Opinion
No. MV 03 0436589 S
September 7, 2004
THE COURT: This is the matter of State versus Vogele. I don't know what line number it is on the 300 docket. But it is on the firm jury docket. And this is the Court's decision on the defendant's Motion to Suppress, and Motion in Limine. If I go too fast, just slow me down, because we're under time constraints, because we can only have one court. He's on break. So . . .
And you tell me also, Madam Monitor.
MADAME MONITOR: Yes.
THE COURT: If I'm going too fast.
Okay, the facts: According to Officer Burkowski's testimony, which this Court finds to be credible, in the early morning hours of February 4th, 2003, Troop G dispatch alerted him that entering into his patrol area was an erratic operator southbound on I-95 South, or westbound in the area of Exit 17.
The vehicle was heading southbound towards New York, trial, record page 10. Dispatch described a blue vehicle with New York tags being followed by a tractor-trailer.
Trooper Burkowski took a post at the Exit 15 on-ramp in Norwalk, and waited for the vehicle to come down. He contacted Troop G to ascertain if there were any more calls on the erratic operator.
Dispatch informed Trooper Burkowski that they had the tractor trailer driver still on the phone, and they, the tractor-trailer and the erratic operator were approaching Exit 16 at the point while Trooper Burkowski was posted at Exit 15.
Trooper Burkowski had an unobstructed view of the traffic moving southbound. Trooper Burkowski observed three tractor-trailers in the left, center, and right lane that had traffic stopped in a quote, "rolling roadblock," end quote.
The vehicle in question quote, "was slaloming through the three lanes." End quote. Trial record, page 12.
Trooper Burkowski observed the three tractor-trailers blocking traffic to keep other cars from entering into the area of operation of the vehicle of the erratic operator.
Trooper Burkowski observed the quote "Extremely erratic operation," end quote, of the vehicle that is moving from right lane, slaloming to the left lane. From the left lane slaloming back to the right lane, and from the right lane back to the left lane.
After his initial observations of the vehicle, Trooper Burkowski waited for the vehicle to pass him, and then moved from the 15 on ramp area, to a position behind the vehicle.
Trooper Burkowski moved around the tractor-trailer to position himself behind the vehicle. At which point, quote, "He started to record operation on the onboard camera." End quote.
Trooper Burkowski at this point quote, "Observed myself, the erratic operation that were not in any established, lane. They had stopped slaloming from left to right and then from right back to left, but they were still over the broken wiles (sic) lines (meaning white lines), and not in any real established lane." End quote.
That's id. at trial record, page 14.
The operator of the vehicle was not using a left or right turn signal, to alert other drivers of these lane changes.
The videotape, which this Court viewed in its entirety and very carefully, and very thoroughly, clearly depicts the operator of the vehicle driving erratically. And therefore, this corroborates Trooper Burkowski's observations.
After observing the erratic operation, Trooper Burkowski activated the lights and sirens to his vehicle, in an attempt to stop the operator on the right shoulder.
The operator of the vehicle used her signal at this time and moved to the right travel lane, but did not stop. The operator did eventually come to a stop in the right travel lane.
At this point, Trooper Burkowski used his PA to announce to the operator to pull forward and pull to the right and get out of the right travel lane.
The vehicle moved forward. It moved to the right, but did not pull all the way off to the right, and was straddling the fault line that separates the right lane from the right shoulder.
Again, after viewing the videotape, it clearly corroborates this observation.
Trooper Burkowski again used his PA to get the operator to move all the way to the right. At which point they did move all the way into the right shoulder area.
Trooper Burkowski then asked the defendant for a driver's license, registration, insurance, and destination.
Trooper Burkowski then checked the defendant's motor vehicle history and criminal history, which revealed an extensive DUI history.
After checking her history, Trooper Burkowski asked the defendant to perform field-sobriety tests, based upon his suspicion that the defendant was operating her vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Trooper Burkowski also detected the odor of alcohol on approach to the defendant's vehicle and coming from the defendant's mouth as she spoke.
According to Trooper Burkowski, the defendant slurred her words, or as described by Trooper Burkowski, spoke with a quote, "thick tongue," end quote.
