Summary
holding that an ordinance violated due process and equal protection rights based on the city's arbitrary application and enforcement of the ordinance
Summary of this case from Dean v. City of WinonaOpinion
No. C7-94-1687.
April 4, 1995.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, John M. Stanoch, J.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Minn. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Robert J. Alfton, Minneapolis City Atty., Surell Brady, E. Robert Pullman, Asst. City Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Thomas P. Melloy, Hall, Byers, Hanson, Steil Weinberger, P.A., St. Cloud, for appellant.
OPINION
In December 1993, appellant Kelly Stewart was cited for violating Minneapolis Ordinance sections 277.3127 and 277.3128. After a hearing, the trial court adjudicated Stewart guilty of the misdemeanor offense. We reverse.
FACTS
Kelly Stewart works as an unlicensed skilled laborer for General Sprinkler Corporation. The corporation designs, installs, repairs, tests, and maintains water-based fire suppression systems. Through its president, General Sprinkler holds a license from the City of Minneapolis as a master fire sprinkler contractor under Minneapolis Ordinance Chapter 277.
General Sprinkler also does a substantial amount of work repairing, installing, and retro-fitting sprinkler systems in existing buildings. When installing a system in an existing building, the licensed sprinkler installer journeyman must do on-site measurements and adjustments to fit the system into the ceiling where electrical wiring and heating and air conditioning ducts may already be present.
Stewart's employment duties include: the on-site fabrication of pipe segments with fittings; assembling the floor hanger components, which support or suspend the fire suppression systems inside the structure; drilling holes in walls, floors, and ceilings; moving materials in and around the work area; loading and unloading trucks; and providing general cleanup and other general tasks. The parties agree that he is not a licensed sprinkler installer. While working with his employer on the Cardiology Unit of the Hennepin County Medical Center, Stewart was cited for installing, connecting, repairing, altering, or adding to the sprinkler system without a license, in violation of sections 277.3127 and 277.3128 of the Minneapolis Ordinance.
At trial, the city presented the testimony of Gordon Bates, the Minneapolis Fire Department's fire protection specialist. Bates testified that the proper threading of pipe and the assembly of hangers were "key components" of a workable sprinkler system and that if done incorrectly, could result in sprinkler failure. However, Bates is not a journeyman sprinkler installer, and has not worked in a pipe fabrication shop for over twenty-nine years.
Bates admitted that the city intentionally does not apply or enforce its ordinance to the cutting and threading of pipe off the job site. He thought just on-site enforcement was necessary because he claimed on-site fabrication of pipe "was more likely to be inaccurate" than pipe fabricated elsewhere. He thought that might be due to "hectic conditions" at a construction site.
On cross-examination, Bates agreed that an unlicensed laborer could fabricate pipe and hanger components off the construction site and not be in violation of the ordinance, while the same person doing the same activities on the construction site would be in violation of the ordinance. He also conceded that other duties essential to the installation of the sprinkler system at the job site done by unlicensed laborers do not fall within the ordinance's prohibitions. These activities include removing ceilings, drilling holes in the walls, and moving materials on the job.
Stewart presented the testimony of Peter Vodenka, the company's general superintendent, and Frank Winiecki, the owner and president of the company. Vodenka is an active journeyman with over eight years of recent and direct experience. Vodenka testified that the equipment on the job site was not more likely to be inaccurate than equipment used off the job site. He also testified that the on-site cutting and fabrication of pipes to meet the requirements of the particular building is the most economical way to complete the job.
Vodenka testified that a licensed journeyman is responsible for taking the on-site measurements, directing the cutting and assembly of a specifically sized pipe, supervising the assembly of an appropriate hanger component, and, finally, installing the system. He stated that a licensed journeyman is the only person permitted to install or test the fire system into the building, and that his unlicensed employees are instructed not to do any installation work. Vodenka agreed that the proper cutting and threading of pipes is "an essential element" of the installation of a sprinkler system.
The trial court determined that Stewart had violated the municipal ordinance because the "cutting and threading of pipe are essential to installation of water-based fire suppression systems" and that the "[o]n-site cutting and threading of pipes is work covered" within the meaning of the ordinance. The court found that the city's enforcement of the ordinance only against on-site fabrication using portable equipment was not unconstitutional because it was "reasonable and rationally related to the public interest in the quality and safe installation of a fire suppression system."
ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by concluding that Stewart's preparation activities and pipe fabrication violated the Minneapolis Ordinance?
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by concluding that the ordinance was constitutional?
3. Were the trial court's findings of fact clearly erroneous?
ANALYSIS
The construction of a statute is a question of law and thus fully reviewable by an appellate court. Hibbing Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn. 1985). Similarly, the interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law, reviewed independently on appeal. Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1980) (interpreting a zoning ordinance); County of Isanti v. Peterson, 469 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Minn.App. 1991).
Words in a statute are to be construed in their plain and common usage. Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (1992). Where the words of a law are unambiguous, courts should not disregard the letter of the law under the pretext of pursuing the spirit. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1992). Moreover, "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1970) (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955) quoted in State v. Niska, 514 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Minn. 1994)).
