Opinion
No. 35391.
June 21, 1962.
CRIMINAL LAW — TRIAL — DISMISSAL OF CAUSE FOR DELAY — EFFECT. The discharge of an accused for want of prosecution, pursuant to RCW 10.46.010, is not a bar to further prosecution for a felony upon the same charge.
See Am. Jur., Criminal Law § 402.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 33477, Lloyd Shorett, J., entered October 28, 1959. Affirmed.
Prosecution for burglary and assault. Defendant appeals from a conviction and sentence.
Henry Opendack, for appellant.
Charles O. Carroll and Richard M. Foreman, for respondent.
Having been found guilty of charges of burglary in the second degree and assault in the third degree, defendant appeals from his judgment and sentence and alleges one assignment of error: that he ". . . was denied his right to a speedy trial . . ."
[1] In a long line of decisions, commencing with State ex rel. Repath v. Caldwell, 9 Wn. 336, 37 P. 669 (1894) — the latest being State v. Moore, ante p. 144, 372 P.2d 536 (1962) — this court has held that the discharge of an accused for want of prosecution, pursuant to RCW 10.46.010, is not a bar to further prosecution for a felony upon the same charge. RCW 10.43.010.
The judgment is affirmed.