Opinion
A21-1401 A21-1402 A21-1403
08-31-2022
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jeremy Aaron Tostrup, Appellant.
Filed Date: 9/6/2022
Red Lake County District Court File No. 63-CR-18-191
Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
Jeanne M. Cochran, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In these consolidated appeals, appellant Jeremy Tostrup argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas in three cases because the pleas are not constitutionally valid. Alternatively, he argues that his sentences in those cases must be reversed because the district court erred by imposing sentences arising from aggravated dispositional departures from the guidelines pursuant to a plea agreement without stating substantial and compelling reasons for the departures. Because we agree with Tostrup that his pleas are not valid, we conclude that Tostrup must be allowed to withdraw his pleas. Accordingly, we do not reach Tostrup's sentencing argument.
2. Between 2018 and 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged Tostrup with multiple criminal offenses in two counties. In 2018, the state charged Tostrup with a fifth-degree controlled-substance crime and two petty misdemeanors in Red Lake County. In 2019, the state charged Tostrup with third-degree and fourth-degree controlled-substance crimes and conspiracy to commit a second-degree controlled-substance crime in Pennington County. In 2020, the state charged Tostrup with first-degree burglary and two counts of possessing stolen property in Pennington County. The state also charged Tostrup with additional crimes under multiple other case files, and Tostrup's probation officer alleged that he had violated the terms of his probation in another case.
3. In May 2021, Tostrup entered Alford pleas pursuant to a plea agreement.Tostrup agreed to plead guilty to three felony charges: a fifth-degree controlled-substance crime, a third-degree controlled-substance crime, and second-degree burglary. In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss all other charges in the pending case files and refrain from charging Tostrup with a new felony.
An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence of the charged offense if the defendant acknowledges that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find the defendant guilty at trial. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 7661 (Minn. 1977) (discussing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970)).
4. During the plea hearing, Tostrup repeatedly expressed reservations about taking the plea deal. The district court noted that Tostrup "sound[ed] really reluctant" and offered multiple times to set the cases for trial. Tostrup explained that he was taking the deal to avoid another felony charge, and the prosecutor confirmed that the state had agreed not to charge another case as part of the plea agreement. After extensive discussion between Tostrup and the district court, Tostrup ultimately agreed to take the plea deal.
5. The prosecutor explained the evidence that the state would present at trial on all three charges, and Tostrup agreed that the evidence was sufficient to convict him. The district court found that the evidence created a "strong probability" that Tostrup would be convicted despite his Alford pleas. The district court recognized the pressure that Tostrup felt from the plea agreement but concluded that Tostrup entered his pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
6. The district court scheduled a sentencing hearing and ordered a presentencing investigation (PSI). According to the PSI reports, the presumptive sentence for the fifth-degree controlled-substance conviction was a stayed sentence of 12 months and one day, the presumptive sentence for the third-degree controlled-substance conviction was a stayed sentence of 27 months, and the presumptive sentence for the second-degree burglary conviction was a stayed sentence of 28 months. The PSI reports also noted that the terms of the plea agreement called for the sentences for these three crimes to be executed (rather than stayed), and one report further stated that execution of the sentences would "be a dispositional departure from the Sentencing Guidelines."
7. In July 2021, the district court sentenced Tostrup, "[p]ursuant to the agreement of the parties," to concurrent executed prison sentences for all three felony convictions. Even though one of the PSI reports indicated that execution of the sentences would be a dispositional departure, the district court stated that "these [sentences] are not departures based upon the agreement." And the sentencing orders for the three felony cases indicate that the sentences imposed were not departures from the sentencing guidelines.
8. On appeal, Tostrup argues that he must be allowed to withdraw his Alford pleas because they are not valid. Assessing the validity of a guilty plea presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea for the first time on direct appeal when the grounds for the challenge do not go outside the record on appeal. State v. Newcombe, 412 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn.App. 1987) (holding that validity of guilty plea could be challenged on direct appeal when problems with acceptance were "thoroughly aired" at the plea hearing), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 1987).
9. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, intelligent, and voluntary. Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 2017). Tostrup argues that his pleas were both unintelligent and involuntary. Because we agree that Tostrup's pleas were unintelligent, we limit our analysis to that issue.
10. "To be intelligent, a guilty plea must represent a knowing and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available." Id. at 877 (quotation omitted). Whether a defendant entered a plea intelligently depends on whether the defendant understood the charges against him, the rights he was waiving, and the direct consequences of the plea. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
11. Tostrup argues that he did not enter his pleas intelligently because he was under the false impression that his sentences were not departures when in fact they were aggravated dispositional departures. As a result, he contends that he "unknowingly agreed to an aggravated departure without waiving his rights to a jury trial on aggravating factors under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004)." In other words, he did not understand that the presumptive sentences for his convictions were stayed sentences rather than prison commits because he relied on the parties' apparent assumption and the district court's mistaken statement that the sentences "are not departures." And he did not understand that any facts that support a dispositional departure from a presumptive sentence must be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant under Blakely. See State v. Bradley, 906 N.W.2d 856, 858 (Minn.App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018). We agree with Tostrup that his pleas were not intelligent under these circumstances.
12. Tostrup's sentences are aggravated dispositional departures under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. A "departure" occurs when the district court imposes any sentence other than the presumptive sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 1.B.5 (2018 & 2020). A "dispositional departure" occurs when the district court orders a disposition other than that recommended under the sentencing guidelines. Id. And an "aggravated dispositional departure" occurs when the sentencing guidelines recommend a stayed sentence but the district court imposes an executed prison sentence. Id. Here, the presumptive sentences for all three of Tostrup's convictions were stayed sentences, but the district court imposed executed prison sentences for all three. Because the sentencing guidelines recommended stayed sentences and the district court departed from the sentencing guidelines by imposing executed sentences, each sentence was an aggravated dispositional departure.
13. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure establish several requirements when a prosecutor seeks an aggravated sentence. First, the district court must inform the defendant at the plea hearing that the prosecutor is seeking an aggravated sentence. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6)(m). Second, before accepting an admission of facts to support an aggravated sentence, the district court must inform the defendant of the presumptive guidelines sentence for the crime to which they have pleaded guilty. Id., subd. 2(2). Third, the district court must inform the defendant of their right to a jury trial to determine whether the facts supporting an aggravated sentence have been proven. Id., subd. 2(6)(b). And finally, the defendant may only waive a jury trial on those facts "in writing or on the record in open court, after being advised by the court of the right to a trial by jury, and after having had an opportunity to consult with counsel." Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(b).
14. Here, the record does not show that these requirements were met with respect to the aggravated dispositional departures imposed for the three felonies to which Tostrup pleaded guilty. Although the record suggests that Tostrup seemed aware of the prison time he would serve as a result of the plea agreement, nothing in the record suggests that he was aware that this prison time resulted from dispositional departures, that he had Blakely rights, or that he had waived those rights. We therefore conclude that Tostrup's pleas were not intelligent.
15. Because Tostrup's pleas were not intelligent, we reverse and remand to permit Tostrup to withdraw his Alford pleas.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is reversed and remanded.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.