Opinion
No. UWY-CR04-328520
February 26, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The State of Connecticut has charged the defendant, Edward Valentin, by substitute information with the crimes of falsely reporting an incident concerning death, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-180b, and false statement in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-157b. The defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial and elected to be tried to the court.
General Statutes § 53a-180b provides, in relevant part: "(a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death when such person commits the crime of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as provided, in section 53a-180c and such false report is of the alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of the serious physical injury or death of another person."
General Statutes § 53a-157b provides, in relevant part: "(a) A person is guilty of false statement in the second degree when he intentionally makes a false written statement under oath or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable, which he does not believe to be true and which statement is intended to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official function."
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress statements that he had given to the Waterbury police. The motion to suppress was heard and denied by Judge Cremins.
Having heard the evidence, the court finds the following facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant and his now ex-wife, Betsy, were married in October 1983. The couple subsequently had three children. Betsy, a member of the United States Army Reserves, was deployed overseas for several periods during the marriage. From November 1990, to early 1991, her unit was activated and deployed overseas in connection with Operation Desert Storm. In February 2003, her unit was again activated and deployed to Iraq. Although Betsy was granted leave to return home for the holidays in December 2003, she was required to return to Iraq in January 2004.
Betsy's lengthy deployments strained the couple's relationship. During her absence, the defendant developed a close friendship with Sandra Roderick and began spending a good deal of time with her. Roderick knew Betsy and knew that the defendant and Betsy were married. On the morning of February 11, 2004, the defendant falsely told Roderick that he had asked Betsy for a divorce.
While at home with his children and his cousin, Carlos Avila, on February 11, 2004, shortly after 4:00 P.M., the defendant began feigning hysteria, telling his children and Avila that he had received a phone call from an Army officer informing him that Betsy had been killed in Iraq. Avila or the defendant subsequently called the defendant's parents and other family and friends to relay the tragic news. The defendant's sister, Carmen Cordero, was among the friends and family members who gathered at the defendant's home that evening. Upon observing the defendant's distraught condition, she became concerned and telephoned the Waterbury police. Cordero told the police that the defendant had become "crazy" at the news of his wife's death and was "really, really upset."
The defendant also informed Roderick of the news.
Officer Steven Binette and an ambulance were dispatched to the defendant's home at 4:57 P.M. in response to Cordero's call. Upon arriving, Binette observed that the defendant was very upset, crying and had some redness and swelling on the top of his forehead from hitting his head against the wall. After the ambulance personnel attempted to treat the defendant, Binette asked the defendant how he had received the news of Betsy's death. The defendant told Binette that he had been on his cell phone with another person, Edna Mills, when a caller with a blocked number beeped through. The defendant claimed that the caller identified himself as a lieutenant colonel in the Army, asked the defendant if he was Betsy's husband, and told the defendant that Betsy's unit had been firebombed and Betsy "may" have been killed. The defendant also said that the caller told him that he would receive confirmation of the incident in a couple of days. Having served in the military, Binette doubted the defendant's story but still filed an incident report. Within a few hours, news of Betsy's supposed death came to the attention of Robin Adams, a reporter for the Waterbury Republican newspaper. Adams had interviewed Betsy in the past and stayed in contact with her by e-mail during her deployment to Iraq. On the evening of February 11 or 12, 2004, Adams e-mailed Betsy, who was very much alive, and told her to call home. After receiving Adams' e-mail and an e-mail from her sister, Betsy called the defendant on February 12, 2004. During the phone call, the defendant tearfully told Betsy about the telephone call from the lieutenant colonel.
News that Betsy was unharmed spread quickly. On February 13, 2004, the Chief of the Waterbury Police Department, Neil Cleary, directed Sergeant Scott Stevenson to investigate the defendant's story. Stevenson obtained a warrant to seize the defendant's cell phone records. Stevenson also spoke to Tanya Lewis, a senior volunteer resource instructor with the U.S. Army, who told Stevenson that the Army would "never" notify a next of kin of a service member's death by telephone.
