Opinion
Docket No. 27491.
Filed May 5, 2003.
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Charles W. Hosack, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for involuntary manslaughter, vacated and case remanded.
John M. Adams, Kootenai County Public Defender, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Karen A. Hudelson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Karen A. Hudelson argued.
A jury found Michelle L. Tiffany guilty of involuntary manslaughter, I.C. § 18-4006(2). On appeal, Tiffany argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant her motion for a judgment of acquittal where the state failed to show the corpus delicti of involuntary manslaughter independently from Tiffany's extrajudicial confessions. Tiffany also argues that the district court erred by giving various jury instructions which misstated applicable law and/or were misleading, and by failing to give requested jury instructions. We vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August of 1999, Tiffany called 911 to report that her infant son, Nathan Tiffany, was not breathing. Paramedics arrived at Tiffany's home and attempted CPR, but they were unable to revive Nathan. Tiffany told her husband and the responding police officers that she had found Nathan limp and not breathing when she went to check on him. Following an autopsy, the coroner declared that the cause of Nathan's death was Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS).
Approximately one year later, Tiffany disclosed to a counselor, to police officers and to her husband, on separate occasions, that she had suffocated Nathan by twice placing her hand over his mouth and nose in an attempt to quiet his crying. Following this disclosure, Tiffany was arrested and charged with involuntary manslaughter.
The case went before a jury and at the close of the state's case, Tiffany moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that under the corpus delicti principle she could not be found guilty when the only evidence that she had killed Nathan was her extrajudicial confessions. The district court denied the motion. At the close of trial, Tiffany requested jury instructions addressing the issues of corpus delicti, mental illness, excusable homicide and proximate cause. The district court refused to give these instructions.
The jury returned a verdict finding Tiffany guilty of involuntary manslaughter based on the predicate acts of injury to a child and battery. Thereafter, the district court sentenced Tiffany to a unified term of seven years with three years determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed her on probation for seven years. Tiffany appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the state failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime prior to using Tiffany's extrajudicial confessions as evidence, and that the district court's giving of certain jury instructions, or the court's refusal to give other requested instructions, was error.
II. THE STATE ESTABLISHED THE CORPUS DELICTI OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Tiffany asserts that the district court should have granted her motion to acquit because the state failed to establish the corpus delicti of involuntary manslaughter independently from her extrajudicial confessions. When a defendant presents evidence at trial and later challenges the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court considers all the evidence, including that offered by the defense, to determine whether it is sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct.App. 1997). We do not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Stricklin, 136 Idaho 264, 269, 32 P.3d 158, 163 (Ct.App. 2001). Moreover, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. If a jury's verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence, it will not be set aside on appeal. Id. Corpus delicti, meaning "the body of a crime," is a common law principle that requires the state to establish some evidence that a crime occurred independently from a defendant's confession. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (6th Ed. 1990). The purpose of corpus delicti is to prevent errors in convictions based on false confessions, to act as a safeguard against the defendant's act of confessing but being mistaken that a crime occurred, and to force the prosecution to use its best evidence. State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71, 76, 437 P.2d 24, 29 (1968) (McFadden, J., special concurrence).
The principle of corpus delicti applies to a defendant's extrajudicial admissions, as well as to his or her extrajudicial confessions. State v. Wilson, 51 Idaho 659, 669, 9 P.2d 497, 500-501 (1932); State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 704, 70 P. 1051, 1052 (1902). Therefore, our use of the term "confessions" or "confession" in this opinion includes admissions.
Some states abandoned the corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard established by the United States Supreme Court. See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954); Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 77-78 (Okla.Crim.App. 1994); State v. Mauchley, Docket No. 20010551 (Utah Apr. 1, 2003).
To prove a crime generally, the state must provide evidence in the context of three broad elements: (1) that an injury occurred; (2) that criminal agency was involved in causing the injury; and (3) the identity of the person who caused the injury. See id. at 75, 437 P.2d at 28 (special concurrence). Under the standard formulations of the corpus delicti principle, the state must show the "body" of a crime by establishing the first two elements of a crime, i.e., the injury and the criminal agency, independently from a defendant's confession. Id.; State v. Darrah, 60 Idaho 479, 482, 92 P.2d 143, 144 (1939). Thus, the state cannot prove its case by solely using a defendant's confession to establish that a crime occurred. See Urie, 92 Idaho at 73, 437 P.2d at 26; State v. Wilson, 51 Idaho 659, 669, 9 P.2d 497, 500-501 (1932); State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 704-05, 70 P. 1051, 1052 (1902).
