Opinion
NO. 2012 KA 1706
2013-09-13
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ALGIE SPEARS
Walter P. Reed District Attorney Covington, Louisiana and Kathryn Landry Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee, State of Louisiana Frank Sloan Mandeville, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, Algie Spears
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the
22nd Judicial District Court,
In and for St. Tammany Parish,
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 512686
The Honorable Peter J. Garcia, Judge Presiding
Walter P. Reed
District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
and
Kathryn Landry
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee,
State of Louisiana
Frank Sloan
Mandeville, Louisiana
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant,
Algie Spears
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J, WELCH, AND CRAIN, JJ.
CRAIN, J.
The defendant, Algie Spears, was charged by bill of information with unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:62.3. He pled not guilty and, after a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. He received a sentence of six years at hard labor. A habitual offender bill of information was filed alleging he was a third-felony offender. After a hearing, he was adjudicated a third-felony offender, the original sentence was vacated, and he was resentenced to serve ten years at hard labor. The defendant now appeals alleging insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Twenty-year-old Marcy Schaffer and a roommate rented a two-bedroom house at 410 West 26th Street in Covington, Louisiana. She began living there in March of 2011. At approximately 11:30 p.m. on August 21, 2011, she was alone in the house and was reading a magazine on her bed when she a black male, later identified as the defendant, standing in her kitchen staring at her. Schaffer did not know the defendant and had never seen him before this incident. She jumped to her feet, closed and locked the bedroom door, and called 911. Although she was not sure how the defendant got into her house, Shaffer testified that she believed he entered through a broken window or possibly through the front door because the lock did not work properly.
The house was located near the police station, and several officers arrived within minutes. The first officer to arrive, Covington Police Lieutenant James Beach, entered the house through a window because Schaffer was scared the perpetrator was still inside and would not unlock the doors. Lieutenant Beach unlocked a door, other officers entered, and the residence was cleared before Schaffer would leave her bedroom. She described the perpetrator as a black male with a bald head and pot belly.
Upon hearing this description, an officer on the scene, Covington Police Detective Joseph Mahon, realized he had just stopped someone who fit that description. On the way to Schaffer's residence, Detective Mahon had noticed a van partially on the road about three houses from Schaffer's residence. Someone was seated in the van, but the headlights were off After the van pulled away, Detective Mahon followed for a short distance then initiated a traffic stop. Although Detective Mahon later identified the driver as the defendant, at the time he allowed him to leave because he appeared calm and Schaffer had advised the 911 dispatcher that she thought the perpetrator was still in her house. After hearing Schaffer's description of the intruder, Detective Mahon left the house, apprehended the defendant, and returned him to the scene. Schaffer then positively identified the defendant as the perpetrator.
Schaffer's next-door neighbor, Morris Batiste, testified he knew the defendant and played dominos with him a few times. On the day of the crime, Batiste saw the defendant outside around dusk, and again when the police brought him back to the crime scene. Batiste testified that the defendant had previously inquired about the victim and her roommate.
Another neighbor, Stephanie Boykins, testified that at approximately 11:00 p.m. on the night of the crime, the defendant visited her house for about ten minutes. She knew he had been drinking, but he refused Boykins' offer to drive him home. Boykins observed him driving slowly away in his van. Boykins spoke to Schaffer days later and said she was sorry for what happened, explaining that the defendant "always did tell me he liked you." Prior to trial, the defense filed a Notice of Alibi indicating that the defendant was with "Stephanie Barkins" at the time of the offense. Boykins, whose name was misspelled in the notice, denied that the defendant was with her at the time of the offense. The defendant neither testified, nor called any witnesses.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also La. Code Crim. Pro. Art. 821B; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Petitto, 12-1670 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/26/13), 116 So. 3d 761, 766; State v. Patorno, 01-2585 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So. 2d 141, 144. When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Wright, 98-0601 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So. 2d 485, 487, writ denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So. 2d 1157, and writ denied sub nom, State ex rel. Wright v. State, 00-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So. 2d 732. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, Louisiana Revised Statute 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Petitto, 116 So. 3d at 766; Patorno, 822 So. 2d at 144. The facts then established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. Wright, 730 So. 2d at 487.