Later that day, after further investigation suggested that the defendant had fabricated his story, Stevenson asked the defendant to come to police headquarters for an interview. The defendant replied that he had no means of transportation. Stevenson replied that he would send a police car to transport the defendant to headquarters. The defendant agreed.
A police officer drove the defendant and Avila to police headquarters in an unmarked car. Stevenson interviewed the defendant in his office while Avila waited in a separate room. Stevenson asked the defendant to recount the events of February 11, 2004, and typed his responses into a computer. Stevenson then presented the defendant with a printout of his typed statement and had him read it aloud and sign the bottom. That statement is as follows:
I, the undersigned, Edward Valentin of 1 Francisco Circle Waterbury, CT, Tel. # 768-0164 , being 43 years of age, born at New York, NY on 6/22/1960, do hereby make the following statement to Scott Stevenson, having first been identified as a Waterbury Police Sergeant.
My name is Edward Valentin and I am 42 years old. I voluntarily came to the Waterbury Police station tonight to speak with the detectives about the phone call at my house the other day. I went up to the 11th grade and I can read and write English. I have not been threatened in any way or promised anything in return or this information.
My wife Betsy Valentin is in the US Army Reserves. She was sent to Iraq last May, returned in late December and then shipped out again in the middle of January 2004. Her unit is the 439th and she is stationed in Baghdad.
This past Wednesday, I was home with my cousin Carlos Avila. Carlos' cousin's sister-in-law, Edna, called my cell phone. My T-Mobile is the only phone working in the house because the house phone is shut off. I talked to her for a few minutes while I was using the bathroom. Just as I was about to hang up with her, another phone call beeped in. I switched over to answer it and it came up blocked numbber, so I couldn't tell who was calling. I answered the phone and a real official sounding person asked if I was Edward Valentin. I asked who this was and he said Lt. Colonel Jack something or other, I don't remember the last name. Then he asked if my wife was Sgt. Betsy Valentin. I said yes and he asked if her unit was the 439th Quartermaster and he said her social security number. I said yes and the guy said that my wife is among the casualties in Baghdad. I was in shock and I asked him to repeat that. He said that Betsy's unit was bombed and that she was among the casualties. Then he said that someone will be there within 2 hours to confirm. When I asked him what was going to be confirmed, the guy said her death. The whole call lasted like 5 minutes or so and when I hung up, I totally lost it, flipped out and ran out of the bathroom. My cousin Carlos asked what was going on and I told him that Betsy was killed. Carlos flipped out, too, and the next thing I did was call my parents in New York from my cell phone, told them what happened and then Carlos made the rest of the calls to tell everyone what happened from his phone. I didn't call anyone else for a long time because of how emotional I was. I can't really remember what happened after that, but a bunch of family and friends came over that night. Next thing I really remember is how relieved I was the next day to find out that Betsy was OK.
I have read this statement and it is the truth.
The facts herein contained are true and correct, and knowing that any false statement is subject to prosecution under the penalties of Connecticut State Statute 53a-157b, I have given the above statement of my own free will without threat or promise.
Signed s/Edward Valentin
Signature of Person giving voluntary statement
Supervisor S/Lt. Patrick D. Deely 02-13-2004
Subscribed and sworn to before me Date
After comparing the defendant's statement with the case file, Stevenson told the defendant that there was a "problem" with his story. Stevenson advised the defendant of his rights and the defendant signed a document indicating that he understood and waived his rights insofar as he was willing to answer questions. Stevenson then confronted the defendant with the evidence developed during the investigation. The defendant gave a second statement admitting that his first statement was not true and that he had fabricated the entire incident. That second statement is a follows:
I, the undersigned, Edward Valentin of 1 Francisco Cir Waterbury, CT, Tel. # 768-0164, being 43 years of age, born at New York, NY on 06/22/1960, do hereby make the following statement to Scott Stevenson, having first been identified as a Waterbury Police Sergeant.
My name is Edward Valentin and I am 42 years old. I am giving this statement to Sgt. Stevenson on my own free will. Sgt. Stevenson has read me my rights, I understand those rights and I have decided to give up those rights and give this statement to Sgt. Stevenson, knowing that it can be used later on in court. I have not been threatened or promised anything in return for this information.
