Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2680-14T4
05-10-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KELVIN J. VALLADARES, a/k/a KEVIN VALLADARES, Defendant-Appellant.
Rochelle Watson, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Watson, of counsel and on the brief). Kimberly L. Donnelly, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Donnelly, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Leone and Whipple. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 13-12-0990. Rochelle Watson, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Watson, of counsel and on the brief). Kimberly L. Donnelly, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Donnelly, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a November 17, 2014 judgment of conviction. We affirm.
On August 21, 2013, Detectives Martinez and Delaprida were patrolling Catherine and William Streets in Elizabeth, an area the detectives believed had a reputation for open-air narcotics activity and violent crime. The detectives received information from their supervisor that defendant and another Hispanic male, who did not live in the area, were frequenting the area and were selling controlled dangerous substances, and that they were often armed with a handgun. The detectives also had received other information regarding defendant from other informants.
The State failed to elicit at the suppression hearing what was the source of the supervisor's information, who these informants were, what information they had provided, or whether defendant had done anything incriminating in connection with the search warrant.
The detectives observed defendant riding his bicycle alone that afternoon in the area they were told he would be. The detectives recognized defendant from prior investigations, and pulled alongside him in their unmarked vehicle. Martinez lowered the window, identified himself as a police officer, and asked defendant to stop, but defendant continued riding his bicycle. At this point, Martinez again identified himself as a police officer, showed his badge, and commanded defendant to stop. Defendant continued riding and the detectives drove ahead of defendant. Defendant started peddling faster and jammed his left hand into his pocket, causing the detective concern that defendant had a gun or drugs. Martinez opened his car door to get out of his vehicle as defendant pedaled by; defendant collided with the door. Defendant then fell off his bicycle and ran, discarding a handgun with his left hand as he fled. Martinez pursued defendant on foot. Delaprida pursued in the vehicle and then on foot, and defendant was arrested.
Defendant was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b; fourth-degree obstructing the administration of the law or other governmental function, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1; fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a; and disorderly persons possession of paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2.
Defendant challenged the admissibility of the gun at a motion in limine, claiming that it was the product of an illegal seizure. The trial court held a hearing and found, based on testimony from Martinez and Delaprida, that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and denied defendant's motion to suppress the gun. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to unlawful possession of a handgun, and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. We disagree.
Defendant raises the following point on appeal:
BECAUSE INFORMATION FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED SOURCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS SELLING DRUGS IN
THE AREA WITH ANOTHER PERSON WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A SEIZURE, THE POLICE HAD NO BASIS TO REPEATEDLY COMMAND DEFENDANT TO STOP AND DISMOUNT FROM HIS BICYCLE. THIS ILLEGAL SEIZURE TAINTED THE REST OF THE ENCOUNTER.
When reviewing a motion to suppress, we "must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 200 (2013) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). "Those findings warrant particular deference when they are substantially influenced by [the trial judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which the reviewing court cannot enjoy." Ibid. "To the extent that the trial court's determination rests upon a legal conclusion, we conduct a de novo, plenary review." Ibid. (citing State v. J.D., 211 N.J. 344, 354 (2012); State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)).
Although the State and defendant focus their arguments on the legality of the initial stop, the record requires a broader inquiry. We agree with defendant that "[t]he propriety of the investigatory stop in this case is doubtful when viewed against the jurisprudence developed under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Paragraph 7." State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 10 (2007). "However, we need not decide whether the officers acted without reasonable and articulable suspicion . . . because we would not suppress the later discovery of the handgun even if the investigatory stop did not meet acceptable constitutional standards." Ibid. "We reach that result because defendant was obliged to submit to the investigatory stop, regardless of its constitutionality." Ibid.
We are "neither bound by, nor required to defer to, the legal conclusions of a trial . . . court." State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010). Both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend IV; N.J. Const., art. I, para. 7. Because the search at issue was executed without a warrant, it is presumed facially invalid; to overcome this presumption, the State must show that the search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858 (1973). The State bears the burden of demonstrating that the seizure was legal. State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983).
The trial judge found that after defendant was ordered to stop and fled the officers, the officers' pursuit and arrest were lawful and defendant's voluntary discarding of the gun constituted abandonment of the property. We agree.
A field inquiry escalates into an investigatory stop or detention "when an objectively reasonable person feels that his or her right to move has been restricted." State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002). When defendant was asked to stop but continued on his way, Martinez showed defendant his badge, and identified himself as an officer and commanded him to stop and dismount. This interaction rose above the level of a mere field inquiry, and constituted a seizure. See State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 450, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1078, 127 S. Ct. 740, 166 L. Ed. 2d 563 (2006) (defendant was "seized" when officers pulled alongside him in their patrol car and called out, "Police. Stop. I need to speak with you."). An officer may conduct such a stop "if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer ha[s] a reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity." State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 365 (2002).
