Opinion
No. 25891-2-III.
June 24, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Yakima County, No. 05-1-00618-3, F. James Gavin, J., entered February 1, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Kulik, A.C.J., concurred in by Sweeney and Korsmo, JJ.
Angela Soto pleaded guilty to first degree assault of a child. The victim, Ms. Soto's four-year-old daughter, Sandra, sustained life-threatening injuries. Ms. Soto admitted she was not in control of her emotions during the assault and that she had previously lost her temper and assaulted Sandra. The court accepted the plea and imposed an order of protection for Sandra, and her two siblings, Felicia and Angel. On appeal, Ms. Soto contends the State failed to show that the order of protection was reasonably necessary to protect the two children who were not victims of the assault. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the no-contact order. We affirm.
FACTS
Angela Soto entered a guilty plea to the charge of first degree assault of a child.
Her plea statement reads as follows:
In Yakima County, State of Washington, on or about March 11, 2005 I was not in control of my emotions and physically assaulted my daughter Sandra Lynn Soto (born 5-03-2000) and recklessly caused her great bodily harm. I hit her with the back of my hand on her chest and she fell back and hit her head on the wall. After complaining of a headache and laying down, she later became unresponsive and I called for help. She was taken to the hospital and treated for brain bleeding and swelling. I accept responsibility for what I did but I did not intend to harm her seriously and I very much regret that she was hurt in this way. I do not agree or admit that I used force or means likely to result in death in most circumstances, but do agree that my actions were reckless.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 33-34 (emphasis added).
During the plea hearing, Ms. Soto admitted that her plea was true. To support the plea, the deputy prosecutor recited the following facts. On or about March 11, 2005, Officer Bill Almon responded to an aid call involving Ms. Soto and her daughter, Sandra, age four. Before Officer Almon could advise Ms. Soto of her constitutional rights, Ms. Soto told him that she hit Sandra, and that she had been hitting her for some time. Officer Almon advised Ms. Soto of her constitutional rights, and she waived them.
Ms. Soto told Officer Almon that on the previous day, she struck Sandra with the back of her hand, causing Sandra to strike her head on the adjacent wall. After this incident, Sandra complained her head hurt bad, sometimes screaming and sometimes just falling asleep. Ms. Soto told the officer that on March 11, she struck Sandra on the head, causing her to hit her head on the wall a second time.
Sandra was treated at a local hospital. She suffered from a severe head injury with a right subdural hematoma, cerebral edema, and a possible right skull fracture. Sandra was transferred to a hospital in Seattle. Sandra's treating physician determined that Sandra's injuries were life-threatening and severe. During part of her hospitalization, Sandra was in a coma and there was concern that she might not live. In addition to the head injury, Sandra also had extensive skin bruises, some of which were hyper-pigmented marks from a prior injury involving the neck and waist. Sandra had significant bruising on her face, legs, back, left wrist, and right arm.
The deputy prosecutor informed the court of ER 404(b) evidence related to Ms. Soto tying a rope around Sandra to restrain her, tying her to the bed, and not allowing Sandra to move for different periods of time.
Based on the evidence presented by the deputy prosecutor, the court concluded that the evidence supported the elements of the crime. The court also determined that Ms. Soto's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court accepted the plea and found Ms. Soto guilty of first degree assault of a child.
After the deputy prosecutor recited the facts of the case, she presented a proposed judgment and sentence. The deputy prosecutor recommended that the court impose an order of protection for Sandra, her brother, Angel, and her sister, Felicia, for a lifetime period. The deputy prosecutor explained that Felicia watched her mother commit the abusive conduct against Sandra. The deputy prosecutor stated that any child who witnesses acts of domestic violence is a victim — if not a direct victim, a secondary victim. Equally important, the deputy prosecutor expressed the State's concern for the safety of Angel and Felicia.