In Idaho, the state need not establish independently from the defendant's confession each element of the corpus delicti. Urie, 92 Idaho at 73, 437 P.2d at 26; but see State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 296-97, 486 P.2d 1008, 1009-10 (1971). Thus, as the corpus delicti of the crime consists of injury and criminal agency, the state needs to independently corroborate only one of those elements to meet its burden. Moreover, only slight corroboration of the corpus delicti by independent evidence is required. Id.; Wilson, 51 Idaho at 669, 9 P.2d at 497; State v. Downing, 23 Idaho 540, 544, 130 P. 461 (1913); Keller, 8 Idaho at 705, 70 P. at 1052.
We note that Urie's analysis is based on State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 P. 1051 (1902), which states: "Full proof of the body of the crime — the corpus delicti — independently of the confessions, is not required by any of the cases; and in many of them, slight corroborating facts were held sufficient." Keller, 8 Idaho at 705, 70 P. at 1052. Keller can be interpreted as standing for the proposition that the evidence of the body of the crime, i.e., the corpus delicti, must only have slight corroboration. In other words, the full corpus delicti must be proven with slight corroboration. In contrast, Urie's analysis of Keller is that not every element of the corpus delicti must be proven by the state. As previously discussed, it is accurate that not every element of a crime must be shown to satisfy the corpus delicti doctrine. However, under classic corpus delicti doctrine, both elements of the corpus delicti must be shown by the state. The perhaps unfortunate result of Urie is that, since the corpus delicti of a crime consists of only two elements which need to be proven, the showing of one element meets the Urie standard. Thus, under Urie, a showing of injury suffices to meet the corpus delicti doctrine, although there is no corroboration of criminal agency. This leads to the anomalous result that no criminality needs to be shown, even though the general purpose of the corpus delicti doctrine is to show that a crime occurred. However, we are constrained by the holding in Urie.
It may be argued that Idaho cases have been inconsistent regarding the burden the state must meet in establishing corpus delicti. Some cases have used the "slight corroboration" approach in dealing with both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. See Urie, 92 Idaho at 73, 437 P.2d at 26; Wilson, 51 Idaho at 669, 9 P.2d at 497; State v. Downing, 23 Idaho 540, 544, 130 P. 461 (1913); Keller, 8 Idaho at 705, 70 P. at 1052. Other cases, however, have held that there is a higher burden of proof in establishing the corpus delicti in circumstantial evidence cases. See Cutler, 94 Idaho at 297, 486 P.2d at 1010; State v. Vanek, 59 Idaho 514, 523, 525, 84 P.2d 567 (1938); State v. McLennan, 40 Idaho 286, 301, 231 P. 718, 723 (1925); State v. Brassfield, 40 Idaho 203, 213-14, 232 P. 1 (1925); State v. Sullivan, 34 Idaho 68, 74-76, 78, 199 P. 647, 650 (1921). As Idaho no longer makes a distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, we conclude that the evidentiary standard of "slight corroboration" applies in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. See State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 660-662, 8 P.3d 652, 655-57 (2000).
Having reviewed the foregoing principles, we now apply Idaho's law of corpus delicti to the instant case. The state was required to show slight corroborating evidence of at least one element of the corpus delicti of involuntary manslaughter independently from Tiffany's confession. In a homicide case or related case, the corpus delicti consists of a death (the injury) and that the death occurred by criminal action or means (the criminal agency). See Cutler, 94 Idaho at 296, 486 P.2d at 1009. The state met its burden to show evidence of one element of the corpus delicti of involuntary manslaughter — that death occurred. Dr. George Lindholm, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Nathan, confirmed Nathan's death. Because only one element of the corpus delicti needs to be corroborated, the state met its burden to establish the corpus delicti of the crime independently from Tiffany's confessions. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of Tiffany's motion for judgment of acquittal.
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Tiffany argues that the district court did not properly instruct the jury on various issues. Whether the district court properly instructed the jury is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997); State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 179, 182, 953 P.2d 619, 622 (Ct.App. 1997). On appeal, we view jury instructions as a whole, not individually, to determine whether the jury was properly and adequately instructed on the applicable law. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998); State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 646, 945 P.2d 1390, 1392 (Ct.App. 1997). To be reversible error, instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. Row, 131 Idaho at 310, 955 P.2d at 1089. The court is required to provide instructions on all matters of law necessary for the jury's information. I.C. § 19-2132(a); State v. Patterson, 126 Idaho 227, 230, 880 P.2d 257, 260 (Ct.App. 1994). The court should not use an instruction, however, which misleads the jury or misstates the law. See Humpherys, 134 Idaho at 659, 8 P.3d at 654; State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647, 962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). A. Corpus Delicti Instructions Tiffany argues that the district court's failure to give Tiffany's requested corpus delicti jury instructions to the jury was reversible error. We determine that Tiffany's proposed instructions were misleading and inaccurate statements of Idaho's law and thus, were properly refused by the district court. Both instructions discuss that the state must provide evidence that a crime has occurred independently from Tiffany's confessions. While this is the general purpose of corpus delicti, the state is actually required to corroborate the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime — not the elements of the crime itself. Thus, in the case of involuntary manslaughter, the state has the burden to corroborate that either death occurred or that criminal means was involved. See Cutler, 94 Idaho at 296, 486 P.2d at 1009; Urie, 92 Idaho at 73, 437 P.2d at 26. Tiffany's proposed instructions, however, require that the state corroborate the elements of the crime itself, rather than the corpus delicti of the crime. This is a misleading and inaccurate statement of Idaho law. Thus, the district court did not err by refusing to give Tiffany's requested corpus delicti instructions.
