them to be meaningful in the guilty but mentally ill analysis. In addition, Mr. Wallace's behavior, as observed by the Court in his video taped interview with the police, and as described by those who have evaluated and interacted with him since then, is indicative of a young man whose mental health is not well. In order to find the defendant guilty but mentally ill, it is not required that the Court reconcile the various diagnoses that have been rendered by competent mental health professionals and, itself, reach a definitive diagnosis for this defendant. It is enough that the Court finds that his condition fits within one of the three "basis" set forth in Section 401(b). The Court finds the defendant guilty but mentally ill under the "first basis" — a psychiatric disorder substantially disturbed his thinking and behavior at the time he committed the murder of Daniel Schlor.
Id.
During closing arguments, the State added a wrinkle to this analysis. According to the State, a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is prohibited in this instance as a matter of law. Specifically, the State refers to Section 401(c) which provides, in pertinent part:
As used in this chapter, the terms "insanity" or "mental illness" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other nonsocial conduct.
According to the State, conduct disorder is "manifested only by repeated criminal or other nonsocial conduct." Thus, according to the State, a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is not available to a defendant whose sole diagnosis is conduct disorder. The Court disagrees. First, even assuming arguendo that conduct disorder meets the restrictions set forth in Section 401(c), it appears from the plain language of that Section that it is meant to address when a "defense" based on mental illness will or will not be available to a criminal defendant. A verdict of guilty but mentally ill, as the parties both acknowledged in response to the Court's inquiry, is not a defense. It is an alternative verdict that qualifies a defendant's culpability by recognizing his potential need for treatment; it does not, however, excuse the defendant's conduct. On that basis, the Court questions whether Section 401(c) applies to Section 401(b) (the guilty but mentally ill provision of the statute).
The Court notes that it has not limited its finding of GBMI to a diagnosis of conduct disorder. The evidence also supports a diagnosis of schizophreniform, schizophrenia, and perhaps other Axis I diagnoses. Nevertheless, the Court has made the point that even the State's own expert has at least tacitly acknowledged that a GBMI verdict is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will address the State's statutory argument under Section 401(c) to complete that aspect of the Court's deliberations.
See Magner v. State, 1998 Del. LEXIS 292, * 3 (citing Section 401(c), the court held that "a defendant suffering from anti-social personality disorder may not assert mental illness as a defense.") (emphasis supplied).
See Daniels, 538 A.2d at 1108-09.
Moreover, the language to which the State refers in Section 401(c) clearly and unambiguously refers to terms not present in the guilty but mentally ill provision of the statute. In defining the criteria for the guilty but mentally ill verdict, Section 401(b) refers to "psychiatric disorders;" it does not refer to "insanity" or "mental illness." And, while Section 408(a) — another provision of the "chapter" arguably referenced in Section 401(c) — speaks of "mental illness," that provision has been held to apply only in instances where a defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty but mentally ill.
Daniels, 538 A.2d at 1110.
The chapter in Title 11 addressing mental illness was adopted after careful consideration by the General Assembly. Most of the key terms in the statutory scheme are themselves defined by statute. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the General Assembly said what it meant and meant what it said. Sections 401(b) and 401(c) are clear and unambiguous and must be construed in accordance with the intent of the legislature in keeping with the clear import of the language used. Conduct disorder is a psychiatric disorder as that term is used in Section 401(b). A finding of guilty but mentally ill based on that diagnosis is not precluded by the qualifications to the definitions of "insanity" or "mental illness" set forth in Section 401(c).
Accord Aizupitis, 699 A.2d at 1096 (recounting the legislative history of Section 401).
See Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985).
V.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the defendant guilty but mentally ill of Count I (murder in the first degree), and Count II (possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony). The Prothonotary is directed to enter the verdicts in accordance with this opinion. Sentencing shall occur on Thursday, April 5, 2007 at 10:00 a.m., or at such other date set by the Court. IT IS SO ORDERED.