This is corroborated by the videotape as well. In response to Trooper Burkowski's questions of whether the defendant had been drinking, she responded that she had had a beer.
Trooper Burkowski administered the divided attention test, which the defendant failed.
After checking the defendant's history, Trooper Burkowski then asked the defendant to step out of the car to perform other field sobriety tests.
Trooper Burkowski performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which the defendant failed. The Court will note that Trooper Burkowski administered this test appropriately as set forth in State v. Commins, 83 Conn.App. 495, 499, 2004.
Trooper Burkowski positioned the stimulus 12 to 18 inches away from the defendant's eyes. He then moved the stimulus slowly from the mid-line of the nose to maximum deviation; the farthest lateral point to which the eyes can move to either side.
Trooper Burkowski instructed the defendant on how to perform the test as he was administering the test. Keep in mind this was a February, cold night. Nobody's going to stand out there and give a dissertation on how to take a nystagmus test. Common sense is that he's going to do what he has to do; get it done, and move forward.
Trooper Burkowski as I said, instructed the defendant on how to perform the test as he was administering the test. The defendant was moving her entire body with the stimulus and not just her head, as instructed by Trooper Burkowski.
Trooper Burkowski had to tell the defendant a number of times that she needed to follow with her eyes. This is clearly depicted on the video.
While administering the HGN test, Trooper Burkowski observed the defendant's eyes as he tracked the stimulus to look for the six clues, three in each eye, of nystagmus. See State v. Commins, supra at 499.
Quote, "As you're moving to the left and right, you're checking for the —" (This is a quote from Trooper Burkowski.) "As you're moving to the left and right, you're checking for the lack of smooth pursuit in the eyes. A person's eyes will track the stimulus. If they're not intoxicated, they'll track the stimulus smoothly.
"After the smooth pursuit, I'll check for nystagmus at maximum deviation to both the left and to the right. After the maximum deviation, what I'll do is I'll check for the nystagmus at a 45 degree angle to the eye, which is less than maximum deviation." Trial record page 59 and 60.
The defendant failed the nystagmus test. Due to the defendant's hip surgery, Trooper Burkowski did not administer the two field-sobriety tests which required the defendant to maintain balance and maintain control while standing still. Trial record page 22 to 23.
Instead, after visually demonstrating, Trooper Burkowski administered the manual dexterity test with the defendant's dominant hand The defendant failed to follow Trooper Burkowski's directions on how to perform the dexterity test, and she failed the test itself. The videotape clearly corroborates this.
After Trooper Burkowski formed an opinion that the defendant had failed the dexterity test, he decided to arrest the defendant.
Trooper Burkowski asked the defendant to turn around and place her hands behind her back, at which point he placed handcuffs on the defendant and verbally informed the defendant of her Miranda rights. Trial record, page 25 to 26.
Thereafter, Trooper Burkowski transported the defendant to Troop G for processing. Trooper Burkowski then apprised the defendant of her constitutional rights, via the written notice of rights form, which both he and the defendant signed.
Trooper Burkowski also read the rights to the defendant. The defendant immediately requested to speak with her attorney. State's Exhibit 3, 55:10 a.m. 2-4-03. The defendant's request was clear and unequivocal. The defendant requested twice.
Trooper Burkowski then went over with the defendant the implied consent or A-44 advisory. State's Exhibit 3, 56:32 a.m.
After reviewing this form with the defendant, Trooper Burkowski had the defendant sign the form, and he signed it as well. Trooper Burkowski asked the defendant at this time if she wanted to call her lawyer, and she responded that she did. State's Exhibit 3, 57:38 a.m.
Shortly thereafter, Trooper Burkowski then informs the defendant that she would have to make a decision whether to take the breathalyzer test. At which point the defendant again stated that she wanted to speak to her lawyer. State's Exhibit 3, approximately. 1:01 a.m.
Trooper Burkowski then proceeded to complete the A-44 form by asking the defendant what he describes as routine processing questions. Some of which are routing booking question, and others, which clearly elicit incriminating responses.