Here, the trial court determined that Stewart's activities violated sections 277.3128 and 277.3127 of the Minneapolis Ordinance. Although Stewart was cited only for the violation of the city ordinance, the court also considered Minn.Stat. §§ 299M.03, subd. 2 and 299M.07 (1992) when deciding this case because the statute's language is similar to the ordinance. The statute provides that a municipality
may not require licensing, certification, registration, bonding, or insurance that is in addition to the state requirements outlined in this chapter.
Minn.Stat. § 299M.07.
The licensing statute provides that:
A person may not install, connect, alter, repair, or add to a fire protection system, under the supervision of a fire protection contractor, unless annually certified to perform those duties as a journeyman sprinkler fitter or as a registered apprentice sprinkler fitter.
Minn.Stat. § 299M.03 subd. 2 (emphasis added). Minneapolis Ordinance 277.3128 is consistent with the statute and provides that:
No person, firm or corporation shall install, connect, repair, alter or add to any fire sprinkler system for any structure in the city without first having obtained a license to do so.
(Emphasis added). The parties agree that the terms "install, connect, repair, alter or add to" are not defined either in the statute or in the ordinance.
On appeal, Stewart first argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that his actions were prohibited by the ordinance and statute. He asserts that on-site fabricating of pipes and hangers does not fit within the prohibition of installing, connecting, repairing, altering, or adding to the fire sprinkler system without a license. We agree.
Because the terms of the statute and ordinance are not defined, and do not clearly include the on-site preparation work done by Stewart, we construe the ordinance (and statute) in favor of lenity. See State v. Niska, 514 N.W.2d at 265. Thus we conclude Stewart's preparation duties are not covered under the ordinance and statute. While the terms of the statute and ordinance have a common theme in that the regulated activities must be done on the job site, the assembly and fabrication of the elements of the system can be — and most often are — completed elsewhere. Importantly, the state's witness admitted that the same activities or fabrication of pipe and assembly of hangers anywhere off the job site, even while using the same portable equipment, do not violate the ordinance.
Additionally, although the trial court based its decision on the fact that the fabrication of pipe and hanger components are "essential" to the system, the state's witness agreed that other essential activities that take place on the job site are not covered by the ordinance. The noncovered essential activities include removing ceilings, drilling holes in the walls, and moving materials on the job. Thus, we cannot conclude that Stewart's activities are covered by the ordinance merely because they are "essential."
We also conclude that respondent's reliance on Springfield Gas Light Co. v. Board of State Examiners, 329 Mass. 664, 110 N.E.2d 113, 114 (1953), Town of Greenland v. Bunker, 118 N.H. 783, 394 A.2d 321, 322 (1978), and Jones v. Minnesota State Board of Health, 301 Minn. 481, 482, 221 N.W.2d 132, 133 (1974) is misplaced. These cases are factually and legally distinguishable.
2. Although we conclude that Stewart's actions did not violate the ordinance, we also address whether the ordinance violates due process and equal protection rights. This court reviews the trial court's determination of questions of law de novo. See Hibbing Educ. Ass'n, 369 N.W.2d at 529; Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc., 295 N.W.2d at 608; County of Isanti, 469 N.W.2d at 469.
A municipal ordinance is presumed constitutional, [therefore] the burden of proving [an] ordinance is unreasonable or that the requisite public interest is not involved, and consequently that the ordinance does not come within the police power of the city, rests on the party attacking its validity.
City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, 245 Minn. 325, 329, 71 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1955). The Dalsin court determined that when properly exercising its police power, a municipality must have a public interest in regulating an activity and that the regulation imposed must be reasonable and appropriate for accomplishing its purpose. Id.
Here, the trial court found that the city's enforcement of the ordinance only against on-site fabrication using portable equipment was not unconstitutional because it was "reasonable and rationally related to the public interest in the quality and safe installation of a fire suppression system." Stewart argues that the city's arbitrary regulation and enforcement to on site-work only is unreasonable, inappropriate and violates his due process and equal protection rights under both the state and federal constitutions. We agree.
We cannot accept the city's argument that a skilled laborer legally can fabricate pipe just across the street from a job site using portable equipment, while the same person doing the same activity on the job site a few feet away violates the ordinance. We conclude the location specific application of the statute unreasonably treats similarly situated persons differently and thus violates equal protection rights. The city's interpretation of the ordinance is neither logical nor rationally related to protecting the public interest in maintaining working fire protection systems.
Because the city does not assert a plausible reason or explanation justifying the disparate application of the ordinance as to similarly situated persons who may be the distance of mere feet away, the regulation is unconstitutional. See Dalsin, 245 Minn. at 329, 71 N.W.2d at 858.
3. Finally, Stewart argues that the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. In particular, Stewart argues that the trial court erred by finding that the portable equipment used to fabricate pipe on the job site is less accurate than the equipment used in other locations. We agree.
However, because of our resolution on the other issues, our analysis does not depend on findings relative to portable equipment.
DECISION
We reverse Stewart's misdemeanor conviction. Stewart's on-site preparations were not validly prohibited by the ordinance. Further, the application of the ordinance by the city only to on-site work while exempting the identical work off site violates constitutional due process and equal protection rights.
Reversed.