Opinion
No. 49535-6-I.
Filed: March 22, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No. 98-1-01926-8. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 10/30/2001. Judge signing: Hon. Joseph Thibodeau.
Counsel for Appellant(s), David Bruce Koch, Attorney at Law, 1908 E Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122.
Christopher James Turgeon (Appearing Pro Se), 7516 Juniper Dr, Everett, WA 98203.
Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Rebecca Jane Quirk, Attorney at Law, Pr Aty of Miss Bldg Ms504, 3000 Rockefeller Ave, Everett, WA 98201-4046.
A deific decree jury instruction may condition an insanity finding on whether God's command destroyed the defendant's free will to distinguish right from wrong. Therefore, as here, an otherwise rational defendant who murders another, allegedly following a direct command from God, is not legally insane if the command did not overcome his cognitive ability to tell right from wrong. We affirm.
FACTS
Christopher Turgeon claims that he is able to predict events and that he regularly receives messages from God. Because of this, he has devoted his life to teaching, prophesying, and confronting others with their sins. In 1991, Turgeon formed a Bible study ministry called "Ahabah Asah," which he later renamed "the Gatekeepers." In 1996, Turgeon allegedly received a message from God that it was time to declare war against the government. The Gatekeepers attempted to advance this mission by robbing and defrauding businesses that it perceived to be sinful. Turgeon and the Gatekeepers also acted according to God's will by exacting judgment on people, particularly those who left the group.
Dan Jess was once a member of the Gatekeepers. After leaving the group, Jess allegedly called Turgeon a "false prophet" and said that he would "stop at nothing" to stop him. In March 1998, during a Gatekeepers meeting, God allegedly told Turgeon that "Dan must be killed." Another group member, Blaine Applin, allegedly received a similar message. The Gatekeepers agreed that Turgeon and Applin must kill Jess.
In preparation for the murder, Turgeon and Applin obtained camouflage clothing and wiped fingerprints off the shell casings that they planned to use. The men drove from their home in California to Jess' home in Washington. Turgeon testified that, on the way to Washington, he asked God to make them take an unscheduled stop if killing Jess was not God's will. Instead, the two men saw seven rainbows, leading them to believe that God blessed their mission. In the early morning of March 29, 1998, Applin knocked on Jess' door, and when Jess answered, Applin shot him multiple times. Turgeon operated as a lookout and drove the getaway car. Turgeon and Applin confessed to the crime but asserted the insanity defense, arguing that God commanded them to murder Jess. The two men received a joint trial. The jury convicted both men of first degree murder. Turgeon appeals his conviction.
This court affirmed Applin's conviction. State v. Applin, 116 Wn. App. 818, 67 P.3d 1152 (2003), review denied, Wn.2d 82 P.3d 243 (2004).
DECISION
To be considered legally insane, Turgeon must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the act and as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act or was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the act. Turgeon may also establish insanity if he knew the criminal act was wrong but believed, as a result of mental defect, that God commanded the act. This is known as the deific decree exception. In this case, the trial court gave a general instruction about the insanity defense, followed by this deific decree instruction:
State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d 789, 798, 659 P.2d 488 (1983).
A defendant is also not guilty by reason of insanity if you find that each of these elements has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) At the time of the acts charged the defendant had a mental disease or defect; and
(2) As a result of that mental disease or defect, the defendant had a delusion that he had received a direct command from God to do the acts; and
(3) The defendant did the acts because of that direct command; and
(4) The direct command destroyed the defendant's free will and his ability to distinguish right from wrong. Turgeon challenges this instruction, arguing that the court should have instead instructed:
Clerk's Papers at 35 (emphasis added).
If you find that the defendant believed, because of mental disease or defect, that he was acting under the direct command of God he may be found not guilty by the reason of insanity only if you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his belief prevented the defendant from comprehending the act with which he is charged was morally wrong or prevented the defendant from perceiving the nature and quality of the act with which he is charged.
Clerk's Papers at 67 (emphasis added).
According to Turgeon, the court's rejection of the latter instruction in favor of the former denied him a fair trial.
Jury instructions satisfy the fair trial requirement when, taken as a whole, they properly inform the jury of the law, are not misleading, and permit the parties to argue their theories of the case. State v. Kennard, 101 Wn. App. 533, 536-37, 6 P.3d 38 (2000) (quoting State v. Tili, 139 Wn.2d 107, 126, 985 P.2d 365 (1999)). This court reviews jury instructions de novo. Kennard, 101 Wn. App. at 537 (citing Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., 127 Wn.2d 67, 92, 896 P.2d 682 (1995); State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 767, 772, 966 P.2d 883 (1998)).