Motion to Suppress Evidence
The first issue the Court must decide is whether or not Trooper Burkowski had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant's car. The principles of fundamental fairness that are the hallmark of due process, permit an investigatory detention, even in the absence of probable cause if the police have a reasonable and articuable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.
In evaluating the validity of such a stop, courts consider whether in light of the totality of the circumstances, the detaining officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
Our Supreme Court has held that a police officer has a right to stop a motor vehicle operating on a Connecticut highway, even if the reason for the stop is only an infraction under our traffic laws. State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, State v. Gordon, which is a recent Appellate Court decision, which is at 84 Conn.App. 519, page 524, 2004. Reasonable and articuable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses, not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person having the information available to and known by the police would have had that level of suspicion.
The police officer's decision must be based on more than a hunch or speculation. In justifying the particular intrusion, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articuable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion.
The Court concludes that under the facts in this case, Trooper Burkowski had a reasonable and articuable suspicion that the defendant, Madeline Vogele, committed or was about to commit a crime. Trooper Burkowski's observations of the defendant's erratic operation of her vehicle, the defendant's improper lane change, and the defendant's inability to pull completely into the shoulder area of the highway as instructed by him are reasonable and articuable facts to justify the initial stop.
Once a lawful stop is made, a police officer's suspicion may become further aroused, and the stop may be prolonged and the scope enlarged, as required by the circumstances. Quote, "Because he smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath, McNellis had a reasonable and articuable suspicion that the defendant had been operating his motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, which warranted an extension of the initial investigatory stop."
"That further investigation was a warranted extension of the initial investigatory stop." End quote. State v. Gordon, supra at 525.
Here, once Trooper Burkowski approached the defendant's car, he detected an odor of alcohol and she spoke with quote, "a thick dry tongue" end quote. Which led him to request the defendant engage in several field-sobriety tests.
Such further investigation was a warranted extension of the initial investigatory stop. And any evidence gathered as a result of the initial stop and the further investigatory stop was legally obtained and therefore admissible at trial.
Quote, "In determining the constitutional validity of an investigatory stop both the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court require a balancing of the nature of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the government interests inducing that intrusion. Our Supreme Court has also recognized the pervasive societal interest in the apprehension and punishment of drunken drivers and has found that balancing the circumscribed nature of a Terry stop against the serious risk of criminal behavior, especially in the context of the risks associated with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, we are persuaded that a brief detention does not violate a defendant's due process rights." End quote. State v. Lamme.
Here, in balancing Trooper Burkowski's brief detention of the defendant against the serious risk associated with driving under the influence, this Court is persuaded that such detention did not violate the defendant's due process rights.
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained as a result of the initial stop and the warranted extension of the initial investigatory stop is denied.
Evidence gathered at the roadside stop
After the defendant was pulled over, Trooper Burkowski gathered information such as license, registration, insurance and destination from the defendant. Trooper Burkowski smelled an odor of alcohol on the defendant and noted that the defendant spoke again with a thick tongue.
Having reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating her vehicle while under the influence, Trooper Burkowski then asked the defendant to perform field-sobriety tests. Quote, "Roadside sobriety tests that do not involve long delay or unreasonable intrusion, although searches under the 4th amendment may be justified by an officer's reasonable suspicion."
In the instant case, the evidence is clear that Trooper Burkowski had a reasonable suspicion to initially stop the defendant's vehicle. Again, the erratic operation of the vehicle and thereafter, to continue that investigatory stop with field-sobriety tests, because on approach he smelled the odor of alcohol coming from the defendant, and the defendant's inability to follow his directions, as well as her slurred speech as he described, a thick tongue — all of these facts justify Trooper Burkowski's stop and detention of the defendant.
Accordingly, all evidence gathered as a result of Trooper Burkowski's initial stop and investigatory stop is admissible, and thus defendant's Motion to Suppress the results of the field-sobriety test as well is hereby denied.
Motion to Suppress Statements: Statements that were made at the roadside stop
The defendant argues that any and all statements, admissions given by the defendant at the police station should be suppressed, as they were in violation of the defendant's 4th, 6th and 14th Amendment rights as guaranteed by the federal constitution and Article 1, Section 7 and 8 of the Connecticut Constitution.
