Opinion
K1-2019-0204A
02-06-2023
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. MICHAEL SOARES
For Plaintiff: Timothy G. Healy, Esq. For Defendant: John J. Canham, Jr., Esq.
For Plaintiff: Timothy G. Healy, Esq.
For Defendant: John J. Canham, Jr., Esq.
DECISION
MATOS, J.
This case arises from the gruesome and untimely murder of Mr. John Fay, a sixty-six-year-old retired postal worker, Vietnam Veteran, Purple Heart recipient, father of four, and friend to others, who, tragically, just happened to be out for a run in the early morning hours of May 17, 2013, when he encountered the Defendant in this case, Michael Soares. He was murdered by the Defendant, a twenty-seven-year-old man at the time of the murder with a history of mental illness, who randomly encountered his victim that early morning and brutally killed him. Defendant claims that he was under the influence of a delusional schizophrenic episode and is not criminally responsible for his actions. This Court must, therefore, undertake the challenging analysis of whether the Defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity.
As will be expanded upon below, although the murder took place on May 17, 2013, Defendant was not arrested until February 5, 2019. On March 18, 2019, he was indicted on one count of the murder of Mr. Fay, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial in accordance with Rule 23(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. See G.L. 1956 § 12-17-3.
The Court held a bench trial over the course of two days. The State called one witness, retired Warwick Police Sergeant of Detectives Mark Canning (Sgt. Canning), to put on its case in chief. The State essentially entered all of the evidence relating to the crime, without any significant objection, through Sgt. Canning. Defendant also agreed at trial that the State could prove that he committed the murder of Mr. Fay beyond reasonable doubt.
The remainder of the trial presentation consisted of expert testimony. Defendant relied on the testimony of Patricia Recupero, M.D. (Dr. Recupero) and the State called Christopher Matkovic, M.D. (Dr. Matkovic) in what could be termed rebuttal. Both were qualified in the field of forensic psychiatry. Both also testified that, in their expert opinions, Defendant was not criminally responsible for his actions on that fateful day due to his mental incapacity. However, they did differ on the bases for their conclusions. Despite the fact that the State called one of the two doctors who concluded that Defendant was not criminally responsible and that no expert testified to the contrary, the State argues against a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Instead, the State urges the Court to rely on the considerable evidence of Defendant's intentional acts both prior to and after the murder.
I
Findings of Fact
The evidence supporting the crime charged in this case was introduced singularly through the narrative testimony of Sgt. Canning. The evidence is summarized as follows and, as it was submitted without objection, the Court adopts it as its findings of fact.
Sgt. Canning testified that on May 18, 2013, Warwick Police Department received a call that a body had been found at Warwick City Park. Sgt. Canning described that the park, in addition to baseball and recreation fields, contains a three-mile walking path. See Ex. 3. The body was discovered by a pedestrian who was walking near the path and noticed an overturned trash barrel with what appeared to be a foot and leg sticking out of it. The pedestrian did not disturb the scene.
A portion of the recitation of facts is based upon the Court's notes of the bench trial. Where relevant, Trial Exhibits (Ex.) are cited.
Police arrived at approximately 10 a.m. Of note, the walking path encircles four baseball fields, a dog park to its interior, and a wooded area to its exterior. Ex. 3. The trash barrel was found in the wooded area, just outside the path which would have been across from the baseball fields. BCI Detective Walter Williams (Det. Williams) responded to the scene. He and the Medical Examiner investigated the scene. The body was initially found with its torso lying, apparently, face up inside the barrel with the remainder of its lower body outside the barrel but covered with debris such as leaves and twigs. Ex. 1 (Photos - 10 - Barrel - Body). The barrel contained several blood stains and what appeared to be fingerprints. Ex. 1 (Photos 11 - Barrel Blood Stains). It also contained palm prints at its bottom suggesting that someone may have tried to push it. Detective Williams and the Medical Examiner removed the barrel and uncovered the victim's torso which revealed a severely mutilated body with extensive cuts and gashes, in particular at the neck and head. Ex. 1 (Photos 12 and 13 - Body). Investigators also found a hammer that appeared to be somewhat camouflaged with debris. Ex. 1 (Photos 16-18 - Hammer). The body was clothed with what appeared to be shorts, a t-shirt, and running shoes. There was no identification, but police identified an abandoned car in the parking lot and eventually identified the victim as Mr. Fay. Ex. 1 (Photos 14 - Jack Fay).
Exhibit 1 is a Compact Disc containing numerous documents. One folder is labeled "Photos." Where appropriate, the Court will reference the file name for the item.
Investigators learned that Mr. Fay ran in City Park every day. He was a sixty-six-year-old retired postal worker, a Vietnam Veteran, and a recipient of a Purple Heart. He was divorced and a father of four adult children.
The Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy on May 20, 2013. Ex. 5. The cause of death was determined to be sharp blunt force injuries. The manner of death was classified as homicide. Id. at 7. The conclusion was supported by extensive findings of stab wounds and sharp force injuries to Mr. Fay's body. Of particular note was an extensive gash on the right side of Mr. Fay's neck, from approximately the ear lobe to the center of his neck, which at a certain point was about two and one-half inches wide and which perforated his carotid artery and was most certainly fatal. Id. at 2; Ex. 1 (Photos 22- Autopsy). See also Photos 23-30 (Photos of extensive injuries to Mr. Fay's head, left arm, hands, and thumb).
Although the body was found on May 18, investigators were able to develop a timeline to determine that Mr. Fay was killed on May 17, 2013, in the early morning. On that day, Warwick Police Department received a 911 call at approximately 4:40 a.m. Ex. 3. The call was placed by a woman who related that her sister, Anne Iacampo, was taking a morning walk when at approximately 4:23 a.m. she heard a male voice near the ball fields yelling for help. She was concerned because there were a couple of gentlemen that she knew who walked and ran (Mr. Fay) the path around that time. Anne Iacampo called her sister Linda, and it was Linda who called 911.