First, Turgeon argues that the trial court erred by refusing to define wrongfulness in terms of moral wrong. But we have already resolved this issue, as Turgeon's co-defendant, Blaine Applin, presented an identical claim to this court. After examining the relevant case law, we concluded that no definition of wrongfulness should ordinarily be given in legal insanity jury instructions. We further concluded that the trial court's instruction was neutral, allowed both parties to argue their theories of the case, and made the relevant legal standard "`manifestly apparent to the average juror.'" Turgeon now asks this court to reconsider its decision in Applin, claiming that it misstates the relevant case law. To the contrary, Applin provides a correct statement of Washington law. Turgeon nevertheless argues that his proposed instruction was necessary to correct expert testimony presented at trial. Several psychologists and psychiatrists testified, and Turgeon argues that their varying recitations of the legal insanity standard were contradictory and misleading. Drs. Lee Gustafson and Doyle Brock spoke of legal wrong, while Dr. G. Preston Sims spoke of moral wrong. Drs. Samuel Etchie, Murray Hart, and Gregory Leong testified about the standard using both legal and moral terms. But the experts stated that they were only explaining their understanding of the insanity standard, and Turgeon was still able to argue his theory of the case in closing argument. Trial testimony was not misleading or contradictory, and the court did not err by rejecting Turgeon's proposed deific decree instruction.
Applin, 116 Wn. App. at 821.
Applin, 116 Wn. App. at 824, discussing Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d at 805 ("as a general rule no definition of wrong should accompany an insanity defense instruction"); State v. Cameron, 100 Wn.2d 520, 674 P.2d 650 (1983) (a trial court should not define wrongfulness in purely legal terms); State v. Rice, 110 Wn.2d 577, 757 P.2d 889 (1988) (defendant did not qualify for a deific decree defense because he showed no evidence that his free will had been subsumed); State v. Potter, 68 Wn. App. 134, 842 P.2d 481 (1992) (free will language in deific decree instructions must refer to the cognitive test)).
Applin, 116 Wn. App. at 825 (quoting State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469, 473, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997)).
See also Applin, 116 Wn. App. at 825-26 (the expert testimony in Applin's trial contained no erroneous assertions and did nothing to cause juror confusion).
Turgeon next argues that the court's reference to "free will" in its deific decree instruction misstated the appropriate standard. As we recognized in Applin, the role of free will in deific decree instructions has been a source of confusion and debate. The Supreme Court introduced the notion in Crenshaw. In illustrating the deific decree exception, the court hypothesized about a mother who killed her child only because God ordered her to do so: "Although the woman knows that the law and society condemn the act, it would be unrealistic to hold her responsible for the crime, since her free will has been subsumed by her belief in the deific decree."
Applin, 116 Wn. App. at 824 n. 23 (citing Potter, 68 Wn. App. at 144-49; People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 139 (Colo. 1992)).
Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d at 798.
Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d at 798 (citing People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 339, 110 N.E. 945 (1915)) (emphasis added). The Colorado Supreme Court criticized the Washington Supreme Court's reference to free will, interpreting Crenshaw to incorrectly add a volitional component to the deific decree exception. Serravo, 823 P.2d at 139 n. 12.
The court again mentioned free will in Cameron, stating that considerable evidence existed from which the jury could conclude that the defendant's "free will had `been subsumed by [his] belief in the deific decree.'" In State v. Rice, the court stated that case law makes it "clear that a defendant following deific commands qualifies as insane only if his free will has been subsumed by his belief in the deific decree." While the Supreme Court has spoken of free will only in passing, this court closely examined the issue in State v. Potter.
Cameron, 100 Wn.2d at 527 (quoting Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d at 798).
Rice, 110 Wn.2d at 604 (citing Cameron, 100 Wn.2d at 527; Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d at 798; State v. Anderson, 44 Wn. App. 644, 647, 723 P.2d 464 (1986)).
Potter, 68 Wn. App. at 134.
In Potter, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that, if it found the defendant's free will was subsumed by the deific command, it need not reach the wrongfulness issue.
Potter, 68 Wn. App. at 144.