I'm going to address, even though it wasn't raised in the defendant's brief, the statements at the roadside stop. The state addressed that. I'm addressing that. It was not specifically raised in the defendant's brief, only the statements at the police station. But I addressed it anyway.
As a basic precept, the 5th Amendment's protection against self-incrimination requires the exclusion of any statement made by an accused during custodial interrogation unless he or she has been advised of his or her Miranda rights and has voluntarily waived them. Warnings are independently required under Article 1st Section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution. That's in State v. Barret, 205 Conn. 437.
The purpose of the required warnings is to counteract the coercive atmosphere attended upon custodial interrogation by the police, and to reduce the risk of involuntary statements. Two conditions must exist before a criminal suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings. The defendant must be in custody and the defendant must be subjected to police interrogation.
The state concedes that the defendant was not read her Miranda rights prior to the field-sobriety tests being conducted at the road-side stop. The state argues however, that any claims by the defendant that statements which were made by the defendant during the roadside stop and field-sobriety tests should be suppressed must fail.
This Court agrees with the state's position.
In Pennsylvania versus Bruder (ph), 488 U.S. 9, Pennsylvania versus Bruder is dispositive of this issue. In Bruder, the United States Supreme Court held that questioning at the scene of a traffic stop and conducting field-sobriety tests do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda. The court reasoned that the non-coercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not in custody for purposes of Miranda.
Although the stop was unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the 4th Amendment, such traffic stops typically are brief, unlike a prolonged station house interrogation. Second: traffic stops commonly occur in the public view, in an atmosphere far less police-dominated than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself.
The detained motorist's freedom of action was not curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Our Connecticut Supreme Court has followed the decision enunciated in Binder. Thus, any statements made by the defendant pursuant to Trooper Burkowski's valid roadside stop are admissible.
Trooper Burkowski's questioning of the defendant at the roadside stop and administering a field-sobriety test at the roadside stop, quote, "Does not involve custody for purposes of Miranda." End quote.
Accordingly, any statements made by the defendant at the roadside stop are admissible and thus, defendant's Motion to Suppress said statements is denied.
Statements made at the police station
After Trooper Burkowski placed the defendant under arrest at the roadside stop, he then transported her from Norwalk to Troop G in Bridgeport for processing.
Once Trooper Burkowski and the defendant arrived at Troop G, he apprised the defendant of her constitutional rights, via the written notice of rights form, which he and the defendant signed.
Trooper Burkowski also read the rights to the defendant. The defendant immediately requested to speak with her attorney. The defendant's request, as I previously stated was clear and unequivocal. The defendant requested twice.
Trooper Burkowski then went over with the defendant the implied consent advisory, or the form A-44.
After reviewing this form with the defendant, Trooper Burkowski had the defendant sign the form and he signed it as well. Trooper Burkowski read the implied consent rights to the defendant as well, and asked if she wanted to call her attorney. 57:39 a.m.
The defendant responded that she did. 57:40 a.m.; that was immediately.
Trooper Burkowski asked the defendant for her lawyer's number to call. At this point, (that's at 57:44 a.m.), there is no further questioning by Trooper Burkowski. And the defendant makes several voluntary statements during this time. It's approximately 57:45 through approximately 1:01 a.m.
At approximately 1:01 a.m. Trooper Burkowski then informs the defendant that she has to make a decision whether to take the breathalyzer test.
After making several statements in response to Trooper Burkowski's request, the defendant stated that she wanted to wait for her attorney. Again, there's no further questioning by Trooper Burkowski at this time.
Approximately 1:01 a.m.
At 1:06 a.m., Trooper Burkowski begins asking the defendant a series of questions from the A-44 form, which he describes as processing questions.
During this questioning Trooper Burkowski continuously asks the defendant to take the breathalyzer test. He also questions the defendant about her previous criminal history. Trooper Consorte then arrives and requests the defendant to take the breathalyzer.
The defendant for the final time refuses to take the test. Trooper Burkowski signs the A-44 form as a witness to the refusal, at which point the defendant is formally charged with DWI.