A little while ago, I gave Sgt. Stevenson a statement about the phone call I got at my house this past Wednesday. I would like to say now that that statement was not the truth. I never got a phone call about my wife, Betsy, and I have decided to get this off my chest and tell what really happened.
My wife did get sent to Iraq last May with the Army Reserves. She came home in December for a couple of weeks and then she went back to Iraq in January. Since she went back, my kids ask for her all the time and have been under a lot of pressure, taking care of the kids and stuff. Recently, I started having a bad feeling that something was going to happen to Betsy over in Bagdad. On Wednesday, I heard and seen on the news that a bomb went off over in Iraq and killed a bunch of people. I was scared that Betsy may have been hurt or killed. I had been thinking recently about how I could get her back home and out of the Army. It seemed like perfect timing for me to tell everyone that someone from the military called and said that Betsy was killed in the bombing on TV. I figured I could get away with it and that I could play it off like a prank call. I thought that it would get so much attention that the Army would send Betsy back home to be with us. That's all I wanted, to have me and my kids reunited with Betsy. That's why I lied to Carlos about be phone call and the next thing I knew the story just got out of control. The truth is that I made the whole story up and I am sorry for that.
I have read this statement and it is the truth.
The facts herein contained are true and correct, and knowing that any false statement is subject to prosecution under the penalties of Connecticut State Statute 53a-157b, I have given the above statement of my own free will without threat or promise after my Constitutional Rights have been explained to me.
Signed s/Edward Valentin
Signature of Person giving voluntary statement
Supervisor S/Lt. Patrick D. Deely 02-13-2004
Subscribed and sworn to before me Date
The defendant was returned home by police cruiser. He was later arrested by warrant.
I
The first count of the information charges that "[t] he said Edward Valentin did commit the crime of falsely reporting an incident concerning death, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-180b, in that on or about February 11, 2004, at approximately 5:00 P.M., the said Edward Valentin, knowing the information reported, conveyed and circulated to be false and baseless, did gratuitously report to a law enforcement officer the alleged occurrence of an incident which did not in fact occur and such false report was of the alleged occurrence of the death of another person, to wit: Betsy Valentin."
General Statutes § 53a-180b provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death when such person commits the crime of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as provided in section 53a-180c and such false report is of the alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of the serious physical injury or death of another person." General Statutes § 53a-180c, to which § 53a-180b refers, provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, such person gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or agency (1) the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur, (2) an allegedly impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur, or (3) false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein."
The defendant argues that his conduct on February 11, 2004, does not satisfy the requirements of § 53a-180c because he did not tell Binette that Betsy had been seriously injured or killed; he simply said that her military unit has been firebombed and that she "may" have been killed. The State counters that although the defendant's statement to Binette on February 11, 2004, "probably" would not satisfy the requirement that the false report is of the alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of the death of another person, it nonetheless satisfies the alternative element that the false report is of the occurrence of the serious physical injury of another person. Alternatively, the State contends that even if the defendant's statement to Binette on February 11, 2004, does not satisfy the statutory requirements, his first statement to Stevenson on February 13, 2004, does satisfy those requirements. The defendant responds that the charge as pled in count one is solely based on the defendant's earlier statement to Binette and does not encompass his statement to Stevenson two days later.
With regard to the first count of the information, the court finds that: (A) the defendant's statement to Binette on February 11, 2004, does not satisfy the requirements of General Statutes § 53a-180b; (B) count one of the information does encompass the defendant's statement to Stevenson on February 13, 2004; and (C) based on his statement to Stevenson on February 13, 2004, the defendant is not guilty of falsely reporting an incident concerning death because that statement was not made "gratuitously."
A.
The court first addresses whether the defendant's statement to Binette was "of the alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of the serious physical injury or death of another person," as required by General Statutes § 53a-180b. The court finds that it was not.
