Opinion
Case No. 990886-CA.
Filed December 14, 2000. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs.
David S. Kottler and Kent R. Hart, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges JACKSON, BENCH, and BILLINGS.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Trane appeals from his conviction of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), contesting the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Trane argues that, because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to search him, he did not interfere with a "lawful arrest or detention," and therefore could not be arrested under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999) (interference statute). Therefore, Trane claims, the evidence was not obtained incident to a lawful arrest. We disagree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999) reads as follows:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
Id.
The law controlling this matter is clear: "a person can be guilty of interfering with a peace officer even when the arrest or detention is later determined to be unlawful." American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, ¶ 11, 408 Utah Adv. Rep. 27. This court reasoned inPena-Flores that "the use of `lawful' in section 76-8-305 does not automatically incorporate th[e reasonable suspicion] standard in determining whether a person is guilty of interfering with a peace officer." Id. Under Pena-Flores, an arrest for interfering with a peace officer is valid "[s]o long as [(1)] a police officer is acting within the scope of his or her authority and [(2)] the detention or arrest has the indicia of being lawful." Id.
Whether an officer is acting within the scope of authority, and whether an arrest or detention has the indicia of lawfulness are determined by an officer's appearance and acts in light of the particular circumstances of each case. See id. at ¶¶ 16-17. In this case, both officers arrived in their marked police cruisers wearing clearly marked police uniforms, thus satisfying the scope of authority prong. The officers were investigating a report of a man hassling convenience store customers at approximately 4:00 a.m., both officers noted the smell of alcohol on Trane's breath and person upon arriving and knew of the dangers presented by intoxicated people, and Trane refused to obey an officer's order; thus the indicia of lawfulness prong is satisfied. Viewing the circumstances objectively, the officers were "seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999); see also Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at
¶ 16. Thus, even if the police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to search Trane, they still could properly arrest Trane under the interference statute because the officers were acting within the scope of their authority and the arrest had the indicia of lawfulness.
We note that the concern raised by Trane's counsel about the balance of "`[t]he societal interest in the orderly settlement of disputes between citizens and their government outweigh[ing] any individual interest in resisting a questionable search,'" State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Doe, 583 P.2d 464, 466-67 (N.M. 1978)), is addressed by the "indicia of lawfulness" prong of the Pena-Flores test. This prong assures that illegal activities such as racial profiling and abuses of police authority, which do not have the indicia of lawfulness, are sufficiently deterred.
Because we resolve this appeal by concluding the arrest under the interference statute was proper, we need not address Trane's other arguments. Accordingly, we affirm.
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge.
WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, Judith M. Billings, Judge.