Warwick police officer Al Marano responded to the park but was not able to find any sign or evidence of distress. He did make note of a Dodge Neon in the parking lot but noted that the hood of the car was cold. The Neon was later linked to Mr. Fay. That same morning, another officer also encountered a gentleman named William Hazelwood. At the time, Mr. Hazelwood indicated that he did not hear anything. Mr. Hazelwood was subsequently interviewed on May 23, 2013, after the discovery of Mr. Fay's body. Mr. Hazelwood stated that he had known Mr. Fay for about twenty years as a result of interacting with him at the park. There was apparently a group of early morning risers, Mr. Fay, Mr. Hazelwood and the Iacampo sisters, who would regularly see each other at the park. Mr. Hazelwood would walk the park while Mr. Fay ran his two laps. They would cross paths twice as a result.
Mr. Hazelwood recounted that on the morning of May 17 he only saw Mr. Fay once. Although he did not hear anything, he did say that as he was walking around the path in the direction of Park Elementary School, he saw a person in dark clothing approximately 100 to 150 feet away. As he saw the person, the person quickly turned around and ran from Mr. Hazelwood. This was about five minutes before Mr. Hazelwood saw the police officer who responded to the 911 call. Years later it was learned that Defendant had parked in the parking lot to the Park Elementary School, which is adjacent to City Park. The parking lot connects to the walking path through a smaller path and appears to be where Mr. Hazelwood saw the dark figure scamper. See Ex. 3. In addition, on the day that investigators found Mr. Fay's body, they also found a knife. The knife was located near where Mr. Hazelwood saw the dark silhouette figure.
Detective Williams submitted swab samples from the blood stains on the barrel to the R.I. Department of Health for DNA profiling. Ex. 6, at 4. The result was a single source DNA from the suspect. The profile was run through CODIS and compared to hundreds of swabs that investigators obtained from persons of interest. For years they were unsuccessful in obtaining a match. The investigation continued until a break finally presented in 2018.
In 2018, investigators partnered with Identifiers International. Identifiers International is a nonprofit organization that helps identify missing persons as well as assists law enforcement by attempting to match known DNA samples to genetic and genealogical databases. Ex. 7. These databases are much larger than CODIS, which is primarily populated only by DNA of individuals who have come into contact with the criminal justice system. Id. Identifiers International performed y-sequencing of the DNA to examine the paternal side of the suspect. On February 9, 2019, Identifiers International reported that it had identified Defendant as the killer of Mr. Fay. Id.
Investigators learned that Defendant had previously lived in Warwick and had been known to frequent City Park in 2013. He was homeless at the time of the murder. His mother had reported him missing ten days before the murder. In addition, they obtained a report from TF Green Airport that indicated that Defendant was identified on May 19,2013, two days after the murder, as acting suspiciously, walking back and forth between TSA checkpoints at the airport. Exs. 14, 15. TSA was aware that he had been reported missing. However, he was allowed to board a flight to Dulles International Airport. His eventual destination was Pakistan. He had also purchased and cancelled another flight to the Middle East days before the murder. Ex. 13.
In addition, they learned that Defendant's car was reported abandoned in a Dunkin Donuts parking lot about one-half mile from the airport on May 24, 2013. On June 4, 2013, Defendant even reported to the Warwick Police Department to claim that numerous items, including a laptop and a sword, had been stolen from his car which had been left at the Dunkin Donuts.
As a result, Warwick Police Department obtained a search warrant for Defendant to obtain a buccal swab (for a DNA profile) and his fingerprints. They served the warrant on Defendant at his apartment in Pawtucket on February 5, 2019. Defendant traveled to the police department with the officers. He was cooperative and diligently waited for the result of the DNA analysis. It was a match for the blood obtained from the barrel. Ex. 8. Investigators also obtained a palm print from Defendant. The FBI examined it and determined that it matched a palm print also obtained from the barrel. Ex. 9.
Further investigation revealed that Defendant had bought the hammer used in the attack on Mr. Fay at a Walmart in Newport using a Bank of America card, on March 14, 2013. Ex. 10. He modified the hammer by sanding it down and modifying its grip to make it look like a medieval weapon prior to its use on May 17. Bank records also revealed that he bought a knife at the Walmart on Bald Hill Road in Warwick on May 16, the day before the murder. Ex. 10.
Investigators also obtained Defendant's cell phone records. A subsequent analysis showed his cell phone "pinging" at a cell tower at Bishop Hendricken High School on May 16, 2013, at 8:22 p.m., the night before the murder, and at Wildes Corner, which is less than one mile from City Park, at 11:58 p.m. that same night. Ex. 12.
On May 14, 2013, three days prior to the murder, Defendant purchased a one-way airfare from Providence to Tehran, Iran, which was set to depart on May 18,2013. Ex. 13. That flight was cancelled. He next booked a flight from Providence to Pakistan, which was purchased on May 16 and set to depart on May 19, 2013. Id. As discussed supra, he did board a flight from Providence to Washington Dulles on May 19, with a final destination of Pakistan. Exs. 14-16. However, he was not allowed to continue to Pakistan because he did not have the appropriate visa. He was also questioned by the TSA in Washington but not detained.
There is no doubt, and no objection by Defendant, that the evidence supports a finding that the Defendant is guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the murder, in the first degree, of Mr. Fay on May 17, 2013, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1. The Defendant, with malice aforethought, acted willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with premeditation in causing the death of Mr. Fay. Id. The State has satisfied its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt during its case in chief. Accordingly, this Court will next turn to the issue of insanity to determine whether Defendant should be held criminally responsible for the crime.
II.
The Law of Criminal Responsibility
The current formulation of the law which is commonly referred to as the insanity defense was first addressed by the R.I. Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254, 399 A.2d 469 (1979). The Court affirmed the use of the Model Penal Code (MPC) formulation of the insanity defense and stated:
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, his capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be held responsible.
"The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct." Johnson, 121 R.I. at 267, 399 A.2d at 476.