The defendant did not tell Binette that Betsy had sustained a serious physical injury; he told Binette that Betsy's military unit had been firebombed. Also, the defendant did not tell Binette that Betsy was dead; he said that she "may" be dead. In the context of this case, the definition of death is not ambiguous. Death is the "cessation of life." Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979); see Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980); State Department of Human Services v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1978); Ruddock v. Cunningham, 43 Ohio.App.3d 146, 145-49, 539 N.E.2d 1141 (1987), quoting Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md. 313, 322, 424 A.2d 744, (1981). By saying that Betsy "may" be dead, the defendant was indicating that he was unsure whether Betsy alive or dead. Nor is this uncertainty evidence that Betsy had sustained serious physical injury. Accordingly, the court finds that the defendant's statement to Binette does not satisfy the requirement of General Statutes § 53a-180b that the defendant falsely report "the alleges occurrence or impending occurrence of the serious physical injury or death of another person."
General Statutes § 53a-3(4) defines serious physical injury as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ . . ."
B.
The court is persuaded by the State's argument that the first count of the information encompasses the defendant's statements to Stevenson on February 13, 2004. The first count charges that the defendant committed the crime of falsely reporting an incident concerning death "on or about" February 11, 2004. "The Supreme Court previously has held that when time is not a material element of the crime charged or when a precise date is unavailable [and] [w] here the [information] alleges that an offense allegedly occurred on or about a certain date, the defendant is deemed to be on notice that the charge is not limited to a specific date . . . [W] hen the [information] uses the on or about designation, proof of a date reasonably near to the specified date is sufficient." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, 69 Conn.App. 41, 50, 794 A.2d 541 (2002).
Time is not a material element of the crime falsely reporting an incident concerning death, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-180b. Moreover, February 13, 2004, is indeed "reasonably near to the date alleged in the first count, February 11, 2004. Accordingly, the court finds that count one of the information does encompass the defendant's written statement to Stevenson on February 13, 2004.
C. CT Page 3919
The court next turns to whether the defendant's statement to Stevenson on February 13, 2004 violated General Statutes § 53a-180b. For the purposes of this prosecution, the State must have proved the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant knew that the information he reported was false or baseless; (2) that the defendant gratuitously reported that false information to a law enforcement officer or agency; and (3) that the false report was about the alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of the serious physical injury or death of another person. The court finds that the State has not proven that the defendant's statement was made "gratuitously."
General Statutes § 1-1(a) provides: "In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly." Moreover, General Statutes § 1-2z provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." "The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tarnowsky v. Socci, 271 Conn. 284, 287 n. 3, 856 A.2d 408 (2004).
The word "gratuitously" is not defined by statute and has not been interpreted by a Connecticut appellate court in the context of General Statutes § 53a-180b. "If a statute . . . does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary." State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 809, 640 A.2d 986 (1994). Accordingly, the court turns to the lexicon.
The State argues that the term "gratuitously" should be interpreted to mean "unwarranted." At oral argument, the defendant appeared to acquiesce in this interpretation. Statutory interpretation, however, including the question of what the statutory elements of a crime are, is a quest of law for be court. State v. Kirk R., 271 Conn. 499, 510-11, 857 A.2d 908 (2004); People v. Brady, 2007 Ill.App. Lexis 21, *13 (2007) ("[t] he interpretation of the essential elements of a criminal offense presents an issue of statutory construction"). The court will not find a defendant guilty of a crime based on a flawed reading of a statute, even where the parties assent to such a reading.
"Gratuitously" is the adverb of the adjective "gratuitous." Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "gratuitous" as: (1) "given freely or without recompense: granted without pay or without claim or merit"; (2) "costing the recipient or participant nothing: FREE"; (3) "not involving a return benefit, compensation or consideration see GRATUITOUS BAILMENT, GRATUITOUS CONTRACT"; and (4) "not called for by the circumstances . . . adopted or asserted without good ground." When read in the context of the statute as a whole, that part of the first definition that defines gratuitous as "without recompense" or "pay" is unreasonable. "It is illogical to assume that the Legislature here intended the word 'gratuitously' to mean, 'without pay or recompense.' Surely, the Legislature, in proscribing false reporting as a crime, did not intend to create an exception where the person making a false report expected to be paid." People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, 67 Misc.2d 221, 223, 323 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1971). This also rules out the second and third definitions of "gratuitous" in Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
The first art of the first definition of "gratuitous" in Webster's is "given freely." "Freely," however, has several definitions in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the first of which is "in a free manner." The definitions of the word "free" in Webster's consumes two and one-half columns and twenty-one definitions. Suffice to say, without parsing through each definition, that the court cannot find that there is only one reasonable definition. This is so even with the aid of referencing a related statute, General Statutes § 53a-180, which does not employ the word "gratuitously."