Notwithstanding defendant's argument that the order to stop was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, the illegality of the initial seizure does not necessarily preclude admission of the gun, because defendant's flight constituted a new offense. "A person has no constitutional right to . . . flee[] or resist[] a stop, even though a judge may later determine the stop was unsupported by reasonable and articulable suspicion." Crawley, supra, 187 N.J. at 458. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1, when a police officer commands a person to stop, that person has no right to take flight or otherwise obstruct the officer in the performance of his duty. Williams, supra, 192 N.J. at 11. A person commits a fourth-degree crime of obstruction if he prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). A defendant can be convicted of violating the obstruction statute even if he fled from an unconstitutional investigatory stop. Crawley, supra, 187 N.J. at 460-61.
In Williams, our Supreme Court determined that the exclusionary rule does not necessarily require suppression of a gun discovered after an illegal stop. Williams, supra, 192 N.J. at 17. In Williams, officers received a dispatch from their headquarters with a description of a man who was possibly selling drugs. Id. at 4-5. The officers responded to the address provided and saw two men matching the description provided in the dispatch. Id. at 5. One of the men walked away as the patrol car approached; defendant Williams remained. Ibid. When the officers asked Williams to place his hands atop his head and submit to a pat down for the officers' safety, defendant pushed one of the officers and fled. Ibid. Williams stumbled and fell to the ground, where the officers arrested and handcuffed him. Ibid. While patting him down, they found a handgun tucked in his waistband. Ibid.
In determining that the gun was admissible, our Supreme Court in Williams ruled that "[i]n obstructing the officers, defendant committed a criminal offense, which led to his arrest and to the discovery of the handgun incident to that lawful arrest." Id. at 10. "Obstructing the police constituted a break in the chain from the investigatory stop, which we will presume was unconstitutional. The taint from that initial stop was significantly attenuated by defendant's criminal flight that caused the handgun's later seizure[.]" Id. at 10-11. Accordingly, the Court found "the application of the exclusionary rule is unwarranted in this case." Id. at 11.
The Williams Court stated that "[i]n evaluating whether evidence is sufficiently attenuated from the taint of a constitutional violation, we look to three factors: '(1) the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct.'" Id. at 15 (quoting State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639, 653 (1990)). The Court found that the temporal proximity between the unconstitutional stop and the seizure of the gun weighed in defendant's favor. Id. at 15-16. However, the Court found that factor was "substantially outweighed by the other two factors." Id. at 16. Although the officers may have acted without a sufficiently reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, they acted in good faith, as they were relying on a dispatch from headquarters. Id. at 13, 16. The Court considered the presence of intervening circumstances, such as defendant's flight, determinative as to the admissibility of the gun. Although defendant was initially illegally stopped by police, his subsequent flight gave rise to probable cause that he had violated N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. Id. at 13. Defendant's attempt to prevent the officers from lawfully performing their official function constituted an intervening act and completely purged the taint from the unconstitutional investigatory stop. Id. at 18. The Court noted that "[t]he point . . . is that the law should deter and give no incentive to suspects who would endanger the police and themselves by not submitting to official authority." Id. at 17.
Our Supreme Court in Williams concluded that "[a] person has no constitutional right to use an improper stop as justification to commit the new and distinct offense of resisting arrest, eluding, escape, or obstruction, thus precipitating a dangerous chase that could have deadly consequences." Id. at 17 (quoting Crawley, supra, 187 N.J. at 459). "Had defendant merely stood his ground and resorted to the court for his constitutional remedy, then the unlawful stop would have led to the suppression of the handgun." Ibid. Because the defendant instead fled after being commanded to stop, his flight constituted a crime, provided probable cause to arrest for that crime, and was an intervening act. Thus, the evidence seized "will not be subject to suppression." Id. at 16. The same conclusion applies here.
The Court held it was "of no consequence . . . that defendant was ultimately acquitted by the jury on the obstruction charge." Id. at 11 n.5. Similarly, it is of no consequence here that defendant pled guilty to a charge other than the obstruction charge. --------
Here, the trial court determined that defendant's flight from police — an intervening act — provided sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant. The record amply supports the judge's findings. Moreover, the trial judge determined that the defendant had abandoned the gun and therefore lacked standing to contest its admissibility. For the purposes of standing, property is abandoned when a person, who has control or dominion over property, knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes any possessory or ownership interest in the property and when there are no other apparent or known owners of the property. State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 548-549, N.J. (2008). Here, the record supports the trial judge's finding that defendant abandoned the gun found by the police.
Defendant's cites to State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158 (1994), are inapposite. In Tucker, the defendant had not been commanded to stop; instead, he simply fled upon seeing the police. Id. at 162. The Tucker Court found that cocaine dropped by the defendant was not abandoned for constitutional purposes because he was fleeing an unconstitutional seizure when he discarded the drugs. Id. at 172. The Court held that, because defendant's seizure was justified solely by defendant's flight, without other articulable suspicion of criminal activity, any perceived abandoned items were a result of an illegal seizure. Id. at 173. In that situation, our Supreme Court reversed their suppression.
In the years since Tucker, our Supreme Court has provided that a defendant's flight from an illegal investigatory stop may constitute an intervening circumstance sufficient to cleanse any taint from an unconstitutional seizure. Williams, supra, 192 N.J. 1. In the instant case, defendant discarded the gun only after fleeing the detectives, purging the taint from the allegedly unconstitutional stop; because defendant discarded the weapon during his illegal flight, it was abandoned and in plain view, and was lawfully seized.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION