Opinion
No. 4031.
Decided July 2, 1951.
The means used by the respondent in making a simple assault (R.L., c. 455, s. 22) is not an essential element of the offense and need not be specifically alleged in the complaint.
TWO COMPLAINTS, each charging the respondent with assault upon two different persons. To the denial of her motions to quash each complaint on the grounds of insufficiency, uncertainty and ambiguity and to the denial of her motions to set aside the Court's ruling the respondent excepted. The complaints were in the usual form and each charged so far as material that the respondent at Manchester on August 24, 1950, with force and arms upon a certain party "did make an assault" and "did then and there beat, bruise and ill treat and other wrongs" to the said party did.
Transferred by Grimes, J. Other facts appear in the opinion.
Gordon M. Tiffany, Attorney General and Glenn G. Davis, Law Assistant (Mr. Davis orally), for the State.
Albert J. Lemieux for the respondent, furnished no brief.
The statute under which the complaints were brought provides that "If any person shall assault or beat another" he shall be fined or imprisoned and may be ordered to recognize with sureties to keep the peace. The complaints are in the usual form for simple assault and contain with additional description the identical word of the statute. R.L., c. 455, s. 22. The means used are not an essential element of the offense and need not be specifically alleged. We believe the complaints were adequate to inform the respondent of the nature and cause of the accusation against her with sufficient definiteness so that she could prepare for trial, and this satisfies our law. State v. Ellard, 95 N.H. 217, 220, and cases cited. It follows the order is
Exceptions overruled.
All concurred.