Tiffany's first requested corpus delicti instruction stated:
Before a person may be found guilty of a crime, the State must first prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has actually occurred. The uncorroborated statement of a defendant, standing alone, is insufficient proof that a crime has occurred.
Therefore, before you may consider whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of any crime, you must consider whether there is any evidence which corroborates the defendant's statement and tends to prove a crime occurred.
Slight corroboration will suffice.
Tiffany's second requested corpus delicti instruction stated:
Corroborative evidence is evidence of some act or fact related to the offense which, if believed, by itself and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the defendant's statement tends to prove a crime occurred.
However, it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged, or that it corroborate every fact within the defendant's statement.
In contrast to the corpus delicti of involuntary manslaughter, the Idaho Code defines the elements of the crime of involuntary manslaughter as follows:
18-4006. Manslaughter defined. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of three (3) kinds:. . . .
2. Involuntary — in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any unlawful act, other than arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or mayhem; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection; or in the operation of any firearm or deadly weapon in a reckless, careless or negligent manner which produces death. . . . .
B. Intent Instructions
Tiffany also argues that the intent instructions given by the district court constitute error. In State v. Young, ___ Idaho ___, 64 P.3d 296 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed the use of the definition of "willfully" in I.C. § 18-101(1) in conjunction with the offense of injury to a child under I.C. § 18-1501(1) in jury instructions. Idaho Code § 18-101(1) states:
The following words have in this code the signification attached to them in this section, unless otherwise apparent from the context:
1. The word "willfully," when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that it was error to give the jury the above definition of "willfully" for an injury to a child offense under I.C. § 18-1501(1). Young, ___ Idaho at ___, 64 P.3d at 298-99. The Court stated that the plain reading of I.C. § 18-1501(1) requires the state to prove more than that a defendant meant to commit an act or omission, i.e., the state must show that the defendant committed the act or omission with the knowledge that the act or omission would cause the consequence of unnecessary suffering or unjustifiable physical pain. Thus, an instruction with an I.C. § 18-101(1) definition of "willfully" misstated the law by not requiring the requisite level of knowledge for injury to a child, and the jury instructions as a whole were apt to confuse the jury on the issue. Id.
In this case, the jury found Tiffany guilty of involuntary manslaughter based on the predicate acts of injury to a child, I.C. § 18-1501(1), and battery, I.C. § 18-903(a) and (c). The district court instructed the jury on the elements of injury to a child and battery as predicate acts for involuntary manslaughter. The special verdict form stated in relevant part:
The special verdict form did not indicate whether the jury found Tiffany guilty of one or both types of battery.
Instruction 12C defined "injury to a child" as follows: "Injury to a Child" is committed when a person:
1. Has the care or custody of a child under 18 years of age,
2. under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death of the child, and
3. the person willfully caused or permitted the child's person or health to be injured or the child to be placed in a situation that endangered the child's person or health.
Instruction 12E defined "battery" as follows:
A "battery" is committed when a person: 1. willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of another; or 2. unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual.
Question No. 1: Do you unanimously find that the defendant, Michelle Lynn Tiffany did commit an unlawful act, as that term is found in the instructions setting out the elements of the crime of Involuntary Manslaughter, by either:
a. Committing Injury to a Child?
Yes____. No____.
b. Committing a Battery?
Yes____. No____.
The district court also submitted an instruction to the jury regarding the term "willfully," which is an element the state must prove for each of the predicate acts of injury to a child and battery under I.C. § 18-903(a). Instruction 12F stated:
You are instructed that the word "willful" or the word "willfully," as used in these instructions, means "purposefully" or "with knowledge of the consequences."
This instruction combines elements of a general definition of "willfully" under I.C. § 18-101(1) as intending to do an act or omission, with a more specific definition of "willfully" as intending a certain result from that act or omission. The instruction permits the jury to find Tiffany guilty of the predicate acts of injury to a child, or battery under I.C. § 18-903(a) if either Tiffany intended the act of placing her hand over Nathan's mouth or that she intended to injure or permit Nathan to be injured. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury on battery as set forth in I.C. § 18-903(c), which while not using the term "willfully," does require an intent to cause bodily harm. See I.C. § 18-903(c). The jury should not have been instructed with a hybrid definition of "willfully" for either injury to a child or battery under I.C. § 18-903(a), and the giving of said instruction was reversible error.