Now I broke it down. These are statements at the police station. But a subcategory of that — statements made by the defendant during and after the Miranda advisement and implied consent advisory:
As previously discussed, one of the conditions which must exist before a criminal suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings is that the defendant be subject to police interrogation.
Here, immediately after Trooper Burkowski advised the defendant of her rights and after the defendant requested her lawyer, there was no questioning. The video was just silent. During that time where there was no question, the defendant made several voluntary statements, which this Court finds were not pursuant to any interrogation at that time. And therefore, those statements are admissible. And the Defendant's Motion to Suppress those statements is denied.
Statements made in response to Trooper Burkowski's initial request to take the breathalyzer
Shortly after Trooper Burkowski went over the defendant's rights with her, that, is the notice of rights and the implied advisory rights, and after the defendant requested an attorney, Trooper Burkowski then requested the defendant to take a breathalyzer test. What he said was, you have to make a decision. And she said, a decision about what? To take the breathalyzer test.
The defendant refused and stated that she would wait for her lawyer. That's clear on the video.
The defendant then made several statements — there was no questioning after that. The defendant then made several statements in response to Trooper Burkowski's request at that time to take the breathalyzer. The Court finds that these statements are admissible under Pennsylvania versus Muniz (ph), that's a 496 U.S. 582, 1990 decision.
In Muniz, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Miranda did not require suppression of statements Muniz made when asked by the police to submit to a breathalyzer examination. Because Muniz's statements were not prompted by an interrogation within the meaning of CT Page 13227 Miranda, those statements were admissible.
The Court held that asking the defendant whether he wished to submit to the breathalyzer test was necessarily attendant to the legitimate police procedure and was not likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating response. Incriminating utterances during the sobriety and breathalyzer tests were not prompted by an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. The officer's dialogue with Muniz concerning the physical sobriety test consisted primarily of carefully scripted instructions as to how the tests were to be performed that were not likely to be perceived as calling for any verbal response.
Therefore they were not words or actions constituting custodial interrogation and Muniz's incriminating utterances were voluntary. The officer administering the breathalyzer test also carefully limited her role to providing Muniz with relevant information about the test, and the implied consent law. She questioned him only as to whether he understood her instructions and wished to submit to the test.
Those limited and focused inquiries were necessarily attendant to a legitimate police procedure and were not likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating response. Muniz, supra at 602, 605.
Here, Trooper Burkowski read to the defendant and had her sign the Miranda rights and implied consent advisory. During the reading of the Miranda rights, the defendant requests very clearly, her attorney.
Shortly thereafter, Trooper Burkowski advises the defendant that she's got to make a decision regarding taking the test. The Court submits that Trooper Burkowski's request at this time that the defendant submit to the breathalyzer is not interrogation, that is quote, "Words or actions" end quote, constituting custodial interrogation as defined in Muniz.
Thus, any statements the defendant made in response to Trooper Burkowski's request at this time to take the breathalyzer are admissible, and the defendant's Motion to Suppress these statements is denied.
Statements made during Trooper Burkowski's questioning from the A-44 form
The state concedes that the defendant requested an attorney per Miranda and the per se advisory. The state also concedes that the defendant did not waive her right to an attorney.
Under Miranda, once the defendant invokes his or her right to an attorney, the police must stop all interrogation until counsel is available, unless the defendant initiates further communication.
In this case, shortly after Trooper Burkowski reviewed the defendant's rights with her, and the defendant invoked her right to an attorney, and after he, Trooper Burkowski requested that she take a breathalyzer test, there was a period of silence. Trooper Burkowski then began questioning the defendant. He was asking her questions from the A-44 form, some of which this Court finds clearly elicited incriminating responses, and thus, violative of the defendant's 5th Amendment rights.
Clearly, routine booking questions inclusive of background, biographical data, which are part of a standard processing procedure essentially administrative in nature and objectively neutral, are not custodial interrogatories.
In Muniz, the U.S. Supreme Court gives an example of such questions. Name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age.
While some of Trooper Burkowski's questions were neutral, there were a great many of his questions that clearly as I said previously, elicited incriminating responses from the defendant.
What type of medication are you taking, if any? How much did you eat today? When did you eat? When did you drink? How much did you drink?