Until 1979, Rhode Island favored the M'Naghten standard for determining criminal responsibility. Id. at 259, 399 A.2d at 472. The M'Naghten standard provided:
"To establish a defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong." Id. at 259-60, 399 A.2d at 472.
The Supreme Court in Johnson gave the Model Penal Code formulation preference because it "clearly delegates the issue of criminal responsibility to the jury" and ensures that the jury is left with the ultimate decision. See id. at 267-68, 399 A.2d at 476. Further, the Court stated that the Model Penal Code formulation emphasized "that the degree of 'substantial' impairment is . . . a legal rather than a medical question" and that "incapacity less than total is sufficient." Id. at 268, 399 A.2d at 477. In essence, the Model Penal Code formulation allows psychiatrists to '"provide grist for the legal mill"' by providing data as a foundation for the judgment, leaving '"society as a whole, represented by judge or jury"' ultimately responsible for determining whether a defendant should be held accountable. See State v. Carpio, 43 A.3d 1, 11 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Johnson, 121 R.I. at 266-67, 399 A.2d at 476).
The formulation adopted in Johnson recognizes that punishing those who lack the substantial capacity to control their actions does not serve any '"of the three asserted purposes of the criminal law[;] rehabilitation, deterrence and retribution[.]"' Johnson, 121 R.I. at 256, 399 A.2d at 471 (quoting United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966)). That is because those who lack this "substantial capacity" are incapable of being deterred and that their punishment cannot serve as a deterrent to others. See id.
In a criminal trial, the State has the burden to prove all the elements of charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt; however, it is the defendant, when raising the insanity defense, who has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that his insanity or diminished capacity 'prevented him from forming the required intent and malice essential for conviction on the [counts charged]."' Carpio, 43 A.3d at 9 (quoting State v. Barrett, 768 A.2d 929, 947 (R.I. 2001)). Additionally, the defendant not only "must prove that he 'suffered from this defect at the time of the offense,' but also that he suffered from this defect to such a degree that he cannot 'justly be held responsible' for the crime." State v. Collazo, 967 A.2d 1106, 1111 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. Gardner, 616 A.2d 1124, 1128-29 (R.I. 1992)). However, "'[t]he fact that a defendant engaged in unusual behavior or made bizarre or delusional statements does not compel a finding of insanity, and a defendant may suffer from a mental illness without being legally insane.'" Id. (quoting Barrett, 768 A.2d at 938).
Accordingly, Defendant must prove to this Court that: (1) he suffered from a mental disease or defect when he committed the offenses alleged; (2) such a mental disability resulted in a substantial impairment of his capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law; and (3) there existed a sufficient relationship between that mental disability and the criminal conduct such that he cannot justly be held responsible for his actions. See Carpio, 43 A.3d at 12 n.10.
'"In determining the issue of responsibility, the jury has two important tasks. First, it must measure the extent to which the defendant's mental and emotional processes were impaired at the time of the unlawful conduct. The answer to that inquiry is a difficult and elusive one, but no more so than numerous other facts that a jury must find in a criminal trial. Second, the jury must assess that impairment in light of community standards of blameworthiness. The jury's unique qualifications for making that determination justify our unusual deference to the jury's resolution of the issue of responsibility.'" Id. at 11-12 (quoting Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1110) (emphasis in original).
Because Defendant has waived his right to a jury trial in the case at bar, it is for the Court to represent '"society as a whole'" and decide whether Defendant should not be held criminally accountable for his actions. See Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1111-12 (quoting Gardner, 616 A.2d at 1127). In so doing, this Court will consider the expert testimony, "as well as the defendant's actions preceding, during, and after the crime." Id. at 1111 (citing Barrett, 768 A.2d at 936-37).
III
Expert Medical Testimony
The Court heard testimony from two expert witnesses-Dr. Recupero and Dr. Matkovic. Both were qualified by the Court as experts in the field of Forensic Psychiatry. Dr. Recupero was called by the Defendant and Dr. Matkovic was called by the State. Both doctors had extensive credentials and experience in forensic psychiatry. Both provided thoughtful opinions that negated Defendant's criminal responsibility, although upon slightly different bases. It is up to this Court to determine the weight it accords their testimony based upon all of the evidence enlightened, though not controlled by, both opinions. See Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1110.
A. Dr. Recupero 1. Personal and Mental Health History
Dr. Recupero's report documents an extensive mental health history as well as investigatory materials related to the murder. Ex. 18, at 1, 2. Defendant was born in 1985. His parents divorced when he was eight or nine years old. He was an honors student in high school and obtained a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University of R.I. (URI) in 2018. He also attended Bryant University and R.I. College prior to his graduation from URI. Id. at 26. He was mostly homeless during much of his adulthood due to his mental health issues and resulting conflicts with family members. Id.
Although there may have been some earlier indicators, his first exposure to extensive psychiatric evaluation was in 2009 shortly after completing his studies at URI. In May of 2009, Defendant was taken to Kent Hospital after exhibiting "paranoia, odd behavior and [making] comments about participating in mass suicide to see what the afterlife was like." Id. at 5. He was transferred from Kent on an emergency certification to the Kent Unit at Butler Hospital. Defendant was treated "on an inpatient basis at Butler Hospital from May 18 to 27, 2009, with symptoms similar to-but less severe than-those he would later present in 2014. On admission, his diagnosis was Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified." Id. at 6. He was discharged on May 27, 2009, with a diagnosis of "Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified." Id. He declined medications and follow-up care after discharge from Butler because he "didn't think anything was wrong," although outpatient treatment had been recommended. Id.
Dr. Recupero documented a subsequent uneven employment history, such as leaving a job at Whole Foods in 2012 due to what he referred to as "a mental situation." Id. at 7. He apparently believed that people around him were capable of "warp[ing] into vampires" and cited this as the reason he immediately quit the job. At some point, he wrote a letter indicating that he was not happy with work and chose to leave." Id. He was also acting erratically with his family and experiencing periods of homelessness through the date of the attack.
