Opinion
No. 1-945 / 01-0042.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, RICHARD R. GLEASON, District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals following his conviction for domestic abuse assault while causing bodily injury, second or subsequent offense. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Denise Timmins, Assistant Attorney General, Fred H. McCaw, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Samuel Taylor III was convicted of domestic abuse assault following a jury trial. See Iowa Code §§ 708.2A(2)(b), 708.2A(3)(b) (1999). He appeals a ruling of the district court allowing hearsay statements into evidence. We affirm.
Scope of Review . We review the admission of hearsay for errors at law, not for abuse of discretion. State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2001); State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 2000). However, we give deference to the district court's factual findings and uphold such findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. See Tangie, 616 N.W.2d at 569.
Excited Utterance . The State did not call the victim of Taylor's assault, Stacey Zinn, to testify at trial. Instead, the State called Officer Klein, who spoke with Zinn just after Taylor allegedly assaulted her. Officer Klein's testimony detailed Zinn's physical and emotional condition and the answers Zinn provided to his questions. Taylor claims the trial court failed to apply the appropriate standards in determining whether Zinn's statements to Officer Klein were excited utterances and therefore admissible or whether the statements were merely in response to the officer's questioning, and thus otherwise inadmissible hearsay under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.802.
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(2) allows an otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement to be admitted into evidence if it is "an excited utterance." The rule defines such statements as those "relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress or excitement caused by the event or condition." Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(2). Statements admitted under this rule are made under the influence of the excitement of an incident, rather than on reflection or deliberation. State v. Mateer, 383 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Iowa 1986). The factors to be considered in determining whether statements are excited utterances are (1) the lapse of time between the incident and the statement, (2) the extent to which questioning elicited statements that otherwise would not have been volunteered, (3) the age and condition of the declarant, (4) the characteristics of the event being described, and (5) the subject matter of the statements. State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Iowa 1999).
Officer Klein spoke with Zinn within minutes of Zinn's emergency call for help. He observed her right eye was bruised and swollen, she had scratch marks on her face and neck, and it appeared as if she had been crying. Her arms were folded, her head was down, and she sniffled as she spoke in a low voice. The officer's audio description was confirmed by the district court after listening to the 911 tape. The district court found the timing and the descriptions of Zinn's body language and speech to be indicators of a stressful situation and sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the admission of the challenged statements.
What Taylor claims the court failed to adequately address is whether the excited utterance exception was defeated because Zinn was responding to Officer Klein's questions. See Bratton v. Bond, 408 N.W.2d 39, 45 (Iowa 1987) (holding excited utterances must be spontaneous in order to demonstrate a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness for admissibility). Prior cases have dealt with this issue in a variety of fact settings. See Cagley, 638 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 2001) (finding substantial evidence for the district court's conclusion that statements made in response to questions by police officers were not excited utterances); Atwood, 602 N.W.2d at 782 (stating answers to officer's questions were admissible as the questioning was short and answers were triggered by the excitement of the incident); Mateer, 383 N.W.2d at 533 (holding impulsive rather than reflective responses were admissible as the product of a stressful situation.); State v Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1981) (finding statements given in response to police questions tends to negate spontaneity but not conclusively).
Officer Klein questioned Zinn for about an hour. He testified that he "would ask questions and she would answer them, but she was reluctant to answer questions. She just didn't freely volunteer what happened." He further testified that although he asked Zinn specific questions, he did not "give her hints" as to what she should say. He testified, "I just asked her what happened, to start from the beginning." While the spontaneity of Zinn's statements may have been tempered by the officer's questioning, there remained other indicia of reliability. No single factor is conclusive on admissibility. State v. Watts 441 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). The district court was looking for indicators of stress to determine the reliability and therefore the admissibility of the statements. Those indicators as detailed in the district court's ruling were Zinn's body language, voice tone, the timing of the statements, and her efforts to overcome crying. We agree with the district court that these tend to support the statements' spontaneous, rather than reflective, quality. We therefore conclude substantial evidence supports the district court's findings that Zinn's statements were the result of stress and excitement of a situation and thus admissible as excited utterances. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the district court.
AFFIRMED.