C. Mental Illness Instruction
For purposes of guidance on remand, we finally address the district court's mental illness instruction. Tiffany presented expert testimony at trial that she was suffering from post partum depression at the time of Nathan's death. The district court instructed the jury that Tiffany's mental illness was not to be considered a defense to any charge of criminal conduct. The instruction is identical to Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction (ICJI) 1505 and consistent with its underlying statute, I.C. § 18-207(1). The district court, however, refused to give Tiffany's requested instruction which stated that Tiffany's mental illness should be considered in determining whether Tiffany formed the requisite purpose required by the crime charged. Tiffany's requested instruction was functionally equivalent to ICJI 1506.
Instruction 14 stated:
Our law provides that mental illness is not a defense to any charge of criminal conduct. This means that mental illness, if the evidence shows such a condition to exist at the time the defendant allegedly committed the crime charged, is not of itself a defense in this case.
Tiffany's requested jury instruction on mental illness stated:
For the defendant to be guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter or Injury to a Child, the state must prove the defendant had a particular purpose. Evidence was offered that the defendant was suffering from mental illness at the time of the alleged offense. You should consider the defendant's mental condition in determining whether the defendant had that required purpose.
If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant was capable of forming such purpose, you must find the defendant not guilty.
The comment in ICJI 1505 specifies that, "If specific intent, state of mind, purpose or motive is not an issue, give this instruction only. If specific intent, state of mind, purpose or motive is an issue, give this instruction and ICJI 1506." In this case, the state was required to prove the predicate acts of injury to a child, I.C. § 18-1501(1) or battery, I.C. § 18-903(a) or (c), for a jury to find Tiffany guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Thus, if "specific intent, state of mind, purpose or motive" is an issue in any of these offenses, ICJI 1506 should have been given in conjunction with ICJI 1505.
As previously discussed, in the offense of injury to a child, I.C. § 18-1501(1), the state was required to prove that Tiffany acted with the knowledge of the consequences of her actions. Additionally, a battery offense under I.C. § 18-903(c) requires a showing that Tiffany intentionally caused bodily harm to Nathan. Thus, based on these offenses, the district court should have provided ICJI 1506 to the jury in conjunction with ICJI 1505.
The state argues that State v. Patterson, 126 Idaho 227, 880 P.2d 257 (Ct.App. 1994) is controlling in this matter. In Patterson, the defendant was convicted of felony injury to a child. This Court determined that the instructions regarding the use of mental illness testimony requested by the defendant were not essential because the other jury instructions adequately addressed the issue. Id. at 230, 880 P.2d at 260. This case is distinguishable from Patterson. In this case, the jury instructions did not adequately address the issue of mental illness. The district court specifically instructed the jury that mental illness is not a defense to a crime by using ICJI 1505. This is an accurate statement of the law; however, it gives the jury an incomplete framework of the appropriate use of mental illness testimony. A plain reading of such instructions by the jury would be that the mental illness testimony they heard was not relevant to its decision. A jury, on its own, will not likely make the fine distinction that, while it may not consider mental illness testimony to be a defense, it may use such testimony in determining the defendant's requisite intent, state of mind, purpose or motive. Given that the district court gave ICJI 1505 and intent was an issue for the predicate acts of injury to a child and battery under I.C. § 18-903(c), the jury should have also received ICJI 1506 to consider the effect of Tiffany's possible mental illness. Accordingly, on remand, if the district court submits ICJI 1505 to the jury, it should also provide the jury with ICJI 1506.
D. Other Jury Instructions
Based on our decision to vacate and remand this case, we need not address Tiffany's other arguments that the district court erred in instructing the jury on battery under I.C. § 18-903(a), in giving an instruction which varied from the charging instrument for the predicate act of injury to a child, or in failing to provide instructions on excusable homicide and proximate cause.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude the state met its burden in showing the corpus delicti of involuntary manslaughter independent of Tiffany's extrajudicial confessions. Additionally, we conclude the district court's failure to instruct the jury on corpus delicti was not error, as Tiffany's requested instructions were incomplete and misleading. We further conclude the district court's instructions regarding the definition of "willfully" misstated the law and, together with the instructions on injury to a child and battery, were apt to confuse the jury, constituting reversible error. Finally, for guidance on remand, if the district court gives ICJI 1505 to the jury, it should also give ICJI 1506 for the predicate acts of injury to a child and battery under I.C. § 18-903(c). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
Judge PERRY and Judge Pro Tem COPSEY CONCUR.