Dr. Recupero also documented the erratic travel plans noted supra. He told Dr. Recupero that he had intended to travel to Pakistan "for religious purposes." Id. at 8. He also felt that "people hated [him] like they hate Muslims." He chose Pakistan because it was near India which is a "very spiritual country." Ex. 18, at 29, 30.
According to his statement to Dr. Recupero, Defendant told her that after the murder, he travelled to Arizona and Los Angeles, California in August and September of 2013. He did not stay in Los Angeles long because his "mind was not stable enough" and he didn't feel safe in any place. Id. at 10.
On January 22, 2014, approximately eight months after the murder, Defendant admitted himself to Kent Hospital. He did so after first visiting the Providence Center and then being referred to Kent. At Kent, he reported having been "scared and overwhelmed" and "had not slept in days." Id. at 11. He sought treatment "for increasing irritability, auditory hallucinations (hearing voices), fears of people reading his mind, difficulty sleeping, concern that he would act out violently towards others, and sensitivity to noise." Id. Hospital records state the following:
"He said that he had not done anything violent, but he was concerned because he had lost control of his temper, and that this would lead him to harm someone. He[said] that these problems had been going on for over a year, and that they were becoming increasingly worse, to the point where it was difficult for him to tolerate it." Id.
His admitting diagnosis was schizophrenia/psychosis, and a note records the following:
"The patient is a 28 years old Male who presents with a complaint of psychiatric problem and Patient reports he is here for 'mental issues,' patient reports increasing irritability, feels like [he] is going to snap and is afraid that he might hurt himself or someone else. Patient reports he feels like he is 'too connected' like he is 'taking in too much energy.' Increasing thoughts, 'kind of like voices, but not, patient reports he hasn't been able to get in to see psychiatrist. The course is increasing. Hallucinations: auditory, substance(s) ingested: Positive alcohol use. Suicidal ideation-risk: social isolation. Other psychiatric symptoms: depression, delusions and abnormal behavior. There are exacerbating factors including family problems, financial problems, housing problems and stress. Prior psychiatric symptoms: hallucinations. Prior psychiatric treatment: counseling. Eligibility for legal hold: harmful to self and harmful to others." Id.
Defendant was discharged from Kent Hospital on January 31, 2014. His diagnosis was schizophrenia, paranoid type, chronic with acute exacerbation. Id. at 12. He was prescribed medication and to follow up with The Providence Center for outpatient mental health treatment. Id. It appears that he had been relatively compliant with his treatment after his discharge and even obtained housing such as the apartment at which he was residing on the day of his arrest.
His mental condition shortly after his arrest in 2019 was described as follows.
"Originally, he had difficulty distinguishing dreams from reality, thought that others could read and control him, and experienced 'intrusive thoughts' coming from the minds of others that would 'put me down.' He felt a strong 'mental connection' to others. He was very distressed by his symptoms, and at their peak, they caused him to be unable to sleep or be around other people. Currently his symptoms are much better controlled. Now, he has some paranoid thinking that others are talking to him or about him, explaining, 'when people are talking, it seems like they're talking to me, but they are also talking to me in a way. It's tough to describe' He still worries that people can read his mind. He does not experience intrusive thoughts or auditory hallucinations and feels that his symptoms do not hold him back from his day-to-day activities." Ex. 16 (Competency to Stand Trial Evaluation, Feb. 2019).
2. Defendant's Version of the Murder
Dr. Recupero interviewed Defendant about the murder. She summarized the interview as follows. See Ex. 18, at 29, 30. Around the time of the events charged, Defendant believed that somebody was going to be shooting at him. He believed that people were going to hunt him down and "kill [him] with energy." He also believed that people would turn into vampires when his fear level was high. At that time, he suffered from intrusive thoughts that were "offensive toward me." When he saw new people, he was able to see energy on the surface of them "like on a film screen." He believed that they knew him and were able to read his mind. It seemed to him "more like broadcasting of his thoughts. He was not sure whether or not he was hallucinating these people."
The night of May 16 into May 17, he spent all night in the park. He did not sleep because "people kept messing with his mind." He said that he walked around the track. He was sitting in the park very early in the morning and around sunrise he saw a man jogging. This was the first person he saw that day. He thought that the man was trying to build up his energy and that someone was going to shoot him. "I went after him believing that it was the end for me and that I would live at most a few days." He thought that if he didn't act on this energy thing that day, he would be dead very soon. He therefore hit the man in the head with a hammer and stabbed him in the throat. He expected to die and was surprised that he did not turn into a monster.
Defendant stated that, "[l]ooking back on the events . . . he believed he knew it was illegal but not bad" to kill the jogger . . . "he did not like it but he had to do it in order to save himself." Ex. 18, at 30 (emphasis added). It "disgusted" him but he felt that he had "reached the end of the line." Id.
About the camouflage of the body, he claimed that after the jogger fell, he "improvised because I did not know what I was doing." He believed that he had to take some steps in case the jogger woke up. He therefore placed him into a trash can and then moved him into the woods. He stated that he tasted the blood on the knife in order to see what vampires do. He looked around and at first it "seemed like in a horror movie." Id.
3. Dr. Recupero's Diagnosis
Dr. Recupero diagnosed Defendant with Schizoaffective Disorder, Manic Type in partial remission. Id. at 31. Specifically, Dr. Recupero opined that:
It is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that at all times relevant to the charges, Mr. Soares was suffering from a severe mental disorder, namely, Schizoaffective Disorder. He "was suffering from a severe, recurrent mental illness, that is, [Schizoaffective Disorder]. As a consequence of said illness, his thought process was so impaired that he did not appreciate the nature or the wrongfulness of his conduct as charged. He was so impaired by his serious mental illness that he lacked the ability to control his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, his impairment was not impacted by his substance use, as the delusions and other symptoms were present both before and after the events in the context of sustained abstinence. He has a long, documented history of significant mental illness with psychosis. He has been diagnosed with several different diagnoses, as his presentation is complex. In addition, as his disorder is cyclical in nature, there are times of [stable mood] as well as severe [depression and mania] . . . The extent and severity of his symptoms were such that he could not control his behavior or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. As a result of this mental illness, [he] was not sufficiently aware of where he was or what he was doing, in that he believed he was going to be shot and that the world was going to end unless he acted to kill his victim. The intensity of his illness and loss of contact with reality made him unable to appreciate the nature or the wrongfulness of any of his actions as charged." Id. at 38.