This court disagreed, stating that free will is not related to the volitional ability to control one's behavior but rather the cognitive ability to tell right from wrong. In other words, a court may instruct the jury that the defendant is legally insane if his cognitive ability to distinguish between right and wrong was destroyed by a delusion that God commanded the act. Volitional control is irrelevant.
Potter, 68 Wn. App. at 147-50.
Potter, 68 Wn. App. at 147 (citing Serravo, 823 P.2d at 140).
Here, the trial court did not instruct that the loss of volitional control was required. It stated that Turgeon was legally insane if, among other things, the direct command from God "destroyed [his] free will and his ability to distinguish right from wrong." According to Turgeon, this instruction caused the State to misinterpret the concept of free will to involve irresistible impulse or, in other words, volitional control. Specifically, Turgeon points out that, during closing arguments, the State said the defendants were not "zombies," or "robots," or "characters out of Invasion of the Body Snatchers." But the State made these statements while discussing the defendants' ability to distinguish right from wrong and thus the statements comport with Potter.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Sept. 27, 2001) at 1946.
The trial court's instruction did not improperly inject the notion of irresistible impulse as Turgeon suggests. While the instruction would have conformed more obviously with Potter if it had instead required the jury to find that the direct command from God had destroyed the defendant's free will to distinguish between right and wrong, the instruction still accurately reflects Crenshaw, Cameron, and Rice. In addition, the instruction permitted Turgeon to argue his theory of the case. The trial court did not misstate the deific decree standard.
We further note that it is awkward to apply the insanity defense to someone like Turgeon. Turgeon is not like the defendants in Crenshaw, Cameron, or Rice, and the traditional insanity defense is likely inapplicable to Turgeon because he is not insane in the traditional sense; he does not suffer from mental disease.
Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d at 791-92 (defendant had a history of psychiatric-related hospitalizations and decapitated his wife because he suspected her of being unfaithful; he afterwards chatted with the motel manager over a beer).
Cameron, 100 Wn.2d at 521-25 (defendant was a paranoid schizophrenic who stabbed his stepmother over 70 times because he thought she was an agent of Satan; defendant was later found wandering the streets in women's clothes).
Rice, 110 Wn.2d at 580-90 (defendant with schizoid and paranoid features brutally murdered two adults and two children because he thought they were Communists).
The trial court's deific decree instruction referred to "a direct command from God." Turgeon now argues that the State, during closing arguments, contended that a command is "direct" only if the defendant received it audibly. Turgeon claims that this statement constituted prosecutorial misconduct because it misstates the law. But the State never made this statement. Instead, its argument suggested that the defendant had to receive a direct order from God, rather than a general religious thought. Turgeon's prosecutorial misconduct claim fails.
Turgeon argues that the court erred by refusing to admit abortion photographs. He claims that the photographs were relevant because Turgeon killed Dan Jess in part because Jess vowed to stop him from killing abortion doctors. But the sole issue before the jury was Turgeon's insanity, and Turgeon had the opportunity to testify at length about his motives for killing Jess. The photographs were not relevant and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit them.
State v. Castellanos, 132 Wn.2d 94, 97, 935 P.2d 1353 (1997) (citing Maehren v. City of Seattle, 92 Wn.2d 480, 488, 599 P.2d 1255 (1979); State v. Huelett, 92 Wn.2d 967, 969, 603 P.2d 1258 (1979)) (an appellate court reviews a trial court's evidentiary decision for an abuse of discretion, and a court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would take the trial court's view).
Turgeon argues that the court erred by refusing to let him represent himself. Before trial, Turgeon notified the court by letter that he suspected his attorneys of sabotage and sharing strategic information with Applin's attorneys. On the third day of trial, Turgeon asked to proceed pro se, stating that his suspicions had been confirmed. The court denied Turgeon's request. Because Turgeon did not make an unequivocal request to proceed pro se until after the trial had commenced, his request was untimely and the court did not abuse its discretion.
State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 737, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (citing State v. DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d 369, 376-77, 816 P.2d 1 (1991)) (a request to proceed pro se must be timely and unequivocal); State v. Breedlove, 79 Wn. App. 101, 106, 900 P.2d 586 (1995) (an appellate court reviews a lower court's decision regarding a request to proceed pro se for an abuse of discretion).
Affirmed.
COX and AGID, JJ., concur.