Similarly, the fourth definition in Webster's — "not called for by the circumstances adopted or asserted without good ground" — is inapplicable. "[N] o part of a legislative enactment is to be treated as insignificant or unnecessary, and there is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase . . . [so that] no word [or phrase] in a statute is to be treated as superfluous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peeler, 271 Conn. 338, 434-35, 857 A.2d 808 (2004), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1029, 126 S.Ct 94, 163 L.Ed.2d 110 (2005). Section 53a-180c, which is incorporated by reference into § 53a-180b, already requires the State to prove that the defendant knew that the information reported was "false or baseless." Interpreting gratuitous to mean "asserted without good ground" would make the incorporated elements of General Statutes § 53a-180c redundant. Accordingly, in the context of § 53a-180b, the court finds the word "gratuitously" to be ambiguous, "and, therefore, we may resort to extratextual evidence in determining its meaning." Alexson v. Foss, 276 Conn. 599, 606, 887 A.2d 872 (2006).
General Statutes § 53a-180b is the progeny of General Statutes § 53a-180, which was enacted in 1969 as part of the enactment of the Connecticut Penal Code. See 1969 Public Acts No. 828 § 182. Having examined the legislative history of that seminal enactment the court finds that it does not illuminate the legislature's intent in enacting the statute.
General Statutes (Rev. 1971) § 53a-180 provided: "(a) A person is guilty of false reporting an incident when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, he: (1) Initiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire, explosion, crime, catastrophe or emergency under circumstances in which it is likely that public alarm or inconvenience will result; or (2) reports, by word or action, to any official or quasi-official agency or organization having the function of dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property, an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire, plosion or other catastrophe or emergency which did not in fact occur or does not in fact exist; or (3) gratuitously report to a law enforcement officer or agency (A) the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur, (B) an allegedly impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur, or (C) false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein. (b) Falsely reporting an incident is a class A misdemeanor."
"In drafting the Connecticut penal code, however, our legislature relied heavily upon the Model Penal Code and various state criminal codes, especially the penal code of New York. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 1, 1969 Sess., p. 11. State v. Hill, 201 Conn. 505, 517, 523 A.2d 1252 (1986). Thus, [in the absence of legislative history] we may turn to . . . the New York Revised Penal Law, effective September 1, 1967, for guidance. State v. Hill, supra, 516-17; In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 9268), 184 Conn. 157, 163-64 nn. 8-9, 439 A.2d 958 (1981). State v. Havican, 213 Conn. 593, 601, 569 A.2d 1089 (1990)." State v. Laws, 37 Conn.App. 276, 301, 655 A.2d 1131 cert. denied, 234 Conn. 907, 659 A.2d 1210 (1995).
General Statutes (Rev. 1971) § 53a-180 was adopted verbatim from New York Revised Penal Laws § 240.50: "The fact that a statute is almost a literal copy of a statute of a sister state is persuasive evidence of a practical reenactment of the statute of the sister state; as such it is proper to resort to the decisions of a sister court construing that statutory language. State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 5, 411 A.2d 3 (1979)." SLI International Corp. v. Crystal, 236 Conn. 156, 164-65, 671 A.2d 813 (1996).0
The term gratuitously in New York Revised Penal Laws § 240.50 has been interpreted by the New York courts to mean "voluntary" and "unsolicited." People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, supra, 67 Misc.2d 223. Thus, a defendant is not guilty of gratuitously giving false information to a police officer when the defendant does not initiate contact with the police and merely responds to an officer's inquiries. Id.; People v. Clairborne, 36 A.D.2d 500, 323 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 29 N.Y.2d 950, 280 N.E.2d 366, 329 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1972); People v. Li, 192 Misc.2d 380, 745 N.Y.S.2d 683 (2002).