Dr. Recupero was asked on cross-examination about Defendant's purchase of the hammer and knife. She opined that the items were not purchased because he was planning an attack but were a defensive response to his hallucinations. She did agree that it was Defendant's intent to attack the first person he saw that night. She also offered that Defendant, according to himself, did not cover up Mr. Fay's body to conceal his crime. Rather, he claimed that he did so to protect himself from the irrational threat he perceived from Mr. Fay.
B. Dr. Matkovic:
1. Personal and Mental Health History
Dr. Matkovic reviewed essentially the same extensive medical history and case materials as Dr. Recupero. Ex. 19, at 2, 3. He also noted the admission to Kent Hospital in January of 2014 during which Defendant stated "[h]e was concerned that his temper would lead him to harm someone." Id. at 12.
2. Defendant's Version of the Murder
Like Dr. Recupero, Dr. Matkovic relied on Defendant for a description of events surrounding the murder. Trial Transcript at 10, Jan. 6, 2023 (Tr.); Ex. 19, at 20, 21. According to Defendant, he did not sleep at the park, but he went there because he knew the park and felt safe there. He stated:
"I wanted to defend myself but did not want to go into a group of people during the daytime, I felt safer at the park, less people. I went there at night, I was intent to attack the first person I saw; people I didn't know were building up that energy, I went there at 8PM, I didn't sleep. Up all night but I didn't see anyone. Morning rolled around then the victim appeared, thought he was running to shoot me, he was part of the scheme .... I was armed, I had a hammer and a knife . . . [Mr. Fay] ran, so I turned toward him and ran at him, and attacked him." Ex. 20, at 20.
Dr Matkovic asked the Defendant whether he had any alternatives to his actions, and he stated, "I think had I known better about meds and mental health I might have done that instead." Id. He was "having intrusive thoughts, the energy of the firearm, I wasn't able to think clearly." Mr. Fay was the first person that he saw, in the "predawn . . I was walking, and I saw him jogging. He ran by, and I turned toward him." After Mr. Fay ran past him, he followed, and "hit him with the hammer, then stabbed him in his neck, he screamed, for someone named Billy, and he said, 'who the hell are you." Id.
"I eventually did stop, I thought he was unconscious, I didn't think he was dead, I was trying to defend myself from the energy. I thought he might get up, I saw a trash barrel, moved it over, so that he wouldn't follow me, and I didn't want to be pursued if someone saw him . . . I left my hammer there, his keys were in my hand, I left the park . . . I put Mr. Fay in a trash barrel to disorient him and so that people wouldn't see him and come after me. People would probably take him out of the barrel, one situation could be arresting me the other would be to attack me . . . when I attacked him, I wasn't sure if he would turn into a monster or something along those lines, I was telling you earlier about the vampires, what someone's true nature really is; I didn't want to go attack him, it was reluctant. I felt backed into a corner and did not have any other options." Id. at 20-21.
Dr. Matkovic noted that "Mr. Soares was careful to clarify that although he knew the action he had taken was "legally" wrong, he did not believe that it was "morally" wrong." Specifically, he offered that, "I knew it was illegal, but I didn't feel it was morally improper; I felt I had the right to defend myself in that way." Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
Defendant admitted that he knew that his fingerprints were on the barrel. Therefore, he took the keys so it wouldn't be easy to find him. He eventually threw them away somewhere else. He did not think of going to the police because "[a]t that time, I didn't care too much if the police got me, my will to live was low. I did not think to go to the police, I thought the police were part of it too, they were part of the ones that wanted to hunt me down." Id. at 21.
He was asked what he would have done had there been a police officer at the park the morning of the crime, and he stated, "I probably would have attacked a police officer too, but it's hard to say because he [the police officer] would have been armed. I was partially expecting to be killed. I went to the park with the intention of stopping the energy." Id.
Defendant stated that he went to Turkey after the murder was committed but was trying to go to Pakistan. He stated, "I felt like people were trying to kill me with a handgun, it seemed like everyone I ran into had an energy to them and the energy would manifest into a handgun. The fear grew so much that I lashed out, I didn't think I was going to live for another two days, like the gun was going to be manifested, I had no choice, I didn't know if the plane trip was going to do anything about it. I was going to fight for my life." Id. at 20. After being denied travel to Pakistan he stayed in Washington, D.C., for a week, slept in a recycling bin, and then took a train back to Rhode Island.
The exhibits at trial document an attempt to travel to Pakistan. It is unclear to the Court whether Defendant did actually travel to Turkey.
He stated that, "when I got back, I heard the FBI was looking for me, so I contacted them, but it was because I tried to go to Pakistan." Id. at 21. Someone had stolen his truck, so he went to the Warwick Police Department and left a report, even though he felt that the police were "connected" to the people that wanted to harm him. Because of this, he did not report the murder he had committed in the park.
About his arrest in 2019, he stated, "I knew what was going on, I believed it was because of the incident. I was in treatment at the time. After the incident occurred, I felt eaten away a little bit, worried about the police, because I knew I left fingerprints, blood, genealogy. I was worried continuously, but I wasn't going to run away. I believed that the police knew it was me the whole time, that they were waiting for a specific moment to take me in. I didn't know how much time I would remain inside, so I wrote [a] book in order to get it done before I was locked up. I thought the police were in on it." Id. at 22.
