Opinion
No. 26664-8-III.
February 12, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Benton County, No. 06-1-01019-5, Craig J. Matheson, J., entered December 7, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Korsmo, J., concurred in by Schultheis, C.J., and Sweeney, J.
Scott Sylvester appeals the order that prohibits him from having contact with the officer who arrested him. We find no support for his argument that a no-contact order is unavailable in a drug possession case. Accordingly, we affirm.
Fish and Wildlife Officer Jonathan Horn knew Mr. Sylvester from prior contacts and also knew that his driver's license was suspended. On February 11, 2006, the officer was in a grocery store parking lot when he saw Mr. Sylvester leave the store and drive away. A radio check confirmed that Mr. Sylvester's license was still suspended. It also advised Officer Horn that there was an outstanding felony arrest warrant for Mr. Sylvester.
The next day Horn and another officer drove by Mr. Sylvester's apartment complex, where they saw the same car Mr. Sylvester had driven the day before. They watched for awhile and eventually saw Mr. Sylvester come out of the building and go to the car. He retrieved something from the trunk. When he started walking back to the apartment, the officers arrested him on the felony warrant. During the arrest, they discovered a pipe containing methamphetamine in Mr. Sylvester's pocket. He was charged with possessing the controlled substance.
Officer Horn testified at the subsequent jury trial. Mr. Sylvester took the stand and testified that the officer had a vendetta against him based on a previous fishing citation that had resulted in a not guilty verdict. The jury convicted Mr. Sylvester. The day following his testimony, Officer Horn found a threatening note on his car. At sentencing, the prosecutor asked for an order prohibiting Mr. Sylvester from contacting Officer Horn. The prosecutor advised the court that the officer and his wife were concerned because Mr. Sylvester knew where they lived. The court granted the no-contact order because there could be "bad blood" between "this witness and this defendant."
Mr. Sylvester timely appealed to this court. The sole argument he presents is a claim that the trial court erred in issuing the no-contact order. He argues that the no-contact order was unrelated to the case because it was actually entered because of the threatening note that he was never proven to have written. He also argues that a no-contact order is not a crime-related prohibition in a drug possession case.
The record amply demonstrates the "bad blood" between the defendant and the officer. Mr. Sylvester himself accused the officer of having a vendetta and planting the evidence against him. He also told jurors that the officer had discussed the previous trial when he was transporting Mr. Sylvester to jail following the arrest in this case. Mr. Sylvester even interrupted Officer Horn's testimony during the trial. Even without attributing the threatening note to Mr. Sylvester, the trial court had significant evidence that the two men did not get along.
A trial court has the authority to impose "crime-related prohibitions" when sentencing a felony case. RCW 9.94A.505(8). A "crime-related prohibition" is an order that "directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted." RCW 9.94A.030(13) (partial). In State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 156 P.3d 201 (2007), our court authoritatively construed these provisions in the very same context of a no-contact order involving a witness who testified at trial. The court unanimously concluded that the statute expressly empowered trial courts to prohibit defendants from contacting witnesses for up to the statutory maximum time period for the offense. Id. at 118-120.
Chapter 9.94A RCW applies to all felony offenses committed after June 30, 1984. RCW 9.94A.905. Thus, the authority to impose no-contact orders found in RCW 9.94A.505(8) applies to felony drug possession cases as well as all other felony offenses. Officer Horn was a witness against Mr. Sylvester. The jury convicted Mr. Sylvester of a felony committed after June 30, 1984. Thus, the trial court was authorized to enter the no-contact order.
There was no error in entering the challenged provision. The judgment is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Schultheis, C.J. and Sweeney, J., concur.