The court sentenced Ms. Soto to 108 months' incarceration. The court rejected the deputy prosecutor's recommendation that the order of protection include the three children for a lifetime period. Instead, the court entered an order of protection for all three children until February 1, 2020, or until further order of the court. Defense counsel objected to the inclusion of Angel and Felicia in the protection order.
Ms. Soto appeals.
ANALYSIS
Crime-related prohibitions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). Discretion is abused when "the decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons." State v. Ancira, 107 Wn. App. 650, 653, 27 P.3d 1246 (2001).
Ms. Soto argues that the proper standard of review is de novo because the issue here is one of statutory interpretation. She contends the court lacked the statutory authority to impose the no-contact order. We disagree.
Under RCW 9.94A.505(8), a sentencing court has the authority to impose crime-related prohibitions, including no-contact orders. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d at 113. A crime-related prohibition is "an order of a court prohibiting conduct that directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted." RCW 9.94A.030(13). A court may impose probationary conditions that tend to prevent the future commission of a crime. State v. Williams, 97 Wn. App. 257, 263, 983 P.2d 687 (1999).
At issue here is the scope of a no-contact order imposed by a sentencing court. As a crime-related prohibition, we review the court's decision to impose the no-contact order for an abuse of discretion. Ancira, 107 Wn. App. at 653.
"Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children." Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982)). Importantly, the State also has a compelling interest in preventing harm to children, and an obligation to intervene to protect children from actions that would jeopardize their physical or mental health. In re Sumey, 94 Wn.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980).
A no-contact order to protect children is within a court's discretion if the order is reasonably necessary to protect children from harm and there is the appropriate nexus between the offense committed and the sentencing condition.
Ancira, 107 Wn. App. at 653-54. Conduct prohibited during community custody need not be causally related to the crime. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 456, 836 P.2d 239 (1992).
Ms. Soto argues that the 13-year, no-contact order here is an extreme interference with her fundamental parental rights. To support her position, Ms. Soto relies on Ancira and State v. Letourneau, 100 Wn. App. 424, 997 P.2d 436 (2000).
In Letourneau, Ms. Letourneau was convicted of two counts of second degree rape of a child who was unrelated to her. As part of her judgment and sentence, Ms. Letourneau was ordered to have no in-person contact with her biological children unless supervised. Id. at 426-27. The appellate court reversed the no-contact order because there was no evidence that Ms. Letourneau was a pedophile or that she otherwise posed a risk to molest her own children. The court concluded that the no-contact order was not reasonably necessary to prevent harm to Ms. Letourneau's children. Id. at 441.
In Ancira, Mr. Ancira was convicted of violating a domestic violence no-contact order against his wife. The court issued a no-contact order that included his children. Ancira, 107 Wn. App. at 652-53. The court reasoned that the no-contact order was necessary to prevent further harm to the children who had witnessed the abuse of their mother. The appellate court considered whether the no-contact order was necessary to protect the children from the harm of witnessing domestic violence. Id. The court reversed the no-contact order, concluding that the no-contact order protecting the wife was sufficient to protect the children from witnessing domestic violence. Id. at 665.
This case is distinguishable from Letourneau and Ancira. Here, Ms. Soto assaulted one of her biological children, and the court entered the no-contact order to protect the victim and two other biological children. When the assault occurred, Sandra was four, Felicia was a little older than Sandra, and Angel was younger than Sandra. Significantly, some of the abuse occurred while Felicia was present. Sandra sustained life-threatening injuries from her mother. And Ms. Soto admitted that she "was not in control of [her] emotions" when she assaulted Sandra. CP at 33. Ms. Soto also admitted that this was not the first time that she had lost her temper and assaulted Sandra.
Ms. Soto's inability to control her emotions puts all three children at risk of being harmed by her. Their young ages make them particularly vulnerable. The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Ms. Soto from having contact with all three children. The no-contact order was reasonably necessary to protect them from harm. We affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KORSMO, J. and SWEENEY, J., concur.