3. Dr. Matkovic's Diagnosis
Dr. Matkovic agreed in part with Dr. Recupero. Dr. Recupero diagnosed Defendant with schizoaffective disorder along with a bipolar disorder, while Dr. Matkovic diagnosed him with schizophrenia. Tr. at 26. It is unclear whether the distinction is significant to the present analysis although Dr. Matkovic did explain that the diagnosis provided by Dr. Recupero is "more cyclical in nature." Id. He found, contrary to Dr. Recupero, that Defendant could appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. However, he agreed with Dr. Recupero that Defendant could not conform his conduct to the law. Specifically, he stated:
"It is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, regarding the charges against the defendant stemming from the event on May 17, 2013, that the defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect he was not able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." Ex. 19, at 2.
Dr. Matkovic explained that Defendant's illness is characterized by hallucinations, delusions, and disorganized thoughts and behavior. His behavior demonstrated that he was knowledgeable about the wrongfulness of the act, but due to delusions and hallucinations, he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Ex. 19, at 27.
"At the time of the crime, objective sources of information provide a description of an individual suffering for years with untreated schizophrenia. He was homeless, despite having a family, a college degree, and a work history from the age of fourteen. He loitered at the library, disheveled and malodorous. He suffered from persecutory delusions as well as the phenomena of "thought broadcasting," whereby others can read and know your thoughts. He believed that other people could become "vampires" and that they were "building up energy" to hurt him. His attempt to flee the country was thwarted by his lack of preparation (believing needed documents would "manifest") and the odd and disorganized behavior that brought attention from authorities. The descriptions of symptoms and behavior he suffered before and after have been consistent across multiple interviews and from varied outside observations." Id. at 28.
At trial, Dr. Matkovic appeared to the Court to have struggled with the question of Defendant's insanity defense to a greater extent than Dr. Recupero. For instance, he explained that he did consider the fact that Defendant had used his mental illness to explain his crime. He explained that, "[t]his is not an unreasonable assumption, given his intelligence, the somewhat dramatic description of the delusions he asserts (people turning into vampires, "warping" reality), the fact that he has experienced actual symptoms for him to draw from and the amount of time lapsed from the crime to his arrest (during which he has been able to consider his illness and actions and how they might fit an insanity defense)." Ex. 19, at 32-33.
Dr. Recupero was much more absolute in her opinions and defense of them on cross-examination than one would expect was warranted in light of the significant contradictory evidence in this case.
In discussing his conclusions, Dr. Matkovic stated the following:
"What I'm talking about here is that due to his delusion that he was being persecuted and was going to be killed, that he was compelled to commit an act in order to save himself. In other words, that psychotic driving belief made him unable to conform his behavior to the law." Tr. at 32.
Although he was challenged by this case, Dr. Matkovic stated that he was comfortable with his diagnosis "to a degree of medical certainty." Id. at 43. However, he agreed that certain statements by Defendant were concerning.
Dr. Matkovic was "troubled" that after his hospitalization in 2014 and after he "was restored to a higher level of functioning through psychiatric treatment," Defendant did not turn himself in until he was arrested. He explained as follows:
"Because if he were to be truly not guilty by reason of insanity, and, of course, he didn't know whether he would be or not, but presuming innocence for this crime through that rationale, I would hope that someone would take accountability at that point for what they had done." Id. at 33.
In sum, even after being treated, he never accepted responsibility for his crime. Tr. at 34. Dr. Matkovic explained that Defendant could be a person who could commit this crime again and that this was "an extremely challenging" case for him. Id. at 35. Dr. Matkovic testified, in response to certain conflicting statements of the Defendant, that:
Although not relevant for this analysis, Dr. Matkovic was so concerned about this Defendant that he volunteered that his recommendation would be for the Defendant to reside in a psychiatric hospital for the remainder of his life. Tr. at 38.
"[I]t could be looked at in a couple of different ways, that he was fabricating facts at that time, or one thing that is common for people with schizophrenia is that they don't have a good recollection of their thought processes at the time because they are psychotic and their thoughts are disorganized, so he may have remembered things differently or remembered something else across the interviews. I felt that overall the interviews were fairly consistent. I was, frankly, shocked by his candor when he told me that he had intended to go there to hurt somebody. If it was someone that were malingering, I would not expect that statement to come out of their mouth. There's quite a few other things that he could have said to explain why he went to the park at that time." Id. at 40-41. See also Ex 19, at 3233.
Again, Dr. Matkovic expressed concern about Defendant's apparent knowledge of the legal concept of insanity, "legally wrong but not morally." When he was asked whether he was concerned that Defendant was trying to mislead him, he stated:
"What I had mentioned before about Mr. Soares coming out leading with the concept of being legally versus morally wrong before I -you know, cause I didn't bring that concept up, I had found that to be unusual for him to understand that that might be part of what was being considered for the standard." Id. at 48.
Dr. Matkovic did agree that it was "possible" "that whatever he was experiencing in 2014 or forward in terms of delusions .. that basically he was conflating them or using later delusions to explain his conduct in 2013." Tr. at 60. There is no way to rule that out. Id.
He clarified about the possibility that Defendant might be conflating his memories. He stated:
"Well, he does appear to suffer from a genuine mental illness, so I wouldn't say necessarily that that's malingering outright, but it could be cherry picking symptoms that he's experienced over time. I think the evidence that we have about his functioning in the years, the years around the crime, because it's spotty around that exact time, but leading up to it, do show someone who is suffering from delusions, from schizophrenia. And having been untreated during that time, it doesn't go away." Tr. at 61.
He agreed that there simply is no objective evidence to test his story. Tr. at 61-62.
IV
Discussion
Defendant must prove to this Court that: (1) he suffered from a mental disease or defect when he committed the offenses alleged; (2) such a mental disability resulted in a substantial impairment of his capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law; and (3) there existed a sufficient relationship between that mental disability and the criminal conduct such that he cannot justly be held responsible for his actions. See Carpio, 43 A.3d at 12 n.10.
A. Defendant Suffered from a Mental Disease or Defect at the Time of the Offense
There is no dispute that Defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect. The well documented reports of both Dr. Recupero and Dr. Matkovic certainly support such a conclusion. Dr. Recupero diagnosed Defendant with schizoaffective disorder along with a bipolar disorder while Dr. Matkovic diagnosed him with schizophrenia. Tr. at 26. More challenging, certainly, is the remainder of the analysis.
