Opinion
(13905)
The appeal by the state, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the defendant's conviction of the crimes of assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree, threatening, disorderly conduct, breach of the peace and reckless endangerment in the first degree, was dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted, this court being in agreement with the views expressed by the Appellate Court on the trial court's exclusion of certain proffered testimony by the defendant's mother.
Argued May 31, 1990
Decision released July 17, 1990
Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of assault in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, threatening, disorderly conduct, breach of the peace and assault in the third degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, geographical area number five, and tried to the jury before Gray, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of assault in the second degree, threatening, disorderly conduct, breach of the peace and assault in the third degree; thereafter, the court rendered judgment revoking the defendant's probation, and the defendant filed separate appeals to the Appellate Court, Dupont, C.J., Daly and Norcott, Js., which set aside the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial and set aside the judgment of revocation of probation, and the state, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
Timothy J. Sugrue, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Mary M. Galvin, state's attorney, and Michael J. Weber, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Elaine M. Scanlon, with whom, on the brief, was Howard T. Owens, Jr., for the appellee (defendant).
The defendant was charged with the crimes of assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree, threatening, disorderly conduct, breach of the peace and reckless endangerment in the first degree, and was found guilty by a jury on all charges except the last. He did not dispute the facts underlying the state's charges, but instead relied on a defense of mental disease or defect.
At trial, the defense sought to introduce testimony by the defendant's mother concerning genetic, family illnesses that he claimed were medically linked to his mental condition. The trial court excluded the testimony. On appeal, the Appellate Court set aside the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Soltes, 20 Conn. App. 342, 566 A.2d 1374 (1989). Because the trial court's ruling appeared to have been based upon the order of testimony of the defense witnesses (the mother's testimony initially preceded the defense expert's testimony), we granted certification limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court err in holding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of the defendant's mother as to whether her `other children suffer from any physical ailments, any medical problems' prior to any evidence that the defendant suffered from a genetic mental disorder?" Upon further review of the transcript, however, we have concluded that the trial court also ruled to exclude the testimony on the independent ground that the mother was a nonexpert witness. It is to this basis for the exclusion that the Appellate Court's opinion is addressed. We are in agreement with the views expressed by the Appellate Court on that subject in its opinion, and it would serve no useful purpose to repeat that court's discussion here. Thus, we have concluded that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.