One court has observed that "[s] everal states that follow the Model Penal Code have interpreted their false report statutes to exclude responses to police initiated inquiry. See State v. Brandstetter, [ 127 Idaho 885, 887-88] 908 P.2d 578, 581 (Idaho Ct.App. 1995); Johnson v. State, [ 75 Md.App. 621, 635,] 542 A.2d 429, 438 ([1988] ), cert. denied, 561 A.2d 215 (Md. 1989); State v. McMasters, 815 S.W.2d 116, 118 [(Mo.App. 1991)] ; State v. Valentin, [ 105 N.J. 14,] 519 A.2d 322, 325-26 ([1987] ); People v. Claiborne, 323 N.Y.S.2d 527, 528 (N.Y.A.D. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 329 N.Y.S.2d 580 (N.Y. 1972); Commonwealth v. Neckerauer, 617 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1992). See contra State v. Terrell, 811 P.2d 364, 365 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1991); People v. Lawson, 161 Cal.Rptr. 7, 11 (Cal.Ct.App. 1979); State v. Nissen, 395 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Neb. 1986); State v. Bailey, 644 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ohio 1994)." State v. Levandowski, Docket No. 03C01-9503-CR-00076 1996 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 341, *28 n. 17 (June 5, 1996), aff'd, 955 S.W.2d 603, 1997 Tenn.Lexis 486 (October 6, 1997).
There is one New York trial court decision that, while acknowledging this rule, appears to hold otherwise. In People v. Oliver, 193 Misc.2d 250, 750 N.Y.S.2d 449 (2002), the defendant was questioned by two investigators about a robbery and assault that occurred at a gasoline station. The next morning, the defendant told his mother that one of the investigators had stolen $300 from him during that questioning. His mother then called the State Police who sent two officers to investigate the defendant's claim. The defendant repeated his stolen money claim to the two officers but admitted two days later that the claim was false. The defendant was subsequently charged with falsely reporting an incident in the third degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.50(3)(a). Id., 250-51.
The defendant in Oliver filed a motion to dismiss the criminal information on the grounds that the false statement he made to the police was the result of solicitation and not gratuitously given as required by the statute. The court disagreed, stating that "although the information was given in response to questioning by two investigators, it must be noted that the investigators were there as a result of a complaint by the defendant's mother after the defendant, her 18-year-old son, had informed her that a deputy sheriff had stolen $300. Therefore, the presence of the investigators resulted from contact initiated by the defendant's mother, an action set in motion by the defendant's claim. Thus this court concludes that the defendant started a chain of events resulting in police questioning and therefore was responsible for initiating police contact. Under these circumstances the initial statements by the defendant were made gratuitously and were not the product of solicitation by law enforcement."1
Following Clairborne and Skinner, this court holds that the word "gratuitously" in General Statutes § 53a-180c means "volunteered and unsolicited." Based on that definition, the court also finds that the defendant's statements to Stevenson were not volunteered and unsolicited in accordance with those New York decisions. The evidence shows that Stevenson asked the defendant to come to police headquarters. Moreover, the defendant's first statement to Stevenson was given in response to questioning.
This court finds that the decision in People v. Oliver is inconsistent with People v. Clairborne and People v. Skinner. In Oliver, the defendant was 18 years old, the age of majority in New York; General Obligations Law § 1-202; except for purposes of financial child support. New York, Family Ct. Act §§ 413, 414, 415, 513. The defendant's mother, not the defendant, initiated contact with the police who then questioned the defendant. Compare People v. Li, supra, 192 Misc.2d 380. However, even if the "chain of events" holding in Oliver were to be imported into Connecticut, in Oliver it was at least foreseeable that the mother would report to other law enforcement authorities her son's claim of having been the victim of a crime, a robbery of $300 by a deputy sheriff. Here, by contrast, the defendant did not fabricate the commission of a crime, nor was it foreseeable that the false story itself — as distinguished from the defendant's bizarre behavior — would foreseeably lead to his friends or family calling the police. The court finds that the State has not sustained its burden of proving that the defendant gratuitously reported false information to a law enforcement officer. On the first count of the Information, the court finds the defendant not guilty.
