Opinion
No. 5-365 / 04-1668
Filed May 25, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, Bryan H. McKinley, Judge.
Travis Wayne Tollagson appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the State's trial information charging him with three felony drug convictions. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Mark Newman, Forest City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert Ewald, Assistant Attorney General, and Karen R. Kaufman, County Attorney for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
In February 2003, Travis Wayne Tollagson was arraigned on three felony drug offenses. In June of 2004, Tollagson filed a motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to bring him to trial within one year. His motion was denied by the district court in August of 2004. This appeal followed.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
We are not concerned with the details of the incident that led to the charges in this case; but rather with the subsequent course of proceedings and whether they affected Tollagson's rights. In January of 2003, the State filed a trial information charging Travis Wayne Tollagson with three felony drug offenses. Tollagson was arraigned in February and waived his ninety-day speedy trial right, but not his right to be brought to trial within one year of his arraignment. Trial was set for April 2, 2003, and eventually continued to January of 2004. In January of 2004, the district court ruled on the State's motion to continue stating,
the court concludes that the State has demonstrated a strong reason for extension of the one-year speedy trial period, i.e. the absence of its primary witness as reflected in the minutes of testimony. . . . His absence due to deployment to Iraq constitutes good cause envisioned by the exception to the one-year speedy trial deadline.
. . . .
Accordingly, the court concludes that the State's Motion to Continue . . . is hereby granted and trial shall be reset following notification by the State to the court that Deputy Nelson has returned and is available for trial. (Emphasis added).
On January 13, Tollagson filed a conditional motion to dismiss asking that trial be dismissed on February 5 if trial is not held by that date. The district court denied this motion, finding good cause for the extension of the time beyond the one-year speedy trial deadline. However, the district court noted that Tollagson "shall not be foreclosed from filing a subsequent motion to dismiss should defendant so elect."
Deputy Nelson returned to Hancock County on April 19, 2004, and returned to work with the sheriff's department on June 1. The county attorney did not inform the district court of Deputy Nelson's return until June 8. A jury trial was scheduled for July 7. On June 28, Tollagson filed a motion to dismiss arguing that his speedy trial rights had been violated because Deputy Nelson had been available since April 19. At a hearing held on July 6, the day before the scheduled trial, the district court noted that it would need to rule on the motion to dismiss before the trial could proceed. It set a hearing on Tollagson's motion for August 6, and continued the trial until the same date.
On July 6 Tollagson and the State reached an agreement whereby the State reduced the three felony charges to a single aggravated misdemeanor and Tollagson waived his right to a jury trial.
Although a hearing on Tollagson's motion to dismiss was held on August 6, the case did not proceed to trial on the minutes as the district court needed some additional time to consider and rule on the motion. On August 26, Tollagson's motion to dismiss was denied and a trial on the minutes was scheduled for September 14. Following trial, the district court found Tollagson guilty of the amended charge of accessory after the fact. Tollagson appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
In deciding indictment and speedy trial questions our scope of review is for correction of errors at law. See State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001) (citing State v. Finn, 469 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1991)). Because a district court has discretion to avoid dismissal under Iowa's speedy trial rule, we ultimately look to whether the district court abused its discretion. Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 204.
III. Issue
The sole issue presented for our review is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Tollagson's motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that the delay in bringing Tollagson to trial after Officer Nelson returned from Iraq was reasonable. Tollagson does not contest the district court's January 7, 2004, ruling granting the State's motion to continue the trial until Officer Nelson returned from Iraq. Tollagson also does not raise any issues regarding the State's failure to bring him to trial during the period between the February 4, 2004, one-year deadline and Officer Nelson's return on April 19, 2004.
A. Speedy Trial Rule
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)( c) provides:
All criminal cases must be brought to trial within one year after the defendant's initial arraignment pursuant to rule 2.8 unless an extension is granted by the court, upon a showing of good cause.
This rule establishes an "outer-limit" for trial, similar to a statute of limitation. See State v. Mary, 401 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa Ct.App. 1986). Under this rule when a trial is not commenced within one year of arraignment, the district court must dismiss the case unless the defendant has waived the right to speedy trial, the delay is attributable to the defendant, or other "good cause" exists for the delay. Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 204. The burden of establishing a permissible reason for an extension beyond the one-year deadline is on the State. State v. Rodriguez, 511 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Iowa 1994).
In this case the district court made the following conclusions: (1) the delay from April 19, 2004, to the July 7th trial date was reasonable; (2) the delay that caused trial to be continued beyond July 7 was caused by Tollagson's renewed motion to dismiss, filed on June 28; and (3) that Tollagson "failed to provide any additional evidence of prejudice for the period of delay." Because we find error in the district court's first conclusion, we need not address the other two.
In assessing whether good cause exists for bringing a defendant to trial beyond the speedy trial deadline we focus on only one factor, "the reason for the delay." State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted). The district court, in its ruling on Tollagson's June 28 motion to dismiss, never concluded that the State demonstrated good cause for its seventy-eight day delay in bringing Tollagson to trial after Officer Nelson returned from Iraq. The district court instead anchored its conclusion on its determination that Tollagson failed to demonstrate prejudice resulted from this delay. Thus, the district court placed the burden on Tollagson to prove the delay was not reasonable and that he was prejudiced by it. This was error as the State has the burden of establishing good cause for a delay and the attending circumstances, such as whether prejudice resulted from the delay, "are important if at all, only insofar as they bear" on the sufficiency of the reason for the delay. See Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 205-206 (emphasis supplied by Iowa Supreme Court) (citation omitted).
The reason for the delay in bringing Tollagson to trial after Officer Nelson returned from Iraq, as gleaned from the record and as argued by the State on appeal, was that Officer Nelson had been absent for an extended period of time and planned on spending some quality time with his wife upon his return. As understandable as this may be, it does not indicate that trial could not have been scheduled sooner. The State, at the August 6 hearing on Tollagson's motion to dismiss, conceded that Officer Nelson could have testified upon his return to Hancock County, as he was subject to subpoena power as early as April 19 and a subpoena would have been honored. In sum, Tollagson was not brought to trial more promptly because the State did not want to disturb Officer Nelson's well deserved vacation, not because the State could not disturb this vacation. While we understand good intentions behind this reason, under our case law, this reason is insufficient for the State to meet its burden of establishing good cause for its delay in bringing Tollagson to trial. See Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 206 (stating even the district court's deference to its own chronic court congestion will not allow the State to meet its burden of establishing good cause for a delay); Mary, 401 N.W.2d at 242 (indicating the State's burden to establish good cause for an extension beyond the one-year speedy trial deadline is a heavy one).
Because the reason for the delay is insufficient for the State to meet its burden, other factors, including the lack of prejudice to Tollagson, "will not avail to avoid dismissal." See Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 205. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying Tollagson's June 28motion to dismiss. Accordingly we must reverse the judgment on Tollagson's conviction and remand to the district court to dismiss the trial information.