Louisiana Revised Statute 14:62.3A provides:
Unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling is the intentional entry by a person without authorization into any inhabited dwelling or other structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode by a person.The elements of this crime are: (1) the accused entered a dwelling; (2) the dwelling did not belong to the accused; (3) the dwelling was used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode; and (4) the entry was not authorized.
At trial, the occurrence of the crime was not challenged. Instead, the defense offered the theory of mistaken identification. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that Detective Mahon did not detect alcohol on the defendant's breath during the traffic stop, though Boykins testified he had been drinking. Defense counsel further questioned both the lighting inside the house and how Schaffer could be so positive in her identification. Lastly, he suggested it would be difficult for the defendant to climb in and out of a window in a short period of time because of his age.
Defense counsel told the jury that the defendant was born in 1945.
The verdict reflects that the jury accepted the testimony of Schaffer and rejected the defendant's attempts to discredit her identification of him. The trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Petitto, 116 So. 3d at 770; State v. Young, 99-1264 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/31/00), 764 So. 2d 998, 1006. Furthermore, where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Petitto, 116 So. 3d at 770; Young, 764 So. 2d at 1006. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam).
Schaffer's identification of the defendant was direct evidence of his guilt. The testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. State v. Clouatre, 12-0407 (La App. 1 Gir. 11/14/12), 110 So. 3d 1094, 1100. The circumstantial evidence also supported the State's case. Two witnesses placed the defendant near the crime scene on the evening and night of the offense. Those witnesses testified that the defendant previously inquired about Schaffer or expressed that he liked her. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the fact finder reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So. 2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 514 So. 2d 126 (La, 1987). The jury reasonably rejected the defendant's hypothesis of innocence based upon misidentification. No other reasonable hypothesis of innocence was argued to the jury.
On appeal, the defendant abandons the misidentification theory and argues, for the first time, that a crime wasn't proven because the State failed to establish his unauthorized entry into an inhabited dwelling "belonging to another," implying that perhaps the defendant owned the house. He notes that Schaffer, a renter, was never asked about the owner of the house, nor was an act of sale introduced into evidence. According to appellate counsel, "[T]here was no evidence at the trial of this matter that the dwelling belonged to someone other than Mr. Spears."
By implying that he could have owned the house, the defendant argues he could not be guilty of an unauthorized entry and raises a new hypothesis of innocence on appeal. A reviewing court does not deteimine whether another possible hypothesis suggested, by a defendant could afford an exculpatory explanation of the events. State v, Mitchell, 99-3342 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So. 2d 78, 83. Rather, the reviewing court must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether the alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Juluke, 98-0341 (La. 1/8/99), 725 So. 2d 1291, 1293 (per curiam). The Jackson standard "does not provide a defendant with a means of splitting alternative and inconsistent defenses in different forums, raising one defense before the jury and when that fails, a second defense presupposing a different set of facts in an appellate court conducting sufficiency review." Juluke, 725 So. 2d at 1293.
We find ample evidence from which a rational jury could find that the home where Schaffer lived did not belong to the defendant. Schaffer lived in the house for approximately five months before the offense. She testified that she never saw the defendant before he appeared unannounced in the house shortly before midnight on August 21, 2011. When she saw the defendant, he ducked behind a hallway and tried to hide. After she locked her bedroom door and called the police, the defendant left the premises without any attempt to explain his presence, suggesting that his presence was unauthorized. Likewise, a neighbor testified that on a previous occasion the defendant was "asking me about my neighbors," referring to the victim and her roommate. The defendant's lack of familiarity with the residents of the house also rationally supports a finding that the defendant did not own the house. We find that the evidence excludes as a reasonable hypothesis of innocence that the defendant owned the home, and cannot say that a rational juror could not have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
After a careful review of the record and evaluating the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was guilty of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling.
The defendant's sole assignment of error is meritless.
CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.