B. Wrongfulness and Conformity of Conduct
Dr. Recupero opined that Defendant did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. "As a consequence of said illness, his thought process was so impaired that he did not appreciate the nature or the wrongfulness of his conduct as charged." Ex. 18, at 38. She arrived at her opinion while acknowledging that, "[l]ooking back on the events . . . he believed he knew it was illegal but not bad" to kill the jogger . . . "he did not like it but he had to do it in order to save himself." Ex. 18, at 30 (emphasis added). Dr. Matkovic disagreed. It appears that Dr. Matkovic was persuaded toward a different conclusion in part because of Defendant's statement that, "I knew it was illegal, but I didn't feel it was morally improper; I felt I had the right to defend myself in that way." Ex. 19, at 21.
Dr. Matkovic was appropriately concerned about Defendant's apparent grasp of the legal standard by which he would be judged. That recognition, coupled with the overwhelming evidence of Defendant's premeditation and subsequent attempts to conceal his crime, certainly bolster Dr. Matkovic's reasoning.
Such evidence is significant. Days before the murder, Defendant purchased a hammer and modified it prior to using it to bludgeon Mr. Fay. He also purchased a knife which he used to almost decapitate his victim. Again, days before the murder, he purchased a ticket to fly to Pakistan (originally to Iran), scheduled for two days after the murder. He attempted to flee the country after the murder, only to be turned back at Dulles Airport.
What has been termed by the experts as Defendant's erratic behavior could undermine a finding that Defendant actually expected to flee the country. The fact is that he did attempt to, even if he was ill prepared without a visa. He was also not inexperienced in international travel. The TSA documents that relate to his failed attempt to flee to Pakistan in 2014 also document the fact that Defendant travelled to Germany the prior year, in 2012, as well as Aruba in 2006. Ex. 16, at. 2, 4.
He went to City Park with the intention of killing someone and killed the first person he encountered. According to his statement to Dr. Matkovic, Mr. Fay passed him, but Defendant nonetheless attacked him from behind. He then camouflaged the body, took Mr. Fay's keys, worried about his fingerprints being on the barrel, and discarded his weapons. When he saw Mr. Hazelwood, he scampered away. And he scampered to a parking lot at the school adjacent to the park which it can be inferred he picked for its detachment from the park.
In addition, at trial there was much made of the e-mails that Defendant drafted after the murder concerning his failed travel plans. Dr. Recupero dismissed some of Defendant's e-mails as a "word salad." Although they are not nefarious, they are revealing.
As discussed supra, Defendant had booked two trips out of the country just prior to the murder. One trip, to Iran, was booked on May 14, 2013, for travel commencing on May 19, 2013, one day after the murder. Ex. 13. The second trip, to Pakistan, which Defendant would have completed had he not been denied boarding at Dulles Airport, was purchased on May 16, 2013, two days before the murder, and only one day before he went to City Park on the evening of May 17. Id. Travel was scheduled for and attempted on May 19. Id.
Although Defendant claims to have grasped the moral quandary of killing Mr. Fay, he indicated no hesitation when trying to get a refund for his failed flight. He submitted the following e-mail to a travel agency on May 23,2013, five days after the murder:
"The trip was postponed. I needed additional documentation to be able to travel there. Upon going to check at the ticket for Quatar airline, the guy denied me access to the plane, however, promised the flight tickets were still valid. I argued with him however he stated the tickets would simply have to be rescheduled and were still valid. I have been unable to contact you however I am seeking for those tickets to be redeemed regarding their currency value. I was transported to Washington Dalles [sic], however the further flights were not allowed. Please grant me assistance in this situation. Michael." Ex. 17.
A word salad it is not. He continued to contact the airline at least until August 21, 2013, seeking a refund. Id. He also sent other routine e-mails to the airline company to retrieve his luggage and provided his contact information. Id. In addition, he appears to have applied for a job although it is unclear what his duties would be. Id.
He also submitted the following to the Information Desk e-mail at TF Green Airport. "Hi, I was on a flight earlier this week from TF Green airport and I was checked upon going through security. The girls there were sifting through my wallet while I have a flashdrive I kept in my wallet. Upon further checking after the flight, I did not see the flashdrive present, thus I was pondering if such was put in the lost and found or similar." Ex. 17.
The Court recognizes that both experts offered explanations for Defendant's conduct that are premised upon manifestations of his disease and indicated that his baseline intelligence compensated at times for his deficiencies. For instance, he claimed to have purchased the hammer and knife to protect himself because of his delusions. He covered up Mr. Fay's body because of an irrational fear that he was still at risk. He purchased international travel for spiritual reasons, even though he did so just days before going to City Park to kill someone and then attempted to actually board a flight to the Middle East. However, his own acknowledgment of the illegality of his conduct cannot overcome his self-serving, legally informed justification that it was "not morally wrong" or "not bad." It is clear to the Court that, as Dr. Matkovic concluded, Defendant understood the wrongfulness of his conduct.
More problematic is whether Defendant could conform his conduct. Both experts conclude that he could not. At this stage, it is critical to restate that it is Defendant's burden to prove this element by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant argues, to some persuasive effect, that the Court should recognize and follow the conclusions of the two experts, and only the two experts, who testified at trial. However, it is for the Court to consider not only the expert testimony, "[but also] the defendant's actions preceding, during, and after the crime." Collazzo, 967 A.2d at 1111 (citing Barrett, 768 A.2d at 936-37).
The Court will not take issue with the doctors' medical opinions, which were based on their considerable experience and background. However, they are, by definition, clinical in nature and are not based on the evidentiary burden that Defendant must overcome. Defendant's own actions undermine his argument.
