Opinion
No. CR 07-221719-S
February 26, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND MOTION TO REARGUE
The defendant, Terence Stradford, brought a motion to suppress which was heard before the court on February 16, 2007, and which motion was denied. The defendant, by motion dated February 22, 2007, moves to reargue his motion to suppress.
The court finds from the testimony of police officer David Riehl the following facts relevant to this inquiry. David Riehl is a police officer with the Bridgeport Police Department with over seventeen years of experience, and currently serves in the Tactical Narcotics Team. Officer Riehl has training in drug interdiction and has been in the Tactical Narcotics Team for three years. At 11:45 a.m. on January 25, 2007, Officer Riehl was alone on "roaming patrol" in the city's east side in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking. Officer Riehl was dressed in a police tactical uniform with police jacket and official patches clearly marking him as a police officer. He was driving an unmarked Ford Taurus equipped with lights (flashing "wigwag" type) mounted in the front grill and a light box mounted in the interior of the vehicle just above the rear view mirror. As Officer Riehl was traveling westbound on Berkshire Avenue he observed the defendant's blue vehicle stopped at the intersection of Orchard Street and Berkshire Avenue, facing in an eastbound direction. Officer Riehl observed the vehicle stopped in this position from at least a distance of a city block as he approached it. Officer Riehl characterized the distance as follows. "[A]ll the way from when I first saw him and I would be coming off of Pembroke Street going up there so it was quite a distance where he was stopped for a period of time." Officer Riehl variously described the defendant's vehicle's position as "blocking the intersection," "not in the middle of the whole intersection but. . .if there was a stop sign at the intersection, that's where he would have been," "in the middle of the street with no stop sign," and "about three feet off the curb." As Officer Riehl passed the stopped vehicle he recognized the defendant, Terence Stradford, an individual whom he describes as known to him, seated in the driver's seat. The street width was relatively narrow and the vehicles passed in close proximity to each other. He also observed an unidentified third party seated in the passenger's seat
Officer Riehl commenced to make a u-turn to approach the defendant's vehicle from the rear. As he did so the defendant pulled his vehicle off, making a left turn to head southerly onto Orchard Street. Officer Riehl followed the defendant and observed the passenger exit the vehicle at the next intersection at Stillman Street. The defendant then made a turn onto Stillman, traveling westerly toward Pembroke Street. At this point, Officer Riehl continued following the defendant and activated his flashing lights. Although not necessarily relevant to our inquiry, the defendant refused to pull over at that point, but continued on another two blocks to Pembroke Street, turned north onto Pembroke Street and continued on another four blocks before stopping. All during the course of this pursuit, Officer Riehl observed the defendant putting his hand up to his mouth as though he were placing items in his mouth. After the defendant's vehicle was stopped and he was removed Officer Riehl observed what he described as a "fold of heroin, an item which later turned out to be heroin" in plain view on the seat of the defendant's vehicle.
The issues in the matter at hand have been narrowly focused. Both the state and defense counsel, at the time the initial motion to suppress was argued, had agreed that the defendant was "seized" within the meaning of an investigatory stop at the moment Officer Riehl activated his flashing lights. Indeed, the defense counsel reiterated this position in his motion to reargue and it is consistent with authority cited by counsel, in State v. Donahue, 251 Conn. 636, 647-48, 742 A.2d 775 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 924, 121 S. Ct. 299, 148 L. Ed. 240 (2000). The rationale is stated in State v. Hill, 237 Conn. 81, 87, 675 A.2d 866 (1996), as follows: "[A] person [is defined] as seized under our state constitution when by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. . . . In determining whether a seizure has occurred, so as to invoke the protections of our state constitution . . . a court is to consider whether in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In the instant case, it is reasonable to conclude that when Officer Riehl activated his flashing lights the defendant would have believed that he was not free to leave. The sole issue then is whether Officer Riehl had a reasonable and articulable basis of suspicion upon which to base the seizure.
Seizures are justifiable under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In the recent matter of State v. Burroughs, 99 Conn. App. 413, 423, ___ A.2d ___ (2007), the court articulated the criteria to be used: "Our Supreme Court has determined that our state constitution affords greater protection against illegal searches and seizures than does the federal constitution. State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 649-50, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992). Article first, §§ 7 and 9 of our state constitution permit a police officer in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. . . . In determining whether the detention was justified in a given case, a court must consider if [b]ased upon the whole picture the detaining officers [had] a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. . . . A court reviewing the legality of a stop must therefore examine the specific information available to the police officer at the time of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to be derived therefrom. . . . These standards, which mirror those set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, [supra, 392 U.S. 20-22], with regard to fourth amendment analysis, govern the legality of investigatory detentions under article first, §§ 7 and 9 of our state constitution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
It is with these criteria in mind that the court will now review the relevant facts and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them. Contrary to the assertions of the defendant's counsel, the facts of the instant case make it readily distinguishable from those in State v. Donahue. First, with regard to the issue of the motor vehicle operation, Officer Riehl, as noted above, observed the defendant stopped in the traveled lane, at the intersection, at a distance of three feet off the curb for a sufficiently long period of time. General Statutes § 14-251 provides in relevant part: "No vehicle shall be permitted to remain stationery . . . upon the traveled portion of any highway . . . and, if such highway is curbed, such vehicle shall be so placed that its right-hand wheels, when stationery, shall, when safety will permit, be within a distance of twelve inches from the curb. No vehicle shall be permitted to remain parked within twenty five feet of an intersection. . . ."
Although there was no apparent motor vehicle violation in the Donahue matter, there was in the instant case. But even more importantly, there are an entire set of inferences that may be drawn which could reasonably have lead Officer Riehl to suspect that a drug sale or purchase was taking place or had taken place. First, the area is a location known for drug trafficking. The defendant, Terence Stradford, was seated in a motor vehicle stationery in the traveled lane of the highway for a sufficiently long period of time with another party seated in the passenger seat. Although Officer Riehl was driving an unmarked police car, the vehicle had "wigwag lights" in the front grill and a light box inside the front windshield above the rear view mirror. Officer Riehl himself was dressed in a police tactical uniform and jacket with clearly visible patches. Officer Riehl's vehicle and the defendant's vehicle passed with such close proximity that the officer was able to clearly recognize the defendant. It is not unreasonable to believe that the defendant recognized Officer Riehl as a policeman and the officer's vehicle as an unmarked police car. As the officer made a U-turn the defendant pulled out and turned left, traveling only the short distance of a city block before his passenger exited. Given the behavior of the defendant and his passenger during this sequence of events, it is a reasonable inference that the defendant, Terence Stradford was in the process of consummating either the purchase or the sale of drugs with the unidentified third party. The motor vehicle violation standing alone would provide a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop. The behavior of the defendant and the third party provide a separate and distinct basis upon which a reasonable and articulable suspicion may be founded. It is the court's conclusion that Officer Riehl had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to effect an investigatory stop or seizure at the point in time at which he activated his lights. The succeeding events, including the pursuit of the defendant and Officer Riehl's observation of the defendant apparently placing items into his mouth, have no bearing on our analysis.
Since it is the conclusion of this court that the investigatory stop or seizure was legal, there is no suppression of any evidence seized under the exclusionary rule pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), or its progeny, nor any separate analysis to determine the admissibility of such evidence under State v. Colvin, 241 Conn. 650, 697 A.2d 1122 (1997).
For the foregoing reasons the defendant's motion to suppress and motion to reargue are denied. It is so ordered.