In People v. Li, 192 Misc.2d 380, 745 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2002), the court denied a motion to dismiss an Information where the defendant's false statement was made in response to questioning. In that case, the defendant had assaulted another person, Fitzgerald, with two compatriots, then called the police. When a police officer arrived he questioned the defendant, who lied about the incident, claiming that Fitzgerald had first assaulted one of his compatriots, Security Officer Larkins. Although the statement was made in response to police questioning, the court held that the allegations "demonstrate[d] that defendant initiated contact with the police, and, prior to their arrival, 'voluntarily' and without solicitation from anyone, concocted the false allegation that Mr. Fitzgerald 'cut' Security Officer Larkins, which concoction, upon police arrival, he conveyed to them both orally and in writing . . . The accusatory instrument in this case thus contains nonhearsay factual attestations supporting the accusatory allegation that defendant "gratuitously" — as that term is interpreted by available authority — reported false information about Mr. Fitzgerald's involvement in the incident . . ." Id., 383-34; see also People v. McCarthy, 126 App.Div.2d 935 (N.Y. 1987).
II
The second count of the information alleges that "the said Edward Valentin did commit the crime of false statement in the second degree, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-157b, in that on or about February 13, 2004, the said Edward Valentin intentionally made a false written statement under oath or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable, which he did not believe to be true and which statement was intended to mislead a public2 servant in the performance of his official function." General Statutes § 53a-157b provides, in relevant part: "A person is guilty of false statement in the second degree when he intentionally makes a false written statement under oath or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable, which he does not believe to be true and which statement is intended to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official function."
The defendant argues that he is not guilty of violating General Statutes § 53a-157b because the statement that he signed was typed by Stevenson and was therefore not "made" by the defendant. The court rejects the defendant's argument for three reasons. First, Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.) defines "make" as "to legally perform as by executing, signing or delivering (a document) to make a contract." Second, the statutory interpretation advanced by the defendant was rejected long ago in State v. Cutts, 24 Idaho 329, 133 P. 115 (1913), in an analogous context. In Cutts, the defendant was convicted of making a false report concerning the affairs, financial condition, and property of a bank in violation of § 7128 of the Revised Codes of Idaho. The defendant claimed, as does the defendant here, that he was not guilty because he did not prepare the false report but merely signed it. The Cutts court rejected the defendant's position holding "that a cashier, who signs such a report and delivers it to another person, has made said report in contemplation of said [statute] ." Id., 116; see also Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061-63 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a corporate officer who, with scienter, signs SEC filings "makes a statement" within the meaning of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Jackson v. State, 463 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970) (evidence that defendant signed revolving charge account agreement with name of another person was sufficient to show that defendant did "make" a false instrument in writing as alleged in indictment charging him with forgery even though a saleswoman prepared the instrument and defendant merely signed it.); State v. Comer, 171 Wn. 25, 30, 33, 17 P.2d 643 (1932).
Third, the position advanced by the defendant would lead to an absurd result. The defendant dictated his statement to Stevenson who then typed the statement on a computer and printed it for the defendant's signature. Thus, with respect to the defendant's written statements, Stevenson merely performed a clerical function. It would be fanciful to presume that the legislature intended to insulate a defendant from criminal liability under General Statutes § 53a-157b merely because the services of a typist were interposed between the recitation of the false statement by a defendant and his signing it. "In construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 550, 848 A.2d 352 (2004). "It is to be presumed that the General Assembly did not intend to work an absurd consequence." Bridgeport v. Stratford, 142 Conn. 634, 643-44, 116 A.2d 508 (1955).3
For these reasons, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "made" a false written statement pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable. Moreover, the court finds that the State has proven that the defendant did not believe the statement to be true at the time he made it and that he intended, by his false statement, to mislead a public servant, Sergeant Stevenson, in the performance of his official function.
The court finds the defendant not guilty on the first count of the Information and guilty on the second count.
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