Opinion
No. COA15–571.
01-05-2016
STATE of North Carolina v. Linwood Earl STEPHENS, Defendant.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Phillip T. Reynolds, for the State. Jeffrey William Gillette for the Defendant.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Phillip T. Reynolds, for the State.
Jeffrey William Gillette for the Defendant.
Opinion
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 3 December 2014 by Judge David L. Hall in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 November 2015.
DILLON, Judge.
Linwood Earl Stephens (“Defendant”) appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I. Background
The evidence presented at trial tended to show that several police officers went to a house where Defendant's mother (“Ms.Moody”) resided in order to locate Defendant and serve him with arrest warrants for an unrelated incident. Ms. Moody answered the door in response to a “knock and talk” by two of the uniformed officers. Conflicting evidence was presented at trial regarding the substance of their conversation with Ms. Moody. Two officers testified that they informed Ms. Moody that they were looking for Defendant to serve him with papers, and Ms. Moody responded that Defendant was not there but that the officers could check the apartment. Ms. Moody testified that the officers did not ask for permission to enter, but instead pushed her out of the way and rushed inside the residence.
After entering the residence, the officers located Defendant hiding in a spare bedroom and arrested him. One officer conducted a sweep of the area where Defendant had been hiding and identified a bag containing white powder, which field tested positive for cocaine. As Defendant was led through the living room and past his mother and several officers, he said, “It's mine.” Ms. Moody subsequently gave written consent for a search of the apartment. Officers found a second bag of white powder pursuant to this search.
Defendant was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to sell and deliver, trafficking in cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search, including Defendant's statement, “It's mine,” and the two bags of cocaine. The trial court entered an order denying the motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress as part of his plea bargain.
II. Jurisdiction
Defendant has filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, acknowledging a jurisdictional defect in his notice of appeal. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, but failed to give notice of appeal from the final judgment entered pursuant to his guilty plea. We exercise our discretion under N.C.R.App. P. 21(a) to address the merits of Defendant's appeal. State v. McCoy, 171 N.C.App. 636, 638, 615 S.E.2d 319, 320–21 (2005).
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his mother's residence. He contends that the search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because it was conducted without a warrant and without consent to search.
The standard of review of a trial court's order on a motion to suppress is strictly limited to a determination of whether its findings are supported by competent evidence, and in turn, whether the findings support the trial court's ultimate conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). The trial court's findings of fact are “conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting .” State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (internal marks omitted).
On appeal, Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in failing to resolve a material conflict in the evidence regarding whether the officers had consent to enter his mother's apartment. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, the State asserts that Defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search of his mother's home; however, the record on appeal makes clear that Defendant stayed in his mother's home as an overnight guest on a regular basis, and thus has standing to challenge the search. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 387, 401 (1990) (holding that overnight guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a host's home).
Defendant challenges the trial court's finding that Ms. Moody gave consent simply by alleging that the trial court, after hearing conflicting testimony from Ms. Moody and the officers regarding the issue of consent, failed to acknowledge or resolve discrepancies in the evidence and “merely recited” the officer's testimony. The authority cited by Defendant in support of this argument, in fact, contradicts Defendant's position.
Defendant cites State v. Lang and State v. Bell in support of the contention that recitation of a witness's testimony is not adequate to resolve a conflict in the evidence. State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 520, 308 S.E.2d 317, 321 (1983); State v. Bell, 221 N.C.App. 535, 542, 728 S.E.2d 439, 444 (2012). However, Lang is clearly distinguishable because in that case the trial court, in its findings, simply stated what the officer thought had occurred, rather than making a specific finding resolving what actually had occurred. Lang, 309 N.C. at 521, 308 S.E.2d at 321 (finding that “[i]t was [the officer's] understanding that the defendant initiated the conversation”) (emphasis added). Conversely, the trial court in the present case made specific findings that the officers (1) told Ms. Moody they needed to talk to Defendant, (2) “told [Ms. Moody] that they had papers to serve on her son,” and (3) “asked [Ms. Moody] if they could come in and check to see if Defendant [was] there.”
In Bell, the Court found that although there was a conflict in the evidence regarding Defendant's consent to a search, the trial court properly made a specific finding resolving the conflict. Bell, 221 N.C.App. at 543, 728 S.E.2d at 444 (finding that “[t]he defendant gave oral consent”). Similarly, the trial court in the present case specifically found that “Ms. Moody said okay,” and “Ms. Moody's consent was voluntary.”
Although Defendant does assign error to several of the trial court's findings of fact, he fails to challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence which supported the findings, instead simply suggesting that Ms. Moody's offered testimony, which contradicted the officers' testimony, may have allowed the trial court to reach a different conclusion. However, it is beyond the scope of our review to re-weigh the evidence or to revisit credibility determinations on appeal. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619–20 (1982). Therefore, the trial court's findings are conclusive on appeal. Accordingly, Defendant's argument is overruled.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
Judges GEER and HUNTER, JR., concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).