I also want to note that during this interrogation, Trooper Burkowski — this is all on the video, okay — asked the defendant many times would she take the breathalyzer test.
The state in its brief argues that the defendant's statements were made in response to Trooper Burkowski's request to take the breathalyzer test. While it is true that during his questioning of the defendant Trooper Burkowski did request many times that the defendant take the breathalyzer test, it is this Court's opinion based on the case law and an understanding of what the purpose of Miranda is, that it is at this point his questioning of the defendant while he does ask her to take the breathalyzer test, has taken on a custodial interrogation tone, and not merely questioning attendant to a legitimate police procedure not likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating response.
Therefore accordingly, all statements made by the defendant during Trooper Burkowski's questioning from the A-44 form except booking questions as the Court previously described are suppressed.
Refusal to take the breathalyzer test — and this is with respect to the defendant's Motion in Limine and the 6th Amendment right claim
Our legislature has seen fit — that is, if due process requirements are met — to require that refusal to take a chemical breath or urine test be admissible in court. It is respectfully submitted that the defendant was properly advised of her rights under not only Miranda, but also the per se advisement as required under 14-227b(b). The Court also finds that the defendant was given a reasonable opportunity to contact her attorney.
Trooper Burkowski called the pager number for Attorney Sam Kretzmer, the defendant's attorney, which was given to him by the defendant at 1:02 a.m.
At 1:24 a.m., Attorney Kretzmer had not returned Burkowski's page.
The Court finds that this period of time is a reasonable opportunity as stated under 14-227b(b).
The Court also submits that there are no Amendment violations here, since under State versus Chicowsky (ph), which I think is dispositive of the issue, under that case the court held that there's no 6th Amendment right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to a chemical alcohol test. Since the defendant had not yet been formally charged in this case, her right to counsel had not yet attached.
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion in Limine is denied, and the defendant's refusal may be introduced at trial.
Just as an end note:
In the analysis that I came up with, it was difficult. But what I think should have happened according to the case law that I read was, that once he took her down for booking and processing and read the rights and asked her to take a breathalyzer test, all questioning should have ended. He should have formally charged her at that point and move forward. That did not happen.
The other thing is with respect to the refusal, that's a separate issue. The legislature has said it comes in if certain rights are read or told to her.
That's a separate issue from Miranda, which she did invoke her Miranda rights. Our legislature has not seen the right to refusal as custodial — the U.S. Supreme Court hasn't either, seen as custodial interrogation. But that's it.
You're asked, do you want to take a breathalyzer? No. Or yes. And then that's the end of it. If in fact they invoked their right to counsel and haven't waived it, which I saw in this case.
Okay? That's the order of the Court.
You both did a very good job. Excellent job.
MR. LACOBELLE: Thank you very much for the decision, Your Honor. We appreciate it.
THE COURT: Any questions?
MR. LACOBELLE: No. You're not filing a written —
THE COURT: Yes. I'm going to have them do an expedited.
MR. LACOBELLE: Okay. And will we get a copy of it?
THE COURT: And I'm going to sign it. Yes.
MR. LACOBELLE: That's fine. Thank you very much.
THE COURT: Okay.
Anything further?
Court stands.
MR. DEJOSEPH: We need a new date.
THE COURT: Oh.
Let's see.
This is one charge, right?
MR. LACOBELLE: Right.
THE COURT: Oh, okay. So this is a possible one for Jennings to do.
September 28th firm jury.
And I'll let him know that this is a possible one that I —
MR. LACOBELLE: If Your Honor please, on September 28th, I have —
THE COURT: Well, you tell me the date —
MR. LACOBELLE: The 28th, I have to be in —
THE COURT: How about October 5th
MR. LACOBELLE: Okay.
Yes. October 5th is a day.
THE COURT: All right, October 5th, and I'll inform Jennings that this is a good possible one for him to do.
Thank you all.
MR. LACOBELLE: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
MADAM MONITOR: Thank you, Your Honor.
CERTIFICATION
I, Carrie Parker, Court Recording Monitor for the State of Connecticut, County of Fairfield do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of the above matter.
Carrie Parker