Specifically, the Court refers not only to evidence of specific intent, planning, and concealment, but also to Defendant's admission to Kent Hospital in 2014 because he claimed that he was concerned that he could harm himself or others. Upon his admission, he stated the following:
"He said that he had not done anything violent, but he was concerned because he had lost control of his temper, and that this would lead him to harm someone. He[said] that these problems had been going on for over a year, and that they were becoming increasingly worse, to the point where it was difficult for him to tolerate it." Ex. 18, at 11 (emphasis added).
Eight months after killing Mr. Fay, Defendant checked himself into a hospital professing his concern about harming others and misled or lied to his health care providers because he clearly had done something violent. It is noteworthy that Dr. Matkovic expressed some concern that Defendant had never reported his crime. Tr. at 33. Not only did he not report it, he affirmatively denied it.
At trial, the Court asked Dr. Matkovic if he was concerned that Defendant may have conflated (or fabricated) his symptoms that he claimed in 2014 by relating them back to the events of 2013. Dr. Matkovic agreed that it was "possible" "that whatever he was experiencing in 2014 or forward in terms of delusions .. that basically he was conflating them or using later delusions to explain his conduct in 2013." Tr. at 60. He agreed that there is no way to rule that out. Id. Dr. Matkovic clarified that Defendant "does appear to suffer from a genuine mental illness, so I wouldn't say necessarily that that's malingering outright, but it could be cherry picking symptoms that he's experienced over time." Id. at 61.
Both doctors also expressed some level of confidence in their opinions based upon what they perceived to be his level of cooperation and apparent candor. For instance, Dr. Matkovic was impressed by how forthcoming Defendant was about his intentions on May 17. The Court is not so persuaded.
One may ask how someone could commit such a brazen crime if not for some mental defect. Indeed, it is troubling but a motive for a crime is not always present. Clearly, the Defendant suffers from a significant mental illness, and the Court will not minimize it. However, as Dr. Matkovic agreed, not all individuals with such significant mental health issues fail to control their violent impulses even if they present with them.
The only objective evidence available to the Court is that in 2014 Defendant was arguably able to control such impulses and lied about whether he had acted upon them. The experts agree that Defendant could not control his behavior. However, other than his own belated statements, there is no contemporaneous objective evidence to support that finding and there is subsequent evidence to contradict it, specifically his admission to Kent. As such, the Court finds that such evidence is not preponderant in Defendant's favor when viewed in light of the considerable evidence of Defendant's intentional acts both prior to and after the murder.
Certainly, one could argue that his admission to Kent supports Defendant's argument. That is part of the issue hovering over this case. Many of the facts can be argued both ways, especially if a defendant has eight years to think about it.
C. The Relationship Between That Mental Disability and the Criminal Conduct
Defendant suffered from delusions. The clinical evidence reviewed by experts supports an on-going battle with delusions that may have been cyclical and affected Defendant in somewhat cyclical or uneven fashion. Whether it was directly related to his criminal conduct is unknown except to the extent he has described it to the doctors.
However, the State does properly focus on the dearth of contemporaneous medical information available for the relevant time frame. There is medical information from 2009, four years before the murder and, admittedly, the more temporally connected admission in 2014. That has not typically been the case in other cases in this jurisdiction when defendants have pressed the "insanity defense."
In Carpio, the issue of defendant's mental impairment was submitted to the jury and rejected. In that case, the defendant was charged with the violent murder of a Providence Police officer while in the custody of Providence Police. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia. The jury was presented with competing expert opinions about defendant's ability to conform his behavior. Carpio, 43 A.3d at 7. The jury had the benefit not only of the contemporaneous evidence of the crime but of expert opinions that were developed within the recent time frame of the events.
In Collazo, the defendant was accused of killing an acquaintance. He was arrested at the scene of the crime and there was testimony about his cool demeanor. He initially provided an alibi but subsequently dramatically changed his story and claimed that he killed the victim because he was "Satan's incarnate" who had raped one of defendant's girlfriends. Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1108. Defendant had a well-documented history of mental health issues and was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and other symptoms. Defendant and the State presented competing expert opinions in that case and the trial court rejected the defendant's insanity defense. The court relied on the expert opinion that rejected defendant's claim because of the deliberateness of his actions and his demeanor which showed that he had carefully orchestrated an ambush of the victim. Id. at 1112 (citing Barrett, 768 A.2d at 934, in which the Court upheld a fact-finders' rejection of the diminished capacity defense based largely upon the methodical manner in which the defendant had cleaned the crime scene and awaited the arrival of the police).
It may be that these cases are distinguishable because they were the subject of competing expert opinions. However, they were also opinions that benefited from the presence of contemporaneous evidence and contemporaneous evaluations. In this case, we have contemporaneous evidence of intent, planning, and concealment of the crime. Due to his success at concealing his crime, however, we have extensively researched retrospective opinions that rely on medical records that do not specifically match the relevant time frame. Dr. Recupero interviewed Defendant on April 14, 2021, almost eight years after the murder. Dr. Matkovic interviewed him twice, on March 21, 2022 and July 15, 2022, nine years after the murder. In addition to the medical records, they rely extensively on Defendant's self-serving statements. The statements, however, reveal that Defendant was fully aware of the illegality of his actions, which he attempts to justify as not "morally" wrong or "bad."
It is for the Court to represent '"society as a whole'" and decide whether Defendant should not be held criminally accountable for his actions. See Collazo, 967 A.2d at 1111-12 (quoting Gardner, 616 A.2d at 1127). Jurors are often advised that it is not the number of witnesses testifying in favor of a particular issue in question, but the confidence that one has in the evidence supporting a particular proposition. Based upon the state of the evidence, the Court cannot find that Defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a relationship between his mental impairment and his crime. He was self-aware enough in 2104 to deny any prior violence and, what has been referred to as his baseline intelligence, appears to have allowed him to grasp the basic concept of the insanity defense and concurrently attempt to absolve himself of the crime. However, the objective evidence undermines his effort. He has not proven that he did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or that he could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
V
Conclusion
For all the forgoing reasons, the Court finds the Defendant GUILTY of the murder, in the first degree, of John Fay on May 17, 2